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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the 
context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise 
of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a 
predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental 
perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that 
we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion is our natural and 
default belief for Hume, but causal reasoning reveals it to be false, and the philosophical 
alternative is a confabulation that we cannot permanently believe and is devoid of 
justification. Hume uses the fact that we cannot have a satisfactory account of belief in 
external existence as a sceptical consideration to motivate his wider philosophical scepticism.  
Hume’s response to his predicament about external existence is found in the context 
of his confrontation with other sceptical worries (Treatise 1.4.7 and Enquiry 12), in which 
Hume also reflects generally on the nature and implications of scepticism. I argue that we 
should characterise Hume’s position as residually sceptical. This means that, while Hume 
accepts the unanswerability of some sceptical problems, he denies that it is possible to 
eradicate all belief as a result (and denies that it is practically useful to even try) and instead 
uses sceptical problems as a motivation to adopt a moderately sceptical position. While we 
inevitably return to entertaining the vulgar belief, there is no solution to the sceptical 
predicament; Hume does not endorse the vulgar belief, or the philosophical system, or indeed 
any alternative system of the external world that might extinguish the predicament. Sceptical 
doubt, for Hume, does not derail intellectual pursuits, but rather modifies our attitudes in 
those very pursuits.   
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1. Introduction 
 
“By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive, that the philosophy contained in this 
book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits 
of human understanding.” 
- Hume (Abstract 27; SBN 657) 
 
1.1 The Puzzle of Reading Hume 
1.1.1 Reading Hume on External Objects 
Hume’s philosophy of objects is inextricably tied to his views on philosophical scepticism. In 
the Treatise, Hume’s main discussion of objects is titled “Of scepticism with regard to the 
senses” (T 1.4.2), and the related discussions on substance (T 1.4.3 and T 1.4.5), and on the 
primary/secondary qualities distinction (T 1.4.4) appear in the same Part of the Treatise, 
which is titled “Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy”. Section 12 of Hume’s first 
Enquiry is similarly framed as an essay on scepticism (“Of the Sceptical or Academical 
Philosophy”), and Hume offers there a condensed version of some key arguments from the 
Treatise. 
The opening paragraph of T 1.4.2 is famous, but an interpretive issue already emerges 
from it. Hume identifies his topic as the belief in “body” and he explicitly chooses to inquire 
into the psychological causes of that belief, in direct contrast to questioning its truth or 
falsity: 
 
Nature has not left this to his [the sceptic’s] choice, and has doubtless esteem’d it an 
affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and 
speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of 
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body? but ’tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we 
must take for granted in all our reasonings. 
(T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187. Original emphasis) 
 
This setting aside of concerns with the evaluation or justification of belief is incongruous 
with T 1.4.2 being a discourse on scepticism. Whether Hume is refuting, endorsing, or 
moderating scepticism, that is a philosophical notion that pertains to the epistemic assessment 
of beliefs. This curious feature of the start of T 1.4.2 is symptomatic of the difficulty of 
reading that section. Our starting point for approaching this section, and thus for approaching 
Hume’s philosophy of objects, is to realise that T 1.4.2 is a coalescence of a variety of issues 
pertaining to objects, the senses, the causes of belief, and the evaluation of belief, and that 
these issues are not clearly demarcated by Hume himself. 
Hume is most pronouncedly occupied with justificatory questions in approximately 
the last quarter of T 1.4.2 (paragraphs 44–57). There, Hume deals with the “vulgar system” 
and “philosophical system” of external objects (T 1.4.2.46; SBN 211–12). Roughly, the 
vulgar system attributes external existence to the direct objects of the mind, which are, in 
fact, perceptions for Hume, either impressions or ideas.1 The philosophical system, by 
contrast, distinguishes sharply between perceptions and objects and only attributes external 
existence to the latter (it is a system of “the double existence of perceptions and objects”, as 
Hume says at T 1.4.2.11 (SBN 21)). The vulgar system is our default, natural belief about 
external existence. The philosophical system is a special theory developed by those who 
                                               
1 “Perception” is defined by Hume at Abstract 5 (SBN 647) as “whatever can be present to the mind, whether 
we employ our senses, or are actuated with passion, or exercise our thought and reflection.” In the same 
passage, the impression/idea distinction is summarised as follows: “Impressions, therefore, are our lively and 
strong perceptions; ideas are the fainter and weaker” (original emphasis). In the secondary literature, 
perceptions are commonly described as “mental” entities and as the basic units that the mind operates on (see, 
for instance, Ainslie (2015, 6), Waldow (2009, 18), Allison (2008, 13), Beebee (2006, 15)). Both impressions 
and ideas may be either complex or simple, depending on whether they can be distinguished into parts or not 
(see T 1.1.1.1; SBN 2; T 1.1.3.4; SBN 10).  
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realise that the vulgar opinion is false because perceptions do not, in fact, enjoy external 
existence (T 1.4.2.45; SBN 210–11). Hume insists, however, that the philosophical system is 
a scant improvement – a mere “palliative remedy” (T 1.4.2.46; SBN 211) – because the belief 
in those objects that are beyond the realm of direct experience can never be justified. In 
T 1.4.2, Hume does not consider a viable third option.  
Hume’s desire for any epistemically satisfactory account of external existence is 
thwarted. He concludes T 1.4.2 with an unforeshadowed expression of sceptical despair and 
an ambivalent resolution: the vulgar and philosophical systems are both inadequate and we 
only avoid the ensuing conundrum between them by not thinking about it too much, or, in 
other words, by “Carelessness and in-attention” (T 1.4.2.57; SBN 218). This progression 
from the vulgar opinion, to the philosophical system, then to an indolent solution, is retained 
in Hume’s Enquiry (EHU 12.6–14; SBN 151–154; EHU 12.24–25; SBN 161–62). In this 
text, Hume calls the failure of the philosophical system to improve on the false vulgar view a 
“sceptical objection to the evidence of sense” (EHU 12.16; SBN 155). Hume’s treatment of 
objects and scepticism in the Enquiry raises a number of distinctive puzzles and issues. Only 
in this text does Hume draw an explicit contrast between extreme and “mitigated” scepticism, 
the latter of which he endorses (EHU 12.24; SBN 161). The nature of this appeal to mitigated 
scepticism as a response to extreme scepticism remains a puzzle, as well as the way in which 
extreme scepticism is supposed to lead to mitigated scepticism (as Hume claims at 
EHU 12.24–25 (SBN 161–62)).2  
I refer to Hume’s confrontation with the negative evaluation of the vulgar and 
philosophical systems of external existence as Hume’s “sceptical predicament concerning 
external existence” (which I will shorten to “Hume’s predicament” or “the predicament”). 
                                               
2 The topic of Hume’s mitigated scepticism in the Enquiry is discussed by Qu (2017), Buckle (2001), Wright 
(1986), and Michaud (1985). 
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Hume’s predicament is to be distinguished from a wider phenomenon in Hume’s philosophy, 
that of his sceptical crisis. This refers to Hume’s confrontation with sceptical worries that 
derive from his entire metaphysical and epistemological project.3 In the Treatise, a single 
section represents a rather sudden and emotionally charged encounter with radical sceptical 
doubt (T 1.4.7, “Conclusion of this book”). In the Enquiry, Hume encounters radical 
scepticism in EHU 12, but without the drama and poignancy that characterises T 1.4.7.4 
Section 12 of the Enquiry has been unjustly neglected in the literature on Hume’s scepticism, 
as Qu (2017) has observed. Differences between T 1.4.7 and EHU 12 notwithstanding, there 
are significant textual and philosophical similarities, which will become clearer in the course 
of this thesis. I will use the term “sceptical crisis” to refer to Hume’s encounter with 
scepticism in both T 1.4.7 and EHU 12. 
In this thesis, I offer a reading of Hume’s predicament in the Treatise and the 
Enquiry. Both T 1.4.2.44–57 and EHU 12.6–14 are of special importance for grasping 
Hume’s views on external objects vis-à-vis scepticism because they represent Hume’s 
confrontation with the potency of sceptical doubts pertaining to external existence. The 
problem that Hume perceives between the vulgar and philosophical systems just is his 
sceptical problem about external objects. Chapter 2 of this thesis will deal with the vulgar 
belief in the external existence of perceptions and Chapter 3 will deal with the philosophical 
system of the double existence of internal perceptions and external objects. My argument will 
consist of two theses corresponding to each of these two beliefs: the philosophical belief is 
entirely unjustified and psychologically weak, and the vulgar belief is false but 
psychologically compelling. When Hume lambastes the philosophical system, he shows that 
it represents a departure from what we naturally believe anyway. Importantly, even those 
                                               
3 By “metaphysical and epistemological project” I refer to all of Book One of the Treatise and all of the first 
Enquiry.  
4 Garrett (2015, 214) aptly observes that the Enquiry describes, without actually enacting, a sceptical crisis 
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who advocate the philosophical system cannot sustain the belief in that system in their 
ordinary lives. The philosophical system is not just epistemically deficient, but it is a 
psychological confabulation. 
An understanding and appreciation of Hume’s predicament cannot be separated from 
a reading of his more general sceptical crisis. Although Hume deals with scepticism in a 
number of places in T 1.4, only T 1.4.7 represents a sustained reflection on the topic; the 
other sections of the Treatise simply do not allow us to discern Hume’s considered response 
to sceptical threats. As we will see in Section 1.2, sceptical doubts accumulate over the 
course of T 1.4, so much so that Hume even begins to raise worries about his theory of 
causation, which was the subject matter of T 1.3. For the Enquiry, in order to grasp Hume’s 
response to the predicament in EHU 12, we have to read that section as a whole, which 
means understanding the place of his predicament in his wider crisis. 
I argue that the position Hume develops in response to his sceptical crisis should be 
characterised as residual scepticism. This means that Hume does not respond to the 
irrefutability of scepticism by abandoning intellectual pursuits, but by modifying his attitudes 
and practices pertaining to those pursuits and insisting that others follow suit. I oppose the 
reading of Hume as offering a more substantive, normative response to sceptical worries 
(such as has been offered by Qu (2017; 2014), Ainslie (2015), and Garrett (2015; 1997)). I 
hold that Hume ought to be characterised as a sceptic about external objects in virtue of the 
fact that the sceptical predicament remains an undefeated sceptical challenge.  
For Hume, the psychological compulsion of the vulgar belief means that what we 
consider external objects are, in fact, perceptions. Hume is sceptical about any attempt to 
justify a belief in non-perceptions. My reading, therefore, has affinity with what has been 
called the “phenomenalist” interpretation of Hume on objects (advocated by Inukai (2011); 
discussed by Rocknak (2013, xiii), Grene (1994, 163–64), and Passmore (1968/1951, 80–
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90)). There are indeed passages in which Hume uses “object” and “perception” (either 
“impression” or “idea) interchangeably.5 It has been thought, however, that an analysis of 
objects in terms of perceptions deprives Hume of a belief in a shared, public world. This 
criticism has been expressed by Annette Baier (1991), who says that a phenomenalist reading 
of Hume would allow only for a commitment to one’s own mind and its perceptions. Baier 
takes this to be absurd, and she chooses to maintain instead that Hume never lets go of a 
“peopled” world in his Treatise (1991, 111).6 Miren Boehm (2013) clearly and more recently 
expresses the same complaint, in the context of arguing against Yumiko Inukai’s (2011) 
reading. Inukai exploits phenomenalist-sounding passages in Hume’s text to argue that Hume 
is committed to a perception-only ontology. Inukai describes Hume’s ontology as “radical 
empiricism”, in order to signify a strict commitment to the existence of the immediate objects 
of experience and nothing else (this is to be contrasted with explanatory, cognitive, or 
justificatory empiricisms, which may or may not make the radical ontological claim; see 
Inukai 2011, 191). Boehm protests: 
 
We may also here briefly highlight some of the radical philosophical implications of 
“radical empiricism”. The Treatise is nothing but a collection of perceptions in 
Hume’s mind. Hume’s science of human nature is, strictly speaking, a “science” of 
David Hume. But the intelligibility of Hume’s project depends on the presupposition 
                                               
5 E.g. “To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, 
convey to him these impressions” (T 1.1.1.8; SBN 5); “Secondly, ’Tis confest, that no object can appear to the 
senses; or in other words, that no impression can become present to the mind, without being determin’d in its 
degrees both of quantity and quality” (T 1.1.7.4; SBN 19. Original emphasis). 
6 Baier also raises the objection that a strict phenomenalist reading of Hume cannot account for the persistence 
of individual minds through time and, consequently, could not account for the influence of memories of past 
regularities in forming causal attitudes, since there would be nothing to store those memories. Baier cites T 
1.3.8.13 (SBN 103) to support this. 
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of the existence of other, not just minds, but human beings, who interact with one 
another in “the common course of the world” [T Introduction 10; SBN xix]. 
(Boehm 2013, 210. Original emphasis) 
 
Baier and Boehm’s complaint pertains to taking Hume to analyse objects in terms of 
perceptions. Here, I want to describe a preliminary response that displays the motivation for 
taking Hume to analyse objects in this way. I insist that Hume can and does presuppose the 
existence of a shared, public world at the same time that he analyses objects in terms of 
perceptions. Since his project is a science of the human person, Hume pays close attention to 
our actual beliefs and attitudes. Hume’s conclusion, drawn from his analysis of the vulgar 
opinion, is that all people, and at almost all times, do not draw a distinction between 
perceptions and non-perceptions (see T 1.4.2.14; SBN 193). The vulgar treat some of their 
perceptions as internal, fleeting realities, but others as external, continuing objects. While 
Hume does not employ the language of a phenomenalist in some passages in the Treatise, we 
do not have to see the existence of these passages as a deplorable error on Hume’s part, and 
we do not have to read them as telling decisively against Hume being sceptical about non-
perceptions. They are, rather, manifestations of the vulgar tendency to not cognise 
perceptions as such and to treat some of them as external objects.  
Baier and Boehm press on the fact that Hume does not take his project to be an 
entirely personal and private investigation. I agree, since Hume overwhelmingly takes his 
results to have significance for others and for the shared world that he and others occupy. I 
suggest that Hume simultaneously takes the objects of philosophical investigation to be 
perceptions and presupposes that there is a shared, public world. Hume directly declares that 
the objects he wants to investigate are perceptions when he states that he wants to remain 
silent on the question of the causes of perception. Hume distinguishes between impressions 
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of sensation and impressions of reflection, the latter encompassing “passions, desires, and 
emotions”, and which causally derive from other ideas, such as pleasure and pain (T 1.1.2.1; 
SBN 8). On the origins of sensory impressions, Hume says: 
 
[They] arise in the soul originally, from unknown causes. […] The examination of our 
sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and 
therefore shall not at present be enter’d upon. 
(T 1.1.2.1; SBN 7–8)7 
 
Here, Hume assigns different questions to different domains of inquiry. In the middle of 
T 1.3, Hume makes the same point, while placing stress on the fact of human ignorance: 
 
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my 
opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ’twill always be impossible to 
decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc’d 
by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author of our being. Nor is 
such a question any way material to our present purpose. 
(T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume is here suggesting that there very well could be intercourse between external objects 
and perceptions. He dismisses the relevancy of non-perceptions qua objects of philosophical 
theorising, but he does not hint at his project being an analysis of merely private phenomena. 
                                               
7 Hume is telling us that impressions of reflection are derived in the following way: impressions of sensations 
give rise to feelings, such as pain and pleasure, and our minds form ideas corresponding to these feelings. These 
ideas, in turn, produce impressions of reflections, such as desire and aversion. These impressions of reflection 
can be copied as ideas too. 
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Hume’s sceptical predicament concerns precisely whether the supposition of external 
existence stands up to scrutiny. The fact that Hume asks this question and struggles to find an 
answer does not mean that he does not make the supposition that there is a shared, public 
world. The reading of Hume as analysing objects in terms of perceptions and as a sceptic 
about non-perceptions should not be summarily dismissed. My task will be to defend my 
reading of the vulgar and philosophical systems more fully. I hold that by approaching the 
question of Hume’s scepticism about objects through the lens of Hume’s sceptical 
predicament, and the ensuing sceptical crisis, we will be able to grasp Hume’s outlook on the 
vulgar and philosophical systems together, as well as the shifting attitudes in Hume’s 
thought. 
In the next sub-section, I proceed to an analysis of the philosophical term 
“scepticism”, with the aim of offering a starting point for approaching scepticism in Hume’s 
philosophy. The rest of this section will proceed as follows: a recount of the traditional, 
disparaging approach to reading Hume’s philosophy, and how scholarly attitudes changed 
and new questions emerged in the 20th century (Section 1.1.3); an examination of the terms 
“reason”, “reasoning”, “imagination” and “knowledge”, which play a crucial role in Hume’s 
science of man (Section 1.1.4); and finally, a closer examination of Hume’s theory of 
perception than I have been able to offer in this opening subsection (Section 1.1.5). In Section 
1.2, I will turn to the development of Hume’s sceptical crisis in his texts. In Section 1.3, I will 
outline the overall argument of the thesis by stating what each chapter contributes.  
 
1.1.2 Philosophical Scepticism 
It is difficult to specify the term “scepticism” for a variety of reasons. “Scepticism” is a term 
that admits of degrees, and its meaning has varied in different times and places over its long 
history. It is also a socially and morally loaded term, associated with the undermining of 
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authority, traditional values and the status quo. “Scepticism” is also a philosophical notion 
that is bound up with other notions that themselves evade simple analysis, such as 
“knowledge”, “certainty”, “warrant”, etc. 
Very generally, to be “sceptical” is to suggest or insist that some beliefs or views lack 
justification, or warrant, or some other similar notion, or that they fall short of some relevant 
epistemic standard, like counting as knowledge.8 Hume himself tends to use “scepticism” and 
“sceptical” with direct reference to human psychological faculties. We can see this in the 
very titles of T 1.4.1 and T 1.4.2 (“Of scepticism with regard to reason” and “Of scepticism 
with regard to the senses”, respectively) as well as EHU 4 (“Sceptical Doubts concerning the 
Operations of the Understanding”). In a word, scepticism encapsulates doubt, as 
Anik Waldow (2010, 51, n. 5) has pointed out: “I understand arguments to be skeptical if 
they are used in order to cast doubt on an established belief or piece of knowledge.” Doubt 
itself comes in different degrees, since a sceptic may claim that we fail to attain a high 
standard, such as certainty, or might radically deny that we lack even a minimal level of 
justification. A sceptic’s claims may also vary in scope, as they may challenge all of our 
views, most of our views, or perhaps a significant subset of our views. There is no standard 
way of understanding “scepticism”, even if we restrict our view to a single historical moment. 
The degree of scepticism under consideration in any given discussion, and in what domain it 
applies, may easily vary. “Scepticism” is often talked about in philosophical contexts with a 
presumption of a high degree and a wide scope, and so it is taken to be a sweeping problem 
or challenge that needs to be overcome.9 Some sceptical challenges are amongst the most 
                                               
8 See also Greco’s (2008, 4–6) identification of philosophical and historical varieties of scepticism. Garrett 
(2015, 3) defines “scepticism” widely as the denial or minimisation of “epistemic merit”. 
9 For instance, Williams (1996, xii–xiii): “Everyday life is characterized by a kind of natural certainty, expressed 
in our willingness to claim not just to believe but to actually know all sorts of things […] However, when we 
step back from our immediate, everyday concerns and ask whether those beliefs amount to knowledge, we 
experience a disturbing transformation. We find ourselves driven inexorably to the conclusion that none of our 
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fundamental of all philosophical issues, such as the problem of the external world (see Stroud 
1984) and the problem of induction (see Stove 1973). These two problems are particularly 
pertinent for understanding Hume’s philosophy. The place of the problem of induction in 
contemporary philosophical discussions is even largely directly due to Hume.10 
The challenge of reading Hume is sometimes stated in terms of competition between 
sceptical and non-sceptical readings: varieties of non-sceptical readings would include what 
have been dubbed “the New Hume” interpretation, the “naturalist” interpretation, and the 
“realist” interpretation. 11 However, speaking of sceptical and non-sceptical interpretations 
(and supposing that the so-called New Hume interpretation is not sceptical at all) has a 
serious downside, since it is undeniable that Hume was a sceptic in some sense. Even if 
proponents of the so-called New Hume do not emphasise it, they always take Hume to be a 
mitigated or moderate sceptic (Hume explicitly identifies himself as a mitigated sceptic at 
EHU 12.24 (SBN 161)).12 Increasingly, the task in Hume scholarship has not been thought of 
                                               
ordinary beliefs really do amount to knowledge or that, even if by some standards they do, we will never 
understand how”. 
10 Although Hume’s philosophy of (and scepticism concerning) causation has generally taken priority over his 
views on external objects in scholarly discussions, David Pears (1990, 154), for one, acknowledges that Hume’s 
philosophy of objects present a more pressing issue: “If we are going to understand Hume’s system, we must 
appreciate that he puts belief in body in a far weaker position than belief in causation or belief in personal 
identity”. See also Pears (1990, 183–84). 
11 Richman (2007, 1) says, “defenders of the New Hume hold that Hume’s analysis of our everyday beliefs has 
as one of its conclusions that the beliefs in the existence of external, independent objects and causes objectively 
so-called meet at least minimal epistemic standards for assent. The New Hume debate is between those who 
read Hume as a strict epistemic sceptic on these matters and those who support the New Hume interpretation”. 
In the same chapter, Richman offers two other ways that the debate between old and new Humes can be 
characterised: between the tendency to engage in philosophy and the tendency to be occupied with “common 
life”, and between Hume’s critical/philosophical/empiricist project and his “naturalist” project (2007, 2–8). For 
an exchange about the New Hume versus the old Hume focussing on Hume on causation, see Millican (2007) 
and Beebee (2007). 
Ainslie (2015, 218 ff.) presents a contrast between “sceptical”, “naturalist”, “dialectic”, and his own, 
“philosophical”, interpretations. Garrett (1997) divides his chapter on “Reason and Induction” (p. 76 ff.) into 
“skeptical” and “nonskeptical” interpretations before providing his own third way. Greenberg (2008) presents an 
opposition between readings that take scepticism to “undermine” naturalism (he cites Broughton (2008; 2004; 
2003) as representative) and readings that take naturalism to undermine scepticism (he cites Garrett (1997) as 
representative).  
The contrast between scepticism and realism appears especially in Hakkarainen (2012a; 2012b). 
Hakkarainen (2012a, 283) says, “One of the essential aspects of this problem [of reading Hume’s scepticism and 
naturalism] is Hume’s attitude to what is nowadays called Metaphysical Realism”.  
12 Wright (1991, esp. 154, 159–61) exemplifies such an approach. Wright reads Hume as a sceptic about the 
adequacy of what our ideas can directly represent, and this suffices to establish a sweeping scepticism about the 
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as deciding whether scepticism or naturalism wins out, but of accurately characterising the 
way in which Hume’s philosophy accommodates both. For instance, Ainslie (2015) and De 
Pierris (2015) both offer wide-ranging and influential studies of Hume’s philosophy that 
claim his naturalism and scepticism must be understood as complementary.  
To characterise Hume as a sceptic does not necessarily mean to take him to 
dogmatically deny the truth of a belief or claim. This is related to a general philosophical 
lesson to be gleaned from scepticism. The ancient Greek sceptic Sextus Empiricus, in his 
Outlines of Scepticism, foregrounds the way in which scepticism involves a lack of any 
settled opinion, explicitly contrasting suspension of belief (epochê) with both affirmation and 
denial. Relatedly, the notion of equipollence plays a central role in Sextus’s explication of 
scepticism, by which he means that, for any opinion, evidence can be found both for it and 
against it. According to Sextus, such equipollence ought to inspire us to suspend belief, and 
doing so results in a state of tranquillity (ataraxia). Sextus summarises the situation when he 
says: 
 
Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are 
thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the 
opposed objects and accounts, we come first to the suspension of judgement and 
afterwards to tranquillity.  
(PH 1.4.8) 
 
                                               
philosophies of his predecessors. But, according to Wright, Hume himself did not claim that we need our ideas 
to be adequate in this way, because our natural, imaginative tendencies ground our most fundamental beliefs 
perfectly well. Penelhum (1975) also perceives the inadequacy of the ‘either/or’ approach to reading Hume on 
scepticism and naturalism (1975, 17–18). Penelhum observes: “Hume is manifestly some sort of sceptic. [The 
question is] What sort?” (1975, 22). 
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Just as Sextus intends to suspend belief, Hume repeatedly emphasises that we could never 
have a justified belief in the existence of the non-perceptual objects that the philosophical 
system posits, and he does not affirm that such things definitely do not exist. Similarly, Hume 
does not intend to affirm that the beliefs that he expresses doubt about in his sceptical crisis 
are definitely false. 
Realising that scepticism involves suspension of belief is helpful in order to sharpen 
our understanding of scepticism. We should also observe, however, that Hume diverges from 
the ancient sceptical tradition in significant ways, especially by his insistence that extreme 
scepticism cannot be a way of life. Hume even presents the fact that we continue to hold 
beliefs in the face of sceptical arguments as a refutation of Pyrrhonism (EHU 12.23; SBN 
159–60; see also T 1.4.1.7; SBN 183; T 1.4.7.9–10; SBN 269–270). We will see in Chapter 4, 
that Pyrrhonism provides a foil for Hume’s own moderately sceptical position. Despite his 
blatant rejection of Pyrrhonism, some interpreters maintain that Hume ought to be 
characterised as a Pyrrhonist (Baxter (2008); Maia Neto (1991); Popkin (1951)). These 
commentators maintain that, while Hume thought that the eradication of all belief was 
impossible, he was still a radical sceptic on the question of the justification of belief.  
I believe that characterising Hume as a Pyrrhonist is unhelpful and likely to distort our 
grasp of his views. Hume’s sceptical crisis reveals that he thinks suspending belief on a 
multitude of topics would lead to feelings of despair and unrest, whereas the Pyrrhonists held 
that suspension of belief led to tranquillity (see PH 1.7.25–30). Furthermore, Hume’s final, 
moderately sceptical position does not match the Pyrrhonian outlook. Hume thinks scepticism 
has to be moderated before it can have any practical benefits. Hume stresses this point in his 
explication of mitigated scepticism in EHU 12.13 Hume advocates assiduousness and 
                                               
13 The fact that Hume thinks an appropriate degree of scepticism ought to be accepted and lived with also 
distinguishes him from the typical modern treatment of scepticism as a challenge that must be defeated. 
Descartes, in his epochal treatment of scepticism, utilised sceptical doubts for a dialectical purpose – to show 
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epistemic modesty as part of his mitigated scepticism, but the Pyrrhonists did not advocate 
such attitudes; indeed, the Pyrrhonists intended to suspend belief no matter what the topic 
was, but Hume qua moderate sceptic clearly thinks there are some topics we should avoid 
and others in which we are not doomed to utter failure. A further point of difference between 
Hume and Pyrrhonism pertains to scepticism about the senses. Hume’s treatment of the 
vulgar and philosophical systems concerns mind-dependency, but the Pyrrhonists never 
articulated doubt in such terms, because the problem of knowing an external world emerges 
from Descartes’s philosophy (as argued by Burnyeat (1982)). The difference between Hume 
and Pyrrhonism on scepticism with regard to the senses will be taken up again in Section 2.3. 
 
1.1.3 Scepticism and Naturalism 
In this sub-section, I discuss the general challenge of reading Hume’s scepticism, while also 
citing issues that are fundamental to the explication of my own interpretation. In this sub-
section I will focus on the Treatise, since this work has traditionally, even if unjustly, been 
identified as Hume’s fullest expression of his own views (as explained in detail by Buckle 
(2001, 3–26)). 
The early critics of Hume’s Treatise charged the text with espousing a dangerous 
brand of scepticism that threatened religion and human endeavour in both natural and moral 
philosophy. According to Biro (2009), the sceptical arguments in Book One of the Treatise 
were, for two centuries after it was published, “not seen as directed against various 
philosophical accounts of our knowledge of the world and of ourselves […] but against the 
very possibility of such knowledge” (2009, 44. Added emphasis). There are a variety of 
elements of Hume’s philosophy that might be considered to push in this direction. Even if we 
                                               
what he took to be the only way of defeating those doubts. Descartes was not the first modern sceptic but he 
offered a novel sceptical challenge in his Meditations on First Philosophy (see Descartes 1996/164, 12–15), as 
argued at length by Burnyeat (1982), and acknowledged by Williams (1996, 1–2) and Stroud (1984, 1, n. 1). See 
Popkin (2003) for a history of scepticism beginning with Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498). 
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put aside the fact that much of his philosophy is sceptical of received wisdom, there are a 
number of arguments that can temptingly be read as establishing dire sceptical conclusions.  
The standard reading of Hume was not just that he was a sceptic about this or that 
topic, but that he was a sceptic tout court. This was the predominant view until at least the 
seminal scholarship of Norman Kemp Smith (1872–1958), who published two Mind articles 
on Hume in 1905 and produced a book-length treatment on him in 1941 (republished in 2005 
with an introduction by Don Garrett). Kemp Smith claimed that the lasting influence of the 
traditional, caustic reading of Hume was due to the influence of Thomas Reid (2002/1785; 
1997/1764; 1969/1788) and James Beattie’s (1777) criticisms, as well as T.H. Green’s (1874) 
introduction to what became a standard edition of Hume’s Treatise. According to these 
authors, Hume extended the empiricist philosophical project that was supposedly common to 
John Locke (1632–1704) and Bishop George Berkeley (1685–1753) and brought it to its 
rightful conclusion.14 Hume’s early critics read him as showing that empiricism implies 
radical scepticism, and that Hume represents a reduction ad absurdum of that philosophical 
approach (Kemp Smith (2005/1941, 3); see also Norton (2000, I12) and Penelhum (1975, 17–
18)). Berkeley argued against the conceivability of a material world (i.e. a world of things 
that are, in their nature, not mental items or perceptions). Hume was similarly read as denying 
the conceivability of such a world. Hume’s critics portrayed him as absurd by exploiting the 
fact that the natural world of everyday experience is ordinarily taken to be a material world. 
They read Hume as saying that he believes the world is populated with the perceptions that 
belong to his own mind. It was only a further complication, and a point for further invective, 
that Hume rejected the belief in his self, according to their reading of T 1.4.6 (“Of personal 
identity”). Reid expresses his contempt towards Hume when he says sardonically:  
                                               
14 I am sympathetic to the view that talk of “empiricism” and “rationalism” can be counterproductive for 
understanding the history of early modern philosophy (see Anstey & Vanzo 2016, 96–98; Loeb 1981; Norton 
1981). However, in recounting how Hume was traditionally read, it is useful to use these terms, since the 
rationalism/empiricism distinction is intimately tied to that reading. 
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It seems to be a peculiar strain of humour in this author, to set out in his introduction 
by promising, with a grave face, no less than a complete system of the sciences, upon 
a foundation entirely new – to wit, that of human nature – when the intention of the 
whole work is to shew [sic], that there is neither human nature nor science in the 
world. It may perhaps be unreasonable to complain of this conduct in an author who 
neither believes his own existence nor that of his reader. 
(Reid 1997/1764, 20) 
 
Reid apprehended Hume’s scepticism as undermining the necessary prerequisites to even 
begin carrying out any philosophical project. He perceived the results of Hume’s philosophy 
to be destructive to the point that no positive philosophical project was left standing. 
While Reid’s calumny should not be totally excused, Hume has, in some ways, 
himself to blame for such an astringent reception. Hume’s flirtations with scepticism in the 
Treatise come very close to a bona fide courtship. Reid’s just-quoted complaint is of Hume’s 
apparent and shocking denial of the existence of the self, of his insistence that there is 
nothing he can directly identify in experience as his self, nothing more than an ever-changing 
flow of mental experience (see T 1.4.6.3; SBN 252). Hume’s argument concerning inferences 
from past experience to the future (T 1.3.6.4–11; SBN 88–92; EHU 4.16–23; SBN 32–39) 
can be read as establishing that such inferences are always devoid of justification. In light of 
this argument, De Pierris (2015), Millican (2012; 2007; 2002) and Fogelin (2009; 1985), have 
all read Hume as a sceptic about induction (even as they acknowledge that Hume does not 
thereby refrain from inductive reasoning).15 This is not to mention that Hume’s sceptical 
                                               
15 There are significant differences between the Treatise and Enquiry versions of the argument. Millican (2002, 
110–11) prefers the Enquiry version since it covers some ground that the Treatise neglects. In classic statements 
of the problem of induction (as in Stove 1973), the emphasis is on the demonstration/probability distinction, 
which is the focus of the Treatise version.  
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crisis at T 1.4.7 contains numerous instances of Hume conceding that sceptical challenges are 
unanswerable. 
The challenge of interpreting Hume is that, despite his apparent scepticism, it is hard 
to deny that he develops a positive philosophical program in his works, one that he has the 
highest hopes for at times. Biro (2009, 45) comments that the potential inconsistency 
resulting from Hume’s scepticism was, for a long time, either not noticed or simply dismissed 
by discounting the passages where Hume speaks positively of philosophy. Reid, we have just 
seen, sees it as a sad irony that Hume begins the Treatise by announcing a new, ambitious 
investigation. The “Introduction” to the Treatise puts the positive elements of Hume’s 
philosophy on clear display, as Hume claims here that his bold new project will “not be 
inferior in certainty” to the Newtonian natural philosophy (T Introduction 10; SBN xvi). 
Hume thinks the “expedient” for dissolving seemingly endless philosophical disputes is to 
observe the following “evident” truth about all bodies of knowledge and to fashion our 
investigations accordingly: all sciences are conducted by human persons, and therefore, “are 
judg’d of by their powers and faculties” (T Introduction 4; SBN xv). Understanding these 
faculties, Hume thinks, would give us untold insight into all of the sciences. Moreover, in 
some sciences, the human person is the direct object of investigation anyway, and so the need 
to examine human nature here is even more imperative (T Introduction 5; SBN xv). Hume 
says that the purpose of logic is to explain the human faculty of reason, that “Morals and 
criticism” concern human sentiments, and that politics concerns how humans unite and 
depend on each other in society (ibid.). Hume evidently hopes to apply to a broad range of 
topics the method of looking directly to the human person to resolve perennial debates 
between philosophers. Hume says, rather evocatively, that we ought to, “march up directly to 
the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, 
we may every where else hope for an easy victory” (T Introduction 6; SBN xvi).  
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Kemp Smith’s scholarship (2005/1941; 1905a; 1905b) emerges on the scene as the 
first sustained attempt to explain Hume’s ambitious, positive philosophical program. Kemp 
Smith emphasised the positive aspects to Hume’s philosophy by offering a new picture of his 
historical influences. He argued that Francis Hutcheson (1694–1747) and Sir Isaac Newton 
(1642–1727) were the principal influences on Hume’s thought. Just as those two privileged 
observation of the natural world in order to establish positive results, so too did Hume 
advance a robust philosophical system by investigating natural causes. Don Garrett glosses 
Kemp Smith’s reading of Hume as establishing the subordination thesis, which is simply that 
“reason is subordinate to feeling” (2005, xxxi)). Kemp Smith leans on a line that appears in 
Book Two of the Treatise to support the centrality of such subordination for Hume: “reason 
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (T 2.3.3.4; SBN 415; Kemp Smith 
(2005/1941, 11); Kemp Smith (1905a, 156)). As the “slave” of the passions, the faculty of 
reason functions as a mere auxiliary in our psychological lives and for philosophy; it is “the 
passions” that hold explanatory import and are of utmost practical importance for human 
psychology, rather than rational choice that proceeds via stepwise reasoning (Hume’s 
treatment of “reason” will be examined in more detail in Section 1.1.4). Kemp Smith 
intended “the passions” to have a wider meaning than just the direct and indirect passions that 
are investigated in Book Two of the Treatise (see T 2.1.1.4; SBN 276). In his 1941 book, 
Kemp Smith says “passion” is Hume’s most overarching term for “the instincts, propensities, 
feelings, emotions and sentiments, as well as for the passions ordinarily so called” 
(2005/1941, 11). For Kemp Smith, the priority of passion over reason was the unifying theme 
of all of Hume’s philosophy. 
Kemp Smith argued that Hume could not have been sceptical because he did not set 
out to offer an evaluation of important beliefs, but rather to analyse their origins (or genesis). 
Hume’s pursuit of the subordination thesis is supposed to be indicative of this. Kemp Smith 
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illustrated his approach to Hume on scepticism with direct reference to Hume’s theory of 
external objects.16 For Kemp Smith, while Hume accepted Berkeley’s arguments for the 
unknowability of the external world, he denied the “relevancy” of Berkeley’s idealistic 
ontology (2005/1941, 85; 1905a, 151). Kemp Smith held that Hume gave a genetic account 
of the belief in an objective, material world in which the faculty of reason was not the 
determining factor, but in no way did he suggest that it was an epistemically deficient belief, 
because the causes or sources of belief should be considered distinct from the reasons for or 
against them. Hume would have agreed that those who wanted to argue their way to a belief 
in the external world were doomed to fail, but only he himself sufficiently realised that our 
human nature is responsible for such a belief anyway (1905a, 151–52). The opening 
paragraph of T 1.4.2 was used by Kemp Smith to support this reading (2005/1941, 87–88; 
1905a, 152). That paragraph contrasts the question of the source of the belief in body with the 
question of whether that belief is in fact true, and also states that it would be “vain” to pursue 
the latter. Hume can very well endorse the double meaning of the word “vain” here: asking 
the evaluative question about the belief in body is both futile and self-obsessed, since we are 
demanding justification for a belief that we can neither choose to hold nor discard. The 
suggestion of those who have traditionally emphasised naturalism over scepticism in Hume’s 
philosophy is that this dismissal encapsulates Hume’s attitude towards scepticism in general, 
or at least towards radical or unqualified forms of it.17  
For Kemp Smith, Hume employs the following pattern of argument: reason fails to 
confirm a belief or a class of beliefs, and this reveals that reason is not the source of those 
beliefs but that some other faculty is, since the fact that we hold them is undeniable 
                                               
16 In Kemp Smith (2005/1941), Hume’s theory of the external world is the second topic that falls under the 
heading “Current Misunderstandings of Hume’s Teaching” (2005/1941, 85–88). 
17 “Naturalism” sometimes contrasts with scepticism not just in terms of being a positive doctrine or 
epistemological outlook, but as being a different project that Hume engages in (that is, the project of examining 
the psychological genesis of beliefs, not their evaluations). Such an identification is made by Durland (2011, 
68–69) and Richman (2007, 3). 
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(2005/1941, 11–12). Hume may seem sceptical because of his emphasis on the subsidiary 
role of reason, but sufficient attention to the text reveals that he accepts no blanket sceptical 
conclusion.  
As much as Kemp Smith’s reading offered a sustained and serious attempt to 
reconcile Hume’s positive program with his apparent scepticism, it also raised new questions 
that remain central to Hume scholarship. Kemp Smith’s Hume was not a crude sceptic, but, 
even if Hume did not primarily intend to establish radical scepticism, there is still a question 
to be asked about his epistemic attitude towards our beliefs, and how he can justify or support 
such an attitude. Did Hume provide a justification for our beliefs – perhaps an entirely novel 
one – or did he just hold that reason need not play a role in such justification, without 
offering a positive answer himself? Pinning down Kemp Smith’s view on Hume’s attitude 
towards the justification of belief is not easy, since he scatters references to justification 
throughout his work (see Loeb (2009) for discussion). One answer that Kemp Smith offers in 
his 1941 book is that, for Hume, nature is providential. This means that our beliefs, as the 
normal products of natural inputs on the mind, do not mislead (2005/1941, 445, 492–94; see 
also Garrett 2005, xxxiv). This point is similarly made by Qu (2017, 9, 13) and Buckle (2001, 
194, 203) in the context of discussing Hume’s Enquiry (see EHU 5.21; 54–55).18 However, 
the challenge remains to specify what it is about nature that makes our beliefs justified. We 
shall see, when we turn to an examination of Hume’s sceptical crisis, that Hume explicitly 
considers that the beliefs that we are compelled by nature to have are not immune from 
sceptical doubt.  
So, it remains difficult to discern whether Hume’s key arguments establish genetic 
conclusions that detail how we acquire beliefs and/or what their contents are, or whether they 
                                               
18 See also T 1.4.1.1; SBN 180: “Our reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural 
effect”. 
 - 30 - 
establish evaluative conclusions that touch on the justification of beliefs. In particular, this 
tension is driven by Hume’s arguments concerning the nature and status of “reason”. Hume 
explicitly discusses the limited role of reason in our belief in necessary connections (i.e. the 
belief that every event is necessitated by a cause; see T 1.3.3), causal inferences (at T 1.3.6, 
esp. 1.3.6.11) and the belief in body (at T 1.4.2). Furthermore, Hume’s definition of belief as 
a lively manner of conceiving an idea subjugates reason since it makes no reference to it.19 It 
is easy to read arguments against reason’s role in our beliefs as attacks on evidence that 
would favourably count towards a positive epistemic valuation of our beliefs. While Kemp 
Smith’s reading centres around the place of reason in Hume’s philosophy, the interpretive 
challenge still persists. 
The very structure of Book One of the Treatise suggests that Hume’s primary interest 
was a genetic project. Hume is concerned with ideas, such as of space, time, and cause and 
effect. Hume sets out to investigate the psychological origins of these ideas – as displayed 
most clearly in the Introduction to the Treatise – and he does not declare that he intends to 
draw evaluative implications from his investigations. So, while Richman (2007, 5) presents 
the different, broad camps of Hume interpretation as divided over whether they think a 
genetic or evaluative project is more fundamental to Hume’s personal philosophical goals, I 
think Hume clearly begins with a genetic project but then goes on to encounter serious 
sceptical doubts in the course of his work. Even though Hume does not begin the Treatise as 
a project of epistemic evaluation, this does not in itself rule out sceptical approaches to 
Hume’s philosophy. From the beginning, therefore, I depart from a naïve psychology-only 
approach to Hume’s philosophy, which Millican (2007, 169, 181–86) rightly criticises under 
the label of reading Hume as engaged in “not epistemology, but cognitive science”. I also 
                                               
19 See T 1.3.7.5–8; SBN 96–98; T 1.3.8.11; SBN 103; T 1.3.8.15; SBN 105; T 1.3.9.2; SBN 107; T 1.4.1.8–10; 
SBN 183–85). 
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depart from the equally one-sided approach offered by Fogelin (2009b), whereby Hume’s 
genetic project is just another form of sceptical argument (Fogelin understands that revealing 
a belief to be produced outside of reason just is to discredit it; see 2009b, 210–13).  
I will conclude this sub-section by looking at some of Hume’s own usages of the 
terms “scepticism” and “sceptical”. Hume does not employ these terms uniformly, but he 
clearly thinks there are extreme and moderate varieties of scepticism. As a preliminary, we 
should look at the scepticism that Hume explicitly denounces in T 1.4.1 (“Of scepticism with 
regard to reason”). Hume presents a sceptical argument in this section but refrains from 
drawing a sweeping negative conclusion from it. Hume addresses the question of, 
“… whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our 
judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falsehood” (T 1.4.1.7; SBN 
183. Original emphasis). We might be tempted to read “who hold that all is uncertain …” as a 
characterisation of all sceptics. However, a more palatable reading would be to see Hume as 
distancing himself from a version of scepticism here. Hume is declaring that he is not one of 
those extreme sceptics who believes that all our beliefs are totally lacking in justification. 
Hume characterises his own view as sceptical in several places (Abstract 27; SBN 657; 
T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270; EHU 12.24–25; SBN 161–62). So we cannot read too much into 
Hume’s rejection of a singular version of scepticism.  
In EHU 12, Hume draws a distinction between antecedent and consequent scepticism, 
which turns on whether an attitude of doubt is adopted before (antecedent) or after 
(consequent) some particular discoveries about the human person or human reason (EHU 
12.3–5; SBN 149–51). Problematically, it seems that this distinction, based on the origins of 
sceptical attitudes, does not help us address the conceptual question that Hume asks at the 
start of that section, namely, “What is meant by a sceptic?” (EHU 12.2; SBN 149). Hume 
criticises the position of radical antecedent scepticism before gesturing towards a more 
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moderate version of it. All Hume has to say by way of description of the radical version is 
that it is “an universal doubt [sic], not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also 
of our very faculties” (EHU 12.3; SBN 149). Hume’s description of moderate antecedent 
scepticism at EHU 12.4 (SBN 150) does not contain any clues as to how Hume understands 
“scepticism”. The paragraph reads as a catalogue of methodological recommendations: 
“preserving a proper impartiality … weaning our mind from all those prejudices … To begin 
with clear and self-evident principles …” (EHU 12.4; SBN 150).  
Later in EHU 12, however, Hume offers a general description of “scepticism” as 
involving “doubt and hesitation”. The reference to “hesitation” suggests that an idea can be 
characterised as sceptical because it prompts attitudes of hesitancy and reservation. In order 
to grasp this, we have to turn to Hume’s treatment of one version of consequent scepticism in 
EHU 12, namely, that which concerns “abstract reasonings” (EHU 12.17; SBN 155. Original 
emphasis). At EHU 12.18–20 (SBN 156–158), Hume puts forward a consideration that might 
push us towards scepticism, which is the “absurdity of … bold determinations of the abstract 
sciences” (EHU 12.19; SBN 157). Hume finds it absurd that physical extension could be 
infinitely divisible, yet he maintains that we are led to this conclusion from sound 
geometrical reasoning. Hume does not provide such reasoning, but he describes it. 
Specifically, he describes as “convincing and satisfactory” the proposition that the angle of 
contact between a circle and a tangent is infinitely less than any angle between two straight 
lines, and he adds that the angle between other curves and a tangent may even be infinitely 
smaller than that between a circle and a tangent (EHU 12.18; SBN 156–57). Hume has less to 
say about the infinite divisibility of time (EHU 12.19; SBN 157). He describes the passing of 
an infinite number of real parts of time as an evident “contradiction” (ibid.). Remarkably, 
however, Hume does not cease the discussion here. He decides that the notion that our ideas 
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of space and time could be inherently contradictory is so unpalatable that it actually weakens 
the case for scepticism:  
 
How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to 
any other clear, distinct idea, is absolutely incomprehensible […] So that nothing can 
be more sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism itself, 
which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of 
quantity. 
(EHU 12.20; SBN 158. Added emphasis) 
 
The description “full of doubt and hesitation” is vague, but Hume’s overall point is plain 
enough: the presence of contradictions in clear ideas is not a convincing reason for scepticism 
precisely because we have trouble coming to terms with such contradictoriness. The 
reference to “doubt and hesitation” suggests that Hume thinks of scepticism as broadly 
encompassing attitudes of hesitancy, caution, and reservation.20 Vitally, such attitudes come 
in degrees. Moderate versions of such attitudes are endorsed by Hume. As we will see fully 
in Chapter 4 (especially sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2), Hume characterises his moderate sceptical 
position as encompassing “modesty and reserve” (EHU 12.24; SBN 161) in philosophical 
endeavours. Hume sees his scepticism as being an expedient to philosophical progress, rather 
than an inhibition. Accordingly, when Hume describes the philosophy of the Treatise as 
                                               
20 We should also observe at this point a difference between Hume’s treatment of the vulgar opinion and of the 
philosophical system: the philosophical system is unjustified, but the vulgar opinion is knowably false. Holding 
that a belief is false is not typically characterised as a sceptical attitude, since one would not suspend belief 
about it. However, the falsity of the vulgar belief is at least a negative epistemic assessment for Hume, and he 
consistently relates this negative assessment to his scepticism about the philosophical system of double 
existence. So I follow Hume’s own presentation of his views on external existence by describing his verdicts on 
the vulgar opinion and philosophical system as “sceptical”. 
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“very sceptical” (Abstract 27; SBN 657), he is not suggesting that his own philosophy is 
totally unpalatable, but that it expresses, and inspires, attitudes of caution and reserve. 
 
1.1.4 Reason, Knowledge, and Imagination 
Hume’s sceptical doubts in the Treatise version of his crisis are expressed in terms of the 
failures and shortcomings of human psychological faculties, with special attention given to 
the imagination. Hume’s genetic investigation concerning the belief in body is also couched 
in terms of which faculty is responsible for that belief, and his answer is the imagination. In 
this sub-section, I offer the essential background to understanding the relationship between 
imagination and reason in Hume. Increasingly, commentators have regarded Hume’s view of 
reason as holding the key to better understanding Hume’s scepticism, precisely because the 
term “reason” features so prominently in Hume’s core arguments (see Millican 2012).21   
Hume does not offer his own definition of the term “reason”. The key to grasping 
Hume’s conception of reason is to understand how he adopts and modifies the Lockean 
framework (this approach is taken by Schmitt (2014), Allison (2008), Owen (1999), and 
Garrett (1997)). For many early modern philosophers, reason is one of the mind’s faculties 
and reasoning is this faculty’s “typical activity” (Owen 1999, 1). For Locke specifically, 
reasoning is an inferential activity, involving the grasping of the relations between ideas via 
mediating ideas (Garret 1997, 26–27). Reasoning is to be contrasted with the non-inferential 
activity of intuition, which involves an immediate grasp of relations between ideas (Garrett 
1997, 87). Reasoning is divided into demonstration (which produces knowledge) and 
probable reasoning (which produces opinion) (Owen 1999, 34). Hume gives his own 
                                               
21 In this thesis, I will not enter the debate on whether Hume understands belief to be an occurrent mental state 
or a disposition. As Marušić (2010) observes, some commentators perceive Hume to be inconsistent in this 
regard. This specialised discussion would take me too far afield. 
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statement of the distinction between knowledge and probability pride of place at the start of 
T 1.3. 
Part 3 of Book One of the Treatise is called “Of knowledge and probability” and the 
first section is “Of knowledge”. Hume begins by identifying seven kinds of ideational 
relations with the intention of assigning some of them to the domain of knowledge and others 
to probability (Hume had previously described these relations in T 1.1.5; see Beebee (2011, 
245–50) for discussion). The seven relations are (1) resemblance, (2) contrariety, (3) degrees 
in any quality, (4) proportion in quantity or number, (5) identity, (6) relations of time and 
place, and (7) causation. For Hume, only the first four of these can allow for knowledge; he 
says that only these are “the objects of knowledge and certainty” (T 1.3.1.2; SBN 70). But 
Hume thinks that the first three of these fall under “intuition”, since they strike the mind 
immediately and do not require further examination. Proportion in quantity or number is 
different, because, while in a simple case we can use intuition (such as to discern that 100 is 
greater than 50), in a complex arithmetical calculation, we have to go through the process of 
demonstration.22 Algebra and arithmetic, as the sciences that depend upon relations of 
proportions in quantity and number, are the only fields of inquiry that involve demonstration 
and, thus, knowledge (T 1.3.1.5; SBN 71. See also EHU 4.1; SBN 25). The only worry Hume 
entertains with regard to demonstration is that human beings are fallible and prone to 
mistakes, and so errors arise in practice (see T 1.3.1.6; SBN 71). This is a theme that Hume 
takes up at length in “Of scepticism with regard to reason” (T 1.4.1.1; SBN 180–87). Of the 
three philosophical relations that fall under the domain of probability, only causation can take 
us from the existence of one thing to that of another, and this fact provides Hume’s 
motivation for occupying himself with the topic of cause and effect in T 1.3 (see T 1.3.2.2; 
SBN 73–74). Hume generally treats causal reasoning as reliable even if it is not 
                                               
22 Norton & Norton (2000, 446) give the example of working out 78 C 69 = 5,382. 
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demonstrative. Hume employs causal reasoning all throughout his philosophy, and such 
reasoning fuels his sceptical predicament concerning external existence.23 
Hume broadly inherited his understanding of reason from Locke, but Hume’s 
innovation consists chiefly in his modification of probable reasoning. Garrett (2015, 93) has 
even suggested that Hume’s greatest originality emerges from this modification. Locke 
himself had already departed from Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, by widening the domain 
of probable reasoning. According to Schmitt (2014, 3–11), Locke’s philosophy represents a 
significant step in the “erosion” of the importance of the category of knowledge. For Locke, 
the domain of knowledge encompasses merely intuition, demonstration and, to a small 
degree, sensation (see ECHU 4.3.2–6). Locke compensates this diminution by broadening the 
domain of, as well as the merits, of probability (Schmitt 2014, 11). By identifying only 
algebra and arithmetic as domains of demonstrative knowledge, Hume assigns a very narrow 
scope to demonstrative knowledge. Accordingly, Hume goes even further than Locke in 
widening the scope of probable reasoning, but he does this at the same time that he rejects the 
need for intervening ideas in probable reasoning altogether. Locke, essentially, models 
probable reasoning on demonstrative reasoning, since the mind supplies an intermediate idea 
even in cases of probable reasoning (Schmitt 2014, 136). For Locke, the intervening idea in a 
demonstration suffices to establish a connection between ideas, but, in probable reasoning, 
the intervening idea is a presumption (Schmitt 2014, 47). Locke directly contrasts the 
                                               
23 In the Enquiry, Hume retains the distinction between demonstrative and probable reasoning (see EHU 4.18; 
SBN 35), but he begins his discussion of the “objects of human reason” (EHU 4.1; SBN 25) by drawing a 
distinction between relations of ideas, which are “either intuitively or demonstratively certain” (ibid.), and 
matters of fact, which can only be contingently true or false (EHU 4.2; SBN 25–26). Hume examines the nature 
of causal reasoning in EHU 4 precisely because it is such reasoning that “assures us” of matters of fact 
(EHU 4.3; SBN 26). 
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perception involved in knowledge and the presumption involved in judgement (ECHU 
4.14.4).24 
Hume’s divergence from Locke on probable reason is exemplified in his theory of 
causal belief formation, in which he directly rejects the need for an intervening idea in 
moving from a perception of a cause to an idea of its effect.25 By contrast, Locke had 
explicitly distinguished reasoning amongst ideas with the mere association of ideas (such as 
at ECHU 2.33). Given that Locke had identified reasoning as an inferential activity, Humean 
causal belief formation is not a version of Lockean reasoning at all. Hume rejects the 
fundamental inferential character of causal reasoning, but he does not refrain from giving the 
name “reasoning” to the process by which we come to have causal beliefs. So, while Hume 
adopts the distinction between demonstrative and probable reasoning, he rejects Locke’s 
fundamental characterisation of the latter.  
The faculty that works via the association of ideas for Hume is the imagination. Hume 
initially introduces the faculty of the imagination at T 1.1.3 (“Of the ideas of the memory and 
imagination”). Hume tells us there that memory and the imagination are both representational 
faculties, “by which we repeat our impressions” as ideas, but that only in memory do our 
ideas retain a considerable degree of liveliness or vivacity (T 1.1.3.1; SBN 8–9. See also 
Garrett 2015, 87; Garrett 1997, 20). This is not to suggest that ideas of the imagination 
entirely lack liveliness or vivacity; on the contrary, many of our most lively and fundamental 
beliefs are products of the imagination.26 The point is, the imagination gives us ideas, whereas 
                                               
24 Locke also countenances “knowledge” and “judgment” as two faculties, by means of which knowledge and 
opinion are assented to, respectively (Owen 1999, 34. See also ECHU 4.14.4). 
25 Schmitt (2014, 146, n. 24), Loeb (2002, 53–59), and Owen (1999, 118–46) all hold that the purpose of the 
argument of T 1.3.6 (“Of the inference from the impression to the idea”) is to show that reason is associative for 
Hume. Even if Hume has some more dire epistemological aim in this argument, as maintained by Millican 
(2012; 2007; 2002), this is still at least one of the purposes served by the argument. 
26 Hume is notoriously vague on the meaning of “force”, “vivacity”, and “liveliness”. He describes the “force 
and liveliness” of an idea as that quality by which ideas “strike upon the mind, and make their way into our 
thought or consciousness” (T 1.1.1.1; SBN 1). For discussion see Allison (2008, 16–18) and Norton & Norton 
(2000, 426). 
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the products of memory border on being impressions themselves. Another key difference 
between ideas of the imagination and ideas of memory is that the latter more strictly copy the 
impressions from which they are derived. Memory cannot as freely vary the ideas that it 
derives from impressions (T 1.1.3.2; SBN 9). Memory is the faculty by which past events are 
recalled, and the order of ideas in a given memory remain the same as the original 
impressions of that event.27 The imagination, by contrast, is free with regard to the way it 
composes complex ideas, since it can take from a variety of cognitive inputs and combine 
them without restriction. Hume thinks this fact is so important that he even identifies “the 
liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas” as the “second principle” of his 
philosophy (T 1.1.3.4; SBN 10. Original emphasis. See also T 1.3.7.7; SBN 628–29; EHU 
5.10; SBN 47; EHU 5.12; SBN 49).28 The basic sceptical worry that will arise with regard to 
the imagination is that it is not necessarily sensitive to evidence, since it extrapolates beyond 
the mental input that the mind receives. I shall have more to say about this in my discussion 
of T 1.4.7 in Section 4.2.   
The imagination is strictly free in its capacity to put together ideas, but, as a matter of 
fact, certain ideas are bound up together so that after one another one follows. Hume says 
“some universal principles” are needed to provide some coherence to the ideas of the 
imagination (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10). The qualities of ideas that render them associated are 
resemblance, contiguity (in time or place), and cause and effect (ibid.). Thus, although the 
imagination is introduced as the faculty that repeats impressions as faint ideas, its most 
distinctive characteristic is that it operates via association (see also T 1.3.9.2; SBN 107).  
                                               
27 We can, of course, arbitrarily alter the content of a memory, but then it ceases to be a memory and is, instead, 
a product of imagination.     
28 The first principle being the copy principle of the origin of ideas (T 1.1.1.11–12; SBN 6–7). That this liberty 
principle is made so explicitly central by Hume is somewhat of a neglected point in the secondary literature. 
Even Garrett (2015, 46), when he mentions this principle, suggests that another (Hume’s separability principle; 
see T 1.1.7.3; SBN 18) might well be considered Hume’s second most important principle. 
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Hume extols the place of the imagination in human psychology. However, Hume does 
not use the term “imagination” consistently, so what exactly falls under its scope changes in 
different contexts. In a footnote to T 1.3.9.22 (SBN 117), Hume offers an attempt to clear up 
the situation. He says there is a broad sense of imagination in which it is only opposed to 
memory (as is the case when imagination is first introduced in T 1.1.3). In this context, the 
faintness (i.e. the smaller degree of liveliness) of the products of the imagination is 
distinctive. But there is also a slightly narrower sense of imagination in which it is contrasted 
with demonstrative and probable reasoning. The ideas that are operated on in such reasoning 
are not distinguished from products of the imagination by their faintness. When Hume 
contrasts reason with the imagination he intends to contrast reasoning with operations of the 
imagination that do not involve argumentation (even though they still involve association) 
(Garrett 1997, 27–28). Reason, thus, falls within the imagination itself in the broad sense, 
and Hume is able to do this because reason is associative for him. So, while one of Hume’s 
most original views was to see causal inferences as products of the imagination, he 
sometimes explicitly contrasts reasoning with products of the imagination.  
We cannot understand Hume’s doubts concerning the imagination without grasping 
the place of custom or habit in his philosophy. Hume describes custom as a “principle … 
operating upon the imagination” that enables us to make inferences between objects, since 
they have no inherent causal connections (T 1.3.8.12; SBN 104). The closest Hume comes to 
defining custom in the Treatise is at T 1.3.8 when he says: “we call every thing custom, 
which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion” (T 1.3.8.10; 
SBN 102). In the Enquiry, Hume offers a more complete definition of the “principle” of 
custom: 
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[…] wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity 
to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or 
process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of 
Custom. By employing that word […] We only point out a principle of human nature, 
which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. 
(EHU 5.5; SBN 43. Original emphasis) 
 
So “custom” is the name that people ordinarily give, Hume thinks, to that influence on human 
nature that is not necessarily driven by reason. Thus, there is a strong affinity between custom 
and the narrow sense of “imagination” whereby it is contrasted with reason. It is worth 
observing that in T 1.4.2, Hume’s central discussion of external objects, custom is explicitly 
referred to only in one paragraph (T 1.4.2.22) and there the point is to say how a certain 
aspect of the genetic account of the belief in “body” is not due to custom (the belief in “body” 
will be discussed briefly in the next sub-section and more fully in Section 2.2). The principle 
of custom, therefore, is not itself directly crucial for understanding Hume’s treatment of 
objects, but for grasping Hume’s doubts about imagination that feature in his wider sceptical 
crisis. In both the Treatise and Enquiry versions of Hume’s rehearsal of his sceptical crisis, 
he emphasises the doubt that arises from realising the orthogonality of custom and reason.   
 
1.1.5 Body and Perception 
In this sub-section, I examine Hume’s philosophy of perception in order to offer some 
background for understanding Hume’s philosophy of external existence. I intend this sub-
section to serve as an introduction to some issues that I will explicate further in Chapters 2 
and 3. Laying some groundwork now will also allow me to utilise terms that are essential to 
my overall view when I outline my argument in Section 1.3. 
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The vulgar opinion and philosophical system are both versions of belief in body, 
which is what Hume identifies as the topic of T 1.4.2. In the second paragraph of that section, 
Hume specifies his topic further and delineates two notions that pertain to external existence: 
distinct existence and continued existence. Hume is clear that he draws the distinction 
between distinct and continued existence for expository purposes. He thinks that if any item 
has distinct existence, then it also has continued existence and vice versa (I will use the 
abbreviation “D&C” throughout this thesis): 
 
We ought to examine apart those two questions, which are commonly confounded 
together, viz. why we attribute a CONTINU’D existence to objects, even when they are 
not present to the senses; and why we suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT 
from the mind and perception? Under this last head I comprehend their situation as 
well as relations, their external position as well as the independence of their existence 
and operation. […] But tho’ the decision of the one question decides the other; yet 
that we may the more easily discover the principles of human nature, from whence the 
decision arises, we shall carry along with us this distinction […]. 
(T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188. Original emphasis) 
 
In outline form: 
- “Distinct” existence: the external position of an item to a perceiver, and the 
independence of its existence and operation from a perceiver.29 
                                               
29 Later in T 1.4.2, Hume observes that independence has priority over external position: “when we talk of real 
distinct existences, we have commonly more in our eye their independency than external situation in place, and 
think an object has a sufficient reality, when its being is uninterrupted, and independent of the incessant 
revolutions, which we are conscious of in ourselves” (T 1.4.2.10; SBN 191). The argument for the falsity of the 
vulgar is directed against the independency of perceptions (as we will see in Section 2.3). At the same time, 
however, in his genetic investigation into the vulgar opinion, Hume finds that the mind is first led to an opinion 
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- “Continued” existence: the existence of an item when it is not present to a perceiver.30 
 
It should be noted that Hume’s assumption that an entity enjoys distinct existence if and only 
if it enjoys continued existence has been objected to in the secondary literature, as we will see 
in Section 2.2.  
The vulgar and philosophical systems are distinguished precisely by whether they 
attribute D&C existence to perceptions (the vulgar) or non-perceptions (the philosophical 
system). For Hume, there is nothing that could be an item of experience except a perception. 
In fact, Hume thinks this is “obvious”, and therefore not requiring any argument. Hume’s 
view can rightly be called a fundamental assumption about experience. Hume thinks that 
even those who ultimately disagree with him will nonetheless accept this assumption: 
 
We may observe, that ’tis universally allow’d by philosophers, and is besides pretty 
obvious of itself, that nothing is really ever present with the mind but its perceptions 
or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those 
perceptions they occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing 
but to perceive.  
(T 1.2.6.7; SBN 67. Added emphasis) 
 
By itself, this paragraph might not determine that perceptions are the only objects of 
experience. There are ways of reading “all this is nothing but to perceive” and “nothing is 
really ever present with the mind but its perceptions” that would not commit Hume to what I 
have called his fundamental assumption about experience. There are some theories of 
                                               
of continued existence and that it “without much study or reflection draws the other [distinct existence] along 
with it” (T 1.4.2.44; SBN 210. See also T 1.4.2.23; SBN 199).  
30 I describe distinctness here in terms of a perceiver instead of a mind because Hume’s experiments at 
T 1.4.2.45 show the dependency of perceptions on a perceiver’s bodily organs. 
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perception according to which the inherent aboutness or intentionality of a perception can tell 
us about something beyond itself (see Lutz 2015, 313–16). According to these theories, if I 
see (to take one of Hume’s examples) another person, that might indeed involve having a 
perception of that person, but my perception has to convey that person to me (and the same 
would go for loving, hating, or thinking of a person). Reid stated that we should be careful to 
distinguish between a perception and the object of that perception (2002/1785, 20). For Reid, 
the intentionality of our cognitions is not explained by any more basic feature: according to 
Nichols’ (2007, 68) interpretation of Reid, intentionality is a “primitive, unaccountable 
feature of mind”.31  
Hume, in contrast to Reid, denies that perceptions can tell us about anything besides 
perceptions themselves. We can see this by looking at what Hume says in the paragraph 
following the one just quoted. Hume argues that we lack any idea of an object “specifically 
different” from perception. This term is used by Hume to refer to non-perceptions, or, in 
other words, objects that are of a different species to perceptions (I argue for this more fully 
in Section 2.2). It should be noted that Hume qualifies the following in the final paragraph of 
T 1.2.6, but, nonetheless, this is the immediate application that Hume makes of the view 
expressed at T 1.2.6.7:  
 
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are 
deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that ’tis 
impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically 
different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much 
                                               
31 Reid appeals to language in support of his view. It is just a fact, he claims, that we commonly distinguish 
between a perception and the object the perception is about, and Reid says philosophers ought not to abuse this 
language. Reid obviously has T 1.2.6.7 in mind when he makes the following complaint: “[Hume] gives the 
name of perceptions to every operation of the mind. Love is a perception, hatred a perception. Desire is a 
perception, will is a perception; and, by the same rule, a doubt, a question, a command, is a perception. This is 
an intolerable abuse of language, which no Philosopher has authority to introduce” (Reid 2002/1785, 28). 
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as possible: Let us chace our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the 
universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind 
of existence, but those perceptions, which have appear’d in that narrow compass. 
(T 1.2.6.8; SBN 67–68) 
 
Here, Hume’s fundamental assumption about perception combines with his copy principle of 
the origin of ideas here to preclude a conception of “any thing specifically different from 
ideas and impressions.” The copy principle states that ideas are derived from impressions and 
that they differ only in degree (see T 1.1.1.7; SBN 4. See also Garrett 1997, 21). Against this, 
Reid would say that even a single perception could take us beyond ourselves because of its 
intentionality. Hume and Reid are simply at loggerheads over this issue. 
Since Hume denies that any perception can tell us about the existence of non-
perceptions, some inference will have to be made. Hume is sceptical of our ability to draw 
this inference. This is exemplified in his scepticism of the philosophical system of double 
existence.  
 
1.2 The Development of Hume’s Sceptical Crisis 
I have suggested that grasping Hume’s sceptical crisis is pivotal for reading his epistemology 
and metaphysics. Hume’s sceptical crisis is an expression of a variety of sceptical 
considerations that emerge from different parts of his project, and so we need to understand 
the development of these sceptical considerations. In this section, I explain my view of how 
Hume’s epistemic attitude shifts and develops in the course of his works. 
A preliminary point about the terminology is in place. Hume’s sceptical 
considerations may also be called “doubts”, “worries” or “concerns”, and these are more 
appropriate than the term “arguments”, because Hume does not lay out a number of 
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propositions or claims and show how they connect or build up to a particular conclusion. To a 
large extent, Hume is unclear about the implications of the various sceptical considerations 
that he runs through and he takes no time to reflect on any logical or structural differences 
between them.32 In Chapter 4, I will return to the way in which Hume’s sceptical crisis is best 
characterised as a compilation of different sceptical doubts. 
Hume’s sceptical crisis emerges at the end of Book One of the Treatise and in the last 
section of the Enquiry. These texts begin as genetic projects concerning the operations of the 
human mind. The language of the Introduction to the Treatise and the start of T 1.1 indicate 
that analysing and understanding the operations of the human mind is of central importance 
to Hume. The opening section of the Enquiry similarly pronounces the necessity of 
investigating “the nature of human understanding” as an alternative to, and remedy for, 
“abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon” (EHU 1.12; SBN 12). In T 1.3 and EHU 4, 
Hume’s goal is to understand the idea of the relation of cause and effect, and this is because 
that relation is of supreme importance to the mind’s formation of ideas. Hume does not say at 
the start of T 1.3 or EHU 4 that he is interested in determining whether or not our causal 
beliefs are epistemically justified. 
Although Hume sets out on a genetic investigation, over the course of his texts he 
begins dealing with the question of how beliefs can be justified, or whether they are worthy 
of belief altogether. Loeb, (2002, 63) has acknowledged that in T 1.3, Hume changes the 
subject from belief to justified belief and that he does so “without notice”. In the course of 
T 1.3, Hume draw a distinction between probabilities and proofs in terms of the high level of 
assurance of the latter (see T 1.3.11.2; SBN 124). In the Enquiry, Hume elevates the 
prominence of the distinction between probabilities and proofs, dedicating an entire short 
section to it (EHU 6, “Of Probability”). At T 1.3.12–13, Hume also makes a normative 
                                               
32 Garrett (2015, 213) also opts to refer to the variety of sceptical doubts as sceptical considerations. 
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distinction between philosophical and unphilosophical probabilities, and at T 1.3.15 (“Rules 
by which to judge of cause and effect”) he offers eight general rules for determining the 
veridicality of causal beliefs. He says: “Since therefore ’tis possible for all objects to become 
causes or effects to each other, it may be proper to fix some general rules, by which we may 
know when they really are so” (T 1.3.15.2; SBN 173. Added emphasis).33  
While there is a great deal of complexity to the issue of the possible sceptical 
implications of Hume’s treatment of causation, I will take it for granted that, within the 
context of T 1.3 and EHU 4–5, Hume himself is not perturbed by a possible sweeping, 
negative assessment of causal beliefs (we will see shortly, though, that in the Treatise he 
acknowledges that his causal theory may seem “extravagant and ridiculous” (T 1.3.14.26; 
SBN 167)).34 I will take it for granted that Hume is a sceptic in at least a very loose sense in T 
1.3 and EHU 4–5, that is, a sceptic of tradition and received views. I suggest that the first 
point in the Treatise in which Hume is seriously taken by a more troublesome sceptical threat 
is at the end of T 1.4.2. The last two paragraphs in this section (T 1.4.2.56–57) are distinctive 
for the way in which they display Hume’s poignant and unforeshadowed despair. That said, a 
variety of different considerations are motivating Hume’s sceptical crisis at T 1.4.7. Putting 
them together is a formidable task because (a) it involves engaging with all of the various 
philosophical arguments of Book One of the Treatise and trying to say how they relate, and 
(b) the text of T 1.4.7 is difficult to deconstruct because Hume simply compiles his sceptical 
doubts one on top of the other, and he uses artful, vague imagery right from the very outset of 
                                               
33 The fact that Hume unproblematically suggests that we can have justified causal beliefs does not by itself 
count as a reason to reject an overall sceptical interpretation of Hume on induction and causation. Such a 
suggestion would miss the point of those who read Hume as a sceptic on induction, because they would hold 
that causal beliefs can indeed be conditionally justified on the assumption of the uniformity of nature but that 
once we separately inquire into the justification of this uniformity we are at a loss (see Millican 2007, 165).  
34 Ainslie (2015, 7) agrees: “[Hume] does not, in this Part, worry about possibly [sic] sceptical implications of 
his treatment of causation”. De Pierris (2015) represents the very alternative outlook: she argues that there is a 
continual trajectory of sceptical developments in T 1.3 and T 1.4. Broughton (2004; 2003, esp. 13 ff.) and Loeb 
(2002) share my view that T 1.4 expresses sceptical concerns that turn against attitudes expressed in previous 
parts of the Treatise. Broughton and Loeb present Hume’s final position as more deeply sceptical than Ainslie. 
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the section. I will now briefly defend my claim about the distinctive character of T 1.4.2.56–
57. 
The titles of the sections of T 1.4 suggests that the first two are examinations of 
scepticism (with regard to reason and the senses, respectively) and that Hume moves on when 
he examines ancient philosophy in T 1.4.3 and modern philosophy in T 1.4.4. Approaching 
T 1.4 in this way, however, belies the complexities of the way topics interrelate: the 
concluding section (T 1.4.7) is a culmination of a series of sceptical worries that have built up 
all throughout the Treatise, and some of the sections that follow T 1.4.2 are still pertinent to 
the question of external objects that is explicitly raised in T 1.4.2. Indeed, Hume ends T 1.4.2 
by declaring that he will move on to an examination of systems of the internal and external 
world (T 1.4.2.57; SBN 218). As much as T 1.4.2 represents Hume’s core discussion of 
beliefs in external objects and the sceptical implications of his negative evaluation of such 
beliefs, Hume does not put the issue of external objects or scepticism behind him after T 
1.4.2. 
Ainslie (2015, 39–41) emphasises the structural parallels between T 1.4.1 and T 1.4.2. 
Because I give Hume’s treatment of objects a special place in the development of his 
sceptical crisis, my view stands in contrast to this. As evidence for his view, Ainslie points to 
the similar titles that the two sections have (2015, 8), as well as the fact that the concluding 
paragraph of T 1.4.2 apparently hearkens back to T 1.4.1, since it references, “This sceptical 
doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses …” (T 1.4.2.57; SBN 218) (Ainslie 2015, 
8). Ainslie concedes, though, that the organisation of the two sections are very different. 
Hume only moves to a direct consideration of evaluative questions quite late in T 1.4.2 
(paragraph 44 onwards). Ainslie accounts for this late shift by saying that Hume did not need 
to provide the background on demonstrative and probable reasoning in T 1.4.1, because that 
was already accomplished in T 1.3, but that the background on the belief in body does need to 
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be provided in T 1.4.2 (2015, 41). However, I would observe that there is a more crucial 
difference between the two sections. Hume is unperturbed by the sceptical implications of the 
argument he runs through in T 1.4.1, but the sceptical predicament of T 1.4.2 causes him 
distress and despondency. In order to explicate this difference, a brief analysis of T 1.4.1 is in 
place.  
Following Waldow (2009, 48–49), I will refer to Hume’s argument at T 1.4.1.1–6 
(SBN 180–83) as Hume’s “degeneration argument”.35 This argument leads to the assessment 
that our degree of confidence in any belief, even a supposedly demonstratively certain belief, 
can be reduced to zero once we reflect on the simple fact of human fallibility. Hume suggests 
that human cognitive abilities are simply less than perfect, and that our awareness of this 
ought to make us gradually reduce our confidence in beliefs: “all the rules of logic require a 
continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence” (T 1.4.1.6; SBN 
183). Hume’s response to this dire conclusion is swift and decisive. He directly tells us the 
purpose for which he displayed the degeneration argument and he distances himself from 
scepticism:  
 
Shou’d it here be ask’d me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem 
to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold 
that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures 
of truth and falsehood; I shou’d reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and 
that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely or constantly of that opinion. 
Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as 
well as to breathe and feel […] 
                                               
35 The entire argument can be divided into sub-arguments, such as in Nelson (2017, 68–69, 132–36). Nelson 
uses the term “degeneration argument” to apply only to the reduction of demonstration to probability at 
T 1.4.1.1–3 (SBN 180–81) and not to the extermination of probability itself. For the sake of simplicity, I will 
treat the section as offering a single sceptical argument. 
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My intention then in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic 
sect, is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our 
reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom; and 
that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative parts of our 
natures. 
(T 1.4.1.7–8; SBN 183. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume evidently has a definite end in mind for his rehearsal of the degeneration argument. 
Belief, for Hume, is not an “act of thought” that involves rational choice; it is not an act of 
the “cogitative part of our natures”, but it depends on custom. So, Hume himself does not 
worry that we are irrational in continuing to hold beliefs in face of the degeneration 
argument. Even though he admits that his reader will “find no error in the foregoing 
arguments”, Hume uses this fact to highlight that “any one … may safely conclude, that his 
reasoning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception, which ’tis 
impossible for mere ideas and reflections to destroy” (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 184). Disagreements 
abound as to how to make sense of Hume conceding the soundness of sceptical reasoning in 
this section, and I do not mean to suggest that reading T 1.4.1 is a less formidable task than 
reading T 1.4.2. But there are marked textual differences between the two sections that justify 
paying special attention to the place of the sceptical predicament in the expression of Hume’s 
overall sceptical crisis. Hume’s swift and positive response to the sceptical argument in 
T 1.4.1 stands in contrast with Hume’s expression of sceptical despair at T 1.4.2.56. As Hume 
concludes his investigation into beliefs in external existence, his immediate reaction is to 
rescind the confidence that he assumed at the very start of T 1.4.2: 
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Having thus given an account of all the systems both popular and philosophical, with 
regard to external existences, I cannot forbear giving vent to a certain sentiment, 
which arises upon reviewing those systems. I begun this subject with premising, that 
we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou’d be the conclusion, 
I shou’d draw from the whole of my reasoning. But to be ingenuous, I feel myself at 
present of a quite contrary sentiment, and am more inclin’d to repose no faith at all in 
my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such an implicit confidence. 
(T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217. Original emphasis) 
 
In context, Hume has just finished his review of the abject failure of the philosophical system 
to improve on the false vulgar opinion. Hume takes time to summarise his dismay, reminding 
his reader that the imagination is led to a belief in the D&C existence of perceptions from the 
qualities of constancy and coherence of perceptions (this will be discussed in Section 2.1), 
but that such qualities do not actually entail such existence: 
 
I cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false 
suppositions, can ever lead to any solid and rational system. They are the coherence 
and constancy of our perceptions, which produce the opinion of their continu’d 
existence; tho’ these qualities of perceptions have no perceivable connexion with such 
an existence. The constancy of our perceptions has the most considerable effect, and 
yet is attended with the greatest difficulties. ’Tis a gross illusion to suppose, that our 
resembling perceptions are numerically the same; and ’tis this illusion, which leads us 
into the opinion, that these perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even 
when they are not present to the senses.  
(T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217) 
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Later in the same paragraph, Hume says that the philosophical system of double existence 
ostensibly denies the truth of the vulgar opinion but depends on the underlying conviction 
towards the vulgar opinion for any appeal that it might have towards the imagination (this 
will be discussed in Section 3.1). Hume also asserts that what the philosopher calls an 
“object” is really just another perception (I will address this part of the quote in Section 3.2). 
For present purposes, the end of the following passage is most relevant: 
 
This is the case with our popular system. And as to our philosophical one, ’tis liable to 
the same difficulties; and is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity, that it at once 
denies and establishes the vulgar supposition. Philosophers deny our resembling 
perceptions to be identically the same, and uninterrupted; and yet have so great a 
propensity to believe them such, that they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, 
to which they attribute these qualities […] What then can we look for from this 
confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood? And how 
can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? 
(T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217–18) 
 
Very simply, the last two sentences here are unforeshadowed and totally unparalleled up to 
this point in the Treatise. Hume will not again express such dismay until his sceptical crisis in 
T 1.4.7. I propose that this is evidence that Hume’s sceptical predicament is the first of 
several sceptical considerations that compile in T 1.4 for Hume, and which culminate with his 
expression of sceptical despair at T 1.4.7. It is in the sceptical predicament that Hume 
encounters just how the enlivening of ideas can be wholly “trivial” and can lead to “error and 
falshood” (T 1.4.2.56; SBN 218). This element of dismay is missing from T 1.4.1. Pace 
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Ainslie, we need to understand the dissimilitude between T 1.4.1 and T 1.4.2 in order to 
appreciate the significance of Hume’s scepticism with regard to the senses within the wider 
context of his scepticism more generally.  
The final section of T 1.4 is Hume’s expression of his sceptical crisis and his response 
to it. That section recollects thoughts and themes from various parts of the Treatise. In T 1.4, 
Hume identifies and examines a number of unjustified beliefs and unclear ideas that arise 
from the faculty of the imagination. This prompts Hume to cast suspicion over the very 
functioning of the faculty of imagination (at T 1.4.7.3 (SBN 265) he describes all products of 
the imagination as “trivial”, which is a term he uses at T 1.4.2.56). In T 1.3, Hume does not 
raise the worry that causal beliefs being the products of imagination might mean that they are 
unjustified, but he comes to realise this after his results in T 1.4. Since Hume does not 
explicitly reflect on any sceptical implications of his philosophy in T 1.3, there is no 
precedent for the end of T 1.4.2. Hume does acknowledge the counter-intuitiveness of his 
claims that there are no necessary connections between objects and that the idea of such 
connections derives from a mental transition (at T 1.3.14.24–27; SBN 166–68). 36 This is a 
point that Hume recalls in his sceptical crisis (T 1.4.7.5; SBN 266–67). But Hume does not 
initially despair over the counter-intuitiveness of his theory. Indeed, Hume defends the 
results of his theory by saying, “We do not understand our own meaning” when we complain 
that we have been deprived of an idea of a “real connexion betwixt causes and effects” 
(T 1.3.14.27; SBN 166). I will have more to say about the relationship between T 1.3.14 and 
T 1.4.7.5 when I examine Hume’s sceptical crisis in Section 4.2.1. 
Regarding the other sections of T 1.4, the very ending of T 1.4.2 (T 1.4.2.57; 
SBN 218) suggests that T 1.4.3 and T 1.4.4 concern some particular ways of thinking about 
external objects and that T 1.4.5 and T 1.4.6 concern ways of thinking about the mind and 
                                               
36 This aspect of Hume’s theory of causation is emphasised by De Pierris (2015).  
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internal perceptions. That said, I maintain that we should recognise that Hume’s sceptical 
predicament is a special sceptical worry for Hume. It is characterised as an evaluative 
epistemological problem, about what belief or system about external existence we ought to 
endorse. In Section 3.4, I will offer a reading of Hume’s treatment of the modern distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities (which he calls “The modern philosophy” (original 
emphasis) at T 1.4.4.2 (SBN 226)). This is an important discussion which, unlike the 
discussions of ancient philosophy (T 1.4.3), the immateriality of the mind (T 1.4.5), and 
personal identity (T 1.4.6), appears in both the Treatise and Enquiry. In both texts, Hume 
treats his argument concerning the primary/secondary qualities distinction as having sceptical 
implications. In the Enquiry, Hume identifies his argument against the feasibility of that 
distinction as a sceptical “topic” (EHU 12.15; SBN 154). In the Treatise, Hume says in three 
places that his treatment of modern philosophy has sceptical implications: (1) when he briefly 
remarks that the admission that sensible qualities are mind-dependent ought to result in “the 
most extravagant scepticism” (T 1.4.4.6; SBN 227–228); (2) when he ends T 1.4.4 by 
concluding that the belief in external objects is in “direct and total opposition” to reason 
(T 1.4.4.15; SBN 231); and (3) when he includes a footnote back to T 1.4.4 in his rehearsal of 
sceptical worries in T 1.4.7 (T 1.4.7.4; SBN 265–66). I will argue that Hume aims to establish 
a conclusion about the idea of so-called primary qualities in his treatment of modern 
philosophy. Hume’s sceptical predicament is a highly general epistemological problem 
concerning external existence, but the discussion of modern philosophy has a more targeted 
aim. In Section 3.4, I will argue against Jani Hakkarainen’s (2012a; 2012b) thesis that the 
treatment of modern philosophy in the Enquiry commits Hume to there being no idea of 
external existence (I will also discuss the possibility of a relative idea of external objects in 
Section 2.2.2). 
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Since I am reading both the Treatise and the Enquiry, a word is in place about the 
different character of the developments in each of these texts. Book One of the Treatise is 
characterised by the incongruence between the confidence expressed in the Introduction and 
the gloom expressed in T 1.4.7. In this text, Hume loses his grip on his own philosophy 
before the reader’s very eyes. Sceptical worries build up, and then Hume offers his response. 
Section 12 of the Enquiry still relates to previous sections of that work – it is still Hume’s 
own commentary on his epistemology and metaphysics as a whole – but this feature of 
incongruence is missing. This is not to diminish the way in which EHU 12 is puzzling: it is 
still the case that Hume’s response to sceptical worries is hard to decipher. But it would be a 
mistake to think that the Enquiry evinces what I have called “incongruence” in the same way 
as the Treatise. An obvious relevant historical consideration here is that Hume has had time 
to reflect on his project, so no wonder his latter text appears more integrated.37 
Hume’s sceptical crises in the Treatise and the Enquiry are expressed in different 
terms. The crisis in the Treatise foregrounds the faculty of the imagination. The operation of 
the imagination is to enliven ideas via association and Hume entertains suspicion precisely 
over this operation. In the Enquiry, references to the faculty of imagination are minimised. 
Hume frames all of EHU 12 in terms of his novel distinction between “antecedent” and 
“consequent” scepticism (mentioned in Section 1.1.3 above), with discussion of examples of 
the latter constituting most of the entire section (EHU 12.5–22; SBN 150–59).  
Having this background in place, I now proceed to offer an overview of the argument 
of this thesis and outline what each chapter contributes. 
 
                                               
37 Another difference between the texts is that the discussion of causation is directly identified as “sceptical” in 
the titles of the relevant sections of the Enquiry: “Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the 
Understanding” (EHU 4) and “Sceptical Solution of theses Doubts” (EHU 5). A puzzling feature of these texts 
is that there are almost no instances of the term “scepticism” (or its cognates) in them. 
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1.3 Overview of the Argument 
Hume’s predicament about objects concerns the vulgar opinion and the philosophical system. 
Hume’s dissatisfaction is not merely intellectual; he experiences a poignant worry that 
prompts negative thoughts and actions and which, in part, fuels his sceptical crisis. The 
problem is that the vulgar opinion is provably false. We may become aware of the falsity of 
the vulgar belief and attempt to console ourselves by developing a philosophical system of 
the “double existence” of perceptions and objects. Hume has some scathing criticisms of this 
philosophical system, which include that, unlike the vulgar opinion, it is a psychological 
confabulation that cannot be stably believed. Moreover, the philosophical system does not 
really free us from the difficulty of the vulgar opinion, because it is utterly unjustified. Hume 
is simply torn because both the vulgar and philosophical systems are defective. 
Ultimately, Hume is a sceptic about the existence of non-perceptions. The vulgar view 
is what the human person generally always believes, but this is due to ascribing D&C 
existence to perceptions. We can realise the falsity of the vulgar belief upon reflection, and it 
can seriously trouble us (and once we consider the abject failure of the philosophical system, 
our troubles deepen). Once reflection ceases, we forget about the falsity of the vulgar 
opinion, and we forget about the philosophical system entirely. Hume goes on to continue 
living, and indeed, philosophising, in the face of the sceptical predicament, just as he 
continues to live and philosophise in response to his wider sceptical crisis. Crucially, though, 
he does not forsake his scepticism or revise any elements of his philosophy that lead him to 
his sceptical crisis.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis will be devoted to the vulgar opinion. I begin by focusing on a 
reading of the start of T 1.4.2. Two main tasks that I have are, to understand the meaning of 
“body” in that section, and to determine the way in which T 1.2.6 (“Of existence, and external 
existence) informs T 1.4.2, as per Hume’s own footnote at the end of T 1.4.2.2. I argue that 
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we must read the belief in body that Hume investigates at the outset of T 1.4.2 as the vulgar 
belief in objects, which is the belief that perceptions themselves enjoy distinct and continued 
existence. There are two alternative ideas that Hume might investigate: a positive idea of 
objects specifically different from perceptions, and a relative idea of objects specifically 
different from perceptions. I argue that an attentive reading of T 1.2.6 allows us to see that the 
positive idea is impossible for Hume and that he has good reason to dismiss the relative idea 
given his genetic interests at the start of T 1.4.2. In this chapter, I also explicate Hume’s 
reasons for thinking that the vulgar belief is false in both the Treatise and the Enquiry, and I 
observe some differences between these two texts and some questions that arise pertaining to 
them. Hume’s argument for the falsity of the vulgar belief is based on what he considers 
satisfactory experimental reasoning, which is to say, reasoning deriving from observation and 
experience. Since Hume is an experimental philosopher, this means that the evidence 
produced against the vulgar belief is as satisfactory as he can hope for. This is a significant 
thesis that will go a long way towards problematising the suggestion that Hume may easily 
distance himself from his argument against the vulgar belief. I also present evidence from the 
Treatise and the Enquiry that shows that Hume thinks the vulgar belief is psychologically 
compulsive and instinctive. I describe the vulgar as a universal belief and as our default 
position regarding external existence (Hume himself uses the word “universal” at EHU 12.9 
(SBN 152)). 
Chapter 3 of this thesis will be on the philosophical system. I clarify how the 
philosophical system is a confabulation but still the intuitive response to the realisation of the 
falsity of the vulgar belief. I argue that the objects that the philosophical system posits are 
objects “specifically different” from perceptions (Hume uses this term at T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68. 
See also Section 1.1.5 above). I also go through Hume’s reasons for taking the philosophical 
system to be unjustified. Hume finds the reasoning against the philosophical system 
 - 57 - 
satisfactory by his own experimental standards. Hume’s arguments against the philosophical 
system in the Treatise and Enquiry commit him to seeing any belief in non-perceptions as 
unjustified. In this way, I challenge the predominant view of Hume’s scepticism vis-à-vis 
objects, in which Hume has a normative response to sceptical doubts about external 
existence.38 In this chapter, I also consider the relationship between Hume’s scepticism about 
the philosophical system of double existence and his argument against the modern 
philosophical distinction between primary and secondary qualities. I argue against the 
orthodoxy of taking Hume’s argument against this distinction to engender a more penetrating 
problem than Hume’s sceptical predicament (such a position is taken by De Pierris (2015, 
285), Winkler (2015), Hakkarainen (2012a; 2012b), Broughton (2003), Morris (2000), and 
Garrett (1997, 215–18)). My view is that Hume considers both the sceptical predicament and 
the argument against the modern philosophy to present sceptical problems. The two problems 
involve distinct issues: the sceptical predicament reveals a lack of epistemic justification for a 
belief in D&C existence, and the argument against the modern philosophy concerns the 
emptiness of the idea of an object that has primary qualities but lacks secondary qualities. I 
especially argue against Hakkarainen’s (2012a; 2012b) view that the Enquiry version of the 
argument against the modern philosophy commits Hume to there being no idea of non-
perceptions at all. My main evidence against this reading is that Hume directly allows for an 
“imperfect notion” of an “inexplicable something” (EHU 12.16; SBN 155. Original 
emphasis). 
In Chapter 4, I offer a reading of Hume’s sceptical crisis and his responses to it in 
both T 1.4.7 and EHU 12. In both the Treatise and Enquiry, we only get more than a brief 
reply to Hume’s predicament in the context of his response to his general sceptical crisis. My 
                                               
38 Offered by Qu (2017; 2014), Ainslie (2015), Garrett (2015; 1997), Boehm (2013), Rocknak (2013), Kail 
(2010/2007), Kemp Smith (2005/1941), Schnall (2004), Buckle (2001), Owen (1999), Strawson (1992/1989), 
Baier (1991), and Wright (1991; 1986; 1983). 
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central argument pertaining to Hume’s sceptical crisis is that Hume falls back on a moderate 
(or “mitigated” as he calls it in the Enquiry) form of scepticism. I describe Hume’s position 
as residual scepticism in order to capture the way he reverts to a moderate sceptical position 
after conceding that various sceptical worries cannot be refuted. 
In Chapter 5, I defend my reading of Hume as a sceptic about external existence in 
light of my wider argument about his general response to scepticism. In particular, I deal with 
Loeb’s (2002) argument that we can easily amend Hume’s views to accommodate for the 
truth of the vulgar belief. I also deal with the suggestion, that appears in different forms in 
Ainslie (2015) and Garrett (2015; 1997), that Hume’s final position must be less sceptical 
than I insist because he describes himself as a “true sceptic” at T 1.4.7.14 (SBN 273). I also 
consider the possibility that the best way of reading Hume is as endorsing different positions 
in different moods or domains, or from different perspectives (what Hakkarainen (2012a; 
2012b) calls the ‘no-single Hume’ interpretation). I defend my residually sceptical reading of 
Hume against such interpretations by insisting on the integrality of Hume’s sceptical 
predicament to Hume’s sceptical crisis: we have to make sense of the fact that Hume himself 
draws a sceptical result from the predicament and uses it to motivate his residual scepticism. 
Hume does not abandon philosophy in light of any sceptical results, but he does not defeat 
scepticism in the very sense that some commentators insist he must. As Hume’s predicament 
forms part of his residual scepticism, it motivates his final, considered position. To dismiss 
Hume’s scepticism about external existence would be to fail to appreciate his wider 
epistemological views. 
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2. The Vulgar Opinion 
 
2.1 Overview and Preliminaries 
Hume’s account of the vulgar belief represents his treatment of the ordinary belief that we 
generally always adopt regarding external existence. This account is one aspect of Hume’s 
broader project of providing a science of human nature. In the Treatise, Hume’s turn to the 
evaluation of the vulgar opinion at T 1.4.2.44 (SBN 210) represents a key moment in the 
development of his scepticism. Hume’s treatment of the vulgar belief has a noteworthy place 
in the Enquiry too, as his negative evaluation of it forms the first part of the very first 
“profound” sceptical objection in that section (EHU 12.6; SBN 151). 
In Sections 2.1 and Section 2.2, I focus on some issues that apply to Hume’s account 
of the vulgar belief in the Treatise specifically. There are three differences between the 
Treatise and the Enquiry that make this appropriate. Firstly, there are separate sections of the 
Treatise in which Hume goes through his predicament and his wider sceptical crisis (T 1.4.2 
and T 1.4.7), but they all appear in one section in the Enquiry (EHU 12). This makes going 
through EHU 12 a more manageable task. Secondly, in the Enquiry there is no section that 
forms the essential background for reading Hume on external existence (T 1.2.6).39 Thirdly, in 
the Enquiry, Hume does not explain the psychological mechanisms that lead to the vulgar 
opinion; he is more directly focused on the tension between this opinion and the 
philosophical system. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, I will devote separate sub-sections to 
discussing the falsity and the universality of the vulgar belief in the Treatise and Enquiry. I 
will use the remainder of this first section to discuss some preliminary issues pertaining to 
T 1.4.2. 
                                               
39 Hume addresses the issue of what is immediately given to us in experience in the Enquiry at the same time 
that he critiques the vulgar opinion (at EHU 12.8; SBN 151–52). 
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This chapter has three main aims: (1) to offer a reading of the content and 
phenomenology of the vulgar opinion (Section 2.2); (2) to show why Hume thinks it is false 
(Section 2.3); and (3) to show that Hume thinks it is our default psychological position 
(Section 2.4). In offering a reading of the content of the vulgar belief, I will consider the 
relationship between T 1.4.2 and the earlier section T 1.2.6 (“Of existence, and external 
existence”). These two sections are linked by Hume’s own footnotes (at T 1.2.6.9 and 
T 1.4.2.2). The earlier section establishes Hume’s basic assumption that only perceptions can 
ever be the direct objects of experience, and that only a peculiar contravention of his copy 
principle allows for the possibility of thought of non-perceptions.  
A simple description of the organisation of Hume’s thought in T 1.4.2 is evasive. The 
bulk of the text pertains to the vulgar opinion: first, an investigation into the genesis of that 
opinion, and then a turn to the question of its epistemic status. Hume devotes a substantial 
portion of T 1.4.2 to his positive account of how the faculty of the imagination gives rise to 
the vulgar belief (T 1.4.2.15–43; SBN 194–210).  
The opening of T 1.4.2 is puzzling because Hume seems to suggest that he will not be 
concerned with justificatory issues at all. He declares early on in T 1.4.2 that he is 
investigating which one of three faculties is responsible for an opinion of distinct and 
continued existence: the senses, reason, or the imagination. But T 1.4.2 is supposed to be on 
scepticism, as per its title. A text can obviously be about scepticism without affirming a 
sceptical conclusion (as T 1.4.1 can naturally be read), but, even given this, the way in which 
T 1.4.2 begins is puzzling. While Hume indeed displays a sceptical argument in T 1.4.1 in 
order to show our imperviousness to it (see T 1.4.1.8; SBN 183–84), the opening paragraph 
of T 1.4.2 does not assert the fact of our imperviousness to scepticism, but its irrelevance. 
Hume says that we can ask what causes us to believe in body, but not whether there be body 
(T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187). In this section, then, Hume seemingly declares that there is no 
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legitimate evaluative question to be asked about the belief in body, and then directs his 
attention towards a genetic project. The fact that Hume begins T 1.4.2 undisturbed by 
sceptical doubts accentuates the shock and despair that he expresses at the end of the section 
(at T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217–18). 
The vulgar belief is that some perceptions enjoy distinct and continued existence 
(“D&C” for short; see Section 1.1.5 above). The vulgar (i.e. those who hold the vulgar 
opinion) do not, however, consciously entertain a belief about perceptions. Hume tells us that 
the vulgar do not distinguish between perceptions and non-perceptions at all. In other words, 
the vulgar do not realise that their perceptions are in fact perceptions. Hume says: 
 
For philosophy informs us, that every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but 
a perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind; whereas the vulgar 
confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continu’d existence to the 
very things they feel or see. 
(T 1.4.2.14; SBN 193. Added emphasis) 
 
By saying the vulgar “confound” perceptions, Hume does not mean that the vulgar confuse 
them, as if they consciously have trouble telling which is which. The sense of “confound” 
here is that of our word “conflate”.40 Annemarie Butler (2008) explains how the vulgar belief 
works by distinguishing between the content of the belief and the “objective situation of the 
vulgar mind” (2008, 120. Original emphasis). Butler intends this distinction to capture the 
difference between what the vulgar consciously or actively believe, and what those who 
reflect may realise about the vulgar belief: only upon reflection may we realise that the items 
                                               
40 Norton & Norton (2000, 574) define “confound” in Hume’s Treatise as “confuse, jumble together”. 
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to which the vulgar attribute D&C existence are in fact perceptions. Butler (2008, 152, n. 11) 
also suggests that another way of making the point is through the de dicto/de re distinction.41 
Such a distinction is employed to differentiate between having a belief that an object is such 
and such, on the one hand, and holding a belief about an object being such and such, on the 
other hand. For illustration: a child may carry Hume’s Treatise and think “this is a large 
book”, but they do not know the contents or the authorship of the book, so they have a de re 
belief about the Treatise and not a de dicto belief. They have a belief about what is in fact the 
Treatise, but they would not report that “Hume’s Treatise is large”. Butler says that the 
vulgar have de re beliefs because they have beliefs about perceptions, but they do not have de 
dicto beliefs because they do not actively entertain thoughts about perceptions. 
Although the vulgar do not cognise their perceptions as such, they also do not 
indiscriminately attribute D&C existence to all perceptions. Impressions of pain and pleasure 
are sensory impressions, but even the vulgar do not pretend that these exist independently of 
themselves (T 1.4.2.12; SBN 192). The vulgar still operate with an understanding that some 
things are internal and others external, as Hume explicitly says in the very last paragraph of 
T 1.4.2 (T 1.4.2.57; SBN 218).  
Hume identifies both the constancy and coherence of perceptions as the qualities of 
perceptual experience that lead the imagination to the vulgar opinion (T 1.4.2.15; SBN 194). 
Constancy is that quality whereby perceptions do not change despite interruptions (such as 
blinking or turning one’s head) and coherence is that quality whereby any changes that we do 
perceive accord with our wider system of beliefs. Hume refuses to consider constancy as a 
special case of coherence, instead maintaining that these two qualities together lead the 
imagination to the vulgar opinion.42 Hume explains how coherence contributes to the belief in 
                                               
41 Miren Boehm has also suggested that the de dicto/de re distinction can be useful for describing the vulgar 
belief (in her comments responding to my presentation at the 2017 Hume Society Conference).  
42 Loeb (2002) considers this a puzzling feature of Hume’s account of the vulgar belief. This will be further 
discussed in Section 5.2. 
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D&C existence in the space of four paragraphs (T 1.4.2.19–22; SBN 195–98). Hume 
illustrates how coherence works by saying that his perception of a fire at one moment is not 
the same as it is an hour later, but that he expects it to change in this fashion (T 1.4.2.19; SBN 
195). He adds a second illustration in which he describes how, upon hearing the sound of a 
door opening without seeing it, he supposes the present and past existence of the door 
(T 1.4.2.20; SBN 196).43 The explanation of how constancy contributes to the vulgar belief is 
notoriously tortuous, and Hume is even self-conscious about the complexity of the account. 
He calls it, “a considerable compass of very profound reasoning” (T 1.4.2.23; SBN 199) and 
confesses that “an intelligent reader will find less difficulty to assent to this system, than to 
comprehend it fully and distinctly” (T 1.4.2.43; SBN 209). Hume summarises his genetic 
argument at T 1.4.2.24 (SBN 199) before delineating four sub-topics at T 1.4.2.25 (SBN 199–
200) that together constitute his full explication of constancy.44 These four topics go on to 
constitute a substantial portion of the entire section (Hume finalises the fourth and final topic 
at T 1.4.2.43; SBN 209–10). 
Hume holds that the vulgar opinion is false. He employs causal reasoning to establish 
this. Hume fully endorses this reasoning, and, as will become clear in Chapter 4, he endorses 
such reasoning even when he adopts his position of moderate or mitigated scepticism. This is 
significant because it tells against the suggestion that Hume resolves his sceptical 
                                               
43 This illustration incidentally reveals that the vulgar sometimes attribute D&C existence not just to their 
present impressions, but to their ideas (as observed by Rocknak (2013, 108, 112–13)). Note also that Hume had 
foreshadowed the way in which we imagine a world far beyond the reach of our senses and memory in his 
explication of two systems of “reality” at T 1.3.9.3–4 (SBN 107–08). We call what we directly sense and vividly 
remember “realities”, and we also call “realities” some things that we have no direct memory of and have never 
sensed. Hume says that he has no memory or sense experience of Rome, but that, nonetheless, the idea of such a 
place for him “is connected with such impressions as I remember to have received from the conversation and 
books of travellers and historians” (T 1.3.9.4; SBN 108) (see also Rocknak (2013, 113–15)). 
44 These are: (1) an explanation of the philosophical sense of “identity”; (2) an explanation of why the 
resemblance of interrupted perceptions leads to an attribution of identity to them; (3) an explanation of why we 
attribute continued existence to those resembling perceptions that we (mistakenly) take to be identical; (4) an 
explanation of why the supposition of continued existence has sufficient liveliness or vivacity to constitute 
belief. 
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predicament by later realising that he need not be convinced of his negative assessment of the 
vulgar belief.  
In the Treatise, Hume calls the numerous considerations against the truth of the vulgar 
opinion “experiments”. In Hume’s time, the word “experiment” did not necessarily refer to a 
controlled scientific test, but was used more loosely to refer to observations derived from 
experience (Norton & Norton 2000, 425; Beauchamp 1999, 227). Hume calls such 
observations “experiments” all throughout his texts.45  
An issue arises with regard to Hume’s need to resort to experiments to establish the 
falsity of the vulgar belief. Hume’s language in his argument against the senses being capable 
of producing any belief in D&C existence already suggests that he thinks the vulgar belief is 
false. Hume appeals to a notion that is now referred to in the literature as mental 
transparency or Hume’s transparency thesis (discussed by Qu (2015)). While I will refrain 
from entering into the debate over defining this thesis precisely, it generally concerns some 
sense in which we cannot be mistaken about facts about our own perceptions (which specific 
facts, and what conditions might need to be met before we can be impervious to error, are 
matters of contention).46 Qu (2015) suggests that one of the most important desiderata for an 
interpretation of Hume’s transparency thesis is to account for Hume saying that it is 
altogether impossible that the senses could deceive us with regard to distinct existence (at 
T 1.4.2.7 and T 1.4.2.11). Hume’s argument for this impossibility tacitly assumes that the 
distinct existence of perceptions is false. 
                                               
45 Some notable instances outside of T 1.4.2 are: T 1.3.8.3–5; SBN 99–100; T 1.3.8.8–11; SBN 101–103; 
T 1.4.6.9; SBN 256; T 2.2.2.1–27; SBN 332–347; T 2.2.9.5; SBN 382–383; EHU 5.15–17; SBN 51–52; 
EHU 8.7–9; SBN 83–85. 
46 Qu (2015) identifies different interpretations of the transparency thesis as follows: (i) we cannot ever be 
mistaken about any aspect of our perceptions; (ii) we cannot be mistaken about any aspect of our perceptions so 
long as they are carefully considered; (iii) our higher-order perceptions of our perceptions as perceptions cannot 
be mistaken (endorsed by Baxter 2008); and (iv) we cannot fail to apprehend the qualitative characters of our 
current perceptions and these apprehensions cannot fail to be veridical (Qu’s own view). “Qualitative character” 
for Qu means, “the raw phenomenal feel or ‘what-it-is-like-ness’ of a perception” (2015, 2). 
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After ruling out the possibility that the senses could produce an opinion of continued 
existence (at T 1.4.2.3; SBN 188–89), Hume considers the possibility that the senses could 
immediately convey perceptions that enjoy distinct existence.47 Strikingly, Hume suggests 
that this would involve the senses reporting a falsehood: “If our senses, therefore, suggest any 
idea of distinct existences, they must convey the impressions as those very existences, by a 
kind of fallacy and illusion” (T 1.4.2.5; SBN 189. Added emphasis). Hume has not offered 
any argument against the very fact of the distinct existence of impressions at this point; he 
has not even previously hinted that the belief being investigated in T 1.4.2 might be fallacious 
or illusory. 
Hume offers his argument against the senses conveying perceptions as distinct 
existences by utilising a conditional: “Now if the senses presented our impressions as 
external to, and independent of ourselves, [then] both the objects and ourselves must be 
obvious to our senses” (T 1.4.2.5; SBN 189). Hume appeals to the obscurity attached to the 
question of the nature of a human subject (the question of “identity”) in order to argue by 
modus tollens that the senses do not present impressions as distinct (T 1.4.2.6; SBN 189–
90).48 Hume then adds to this argument by establishing the total impossibility of the senses 
conveying a notion of distinct existence. The puzzle about the following paragraph is that 
there are two ways to read it, and either Hume’s argument entirely misses the point or it begs 
the question. He says: 
 
                                               
47 In the same paragraph, Hume clarifies that the question at hand concerns perceptions themselves and not non-
perceptions. Hume says the relevant question concerns not the “nature” of sensations (that is, not whether non-
perceptions are the direct objects of experience), but concerns the “relations and situations” of sensations (T 
1.4.2.5; SBN 189). 
48 When Hume restricts the discussion to the faculty of the senses, the question of the D&C existence of 
perceptions becomes the question of the D&C existences of the objects of sensation, which are sensory 
impressions. 
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Add to this, that every impression, external and internal, passions, affections, 
sensations, pains and pleasures, are originally on the same footing; and that whatever 
other differences we may observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true 
colours, as impressions or perceptions. 
(T 1.4.2.7; SBN 190) 
 
So far, there is nothing here that would indicate that sensations necessarily lack distinct 
existence. However, Hume says in the very next sentence that it is not possible – he even 
goes as far as saying it is not “conceivable” – that the senses could deceive us with regard to 
the question of the distinct existence of sensations. He concludes: 
 
Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality a perception, ’tis impossible any 
thing shou’d to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that even where we are 
most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken. 
(T 1.4.2.7; SBN 190. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume already established in T 1.2.6 that the direct objects of the mind are perceptions. But 
this alone is not relevant to the question at hand. Whether or not we are presented with 
perceptions or non-perceptions in sense experience is one question, and whether we are 
presented with perceptions that enjoy distinct existence is another. We may read the passage 
as asserting that everything that enters the mind is a mere perception, that is, a mental item 
that lacks distinct existence. But now Hume would be simply stating what he is supposed to 
be arguing for.  
Hume’s official position, which derives from his conceivability principle, is that it is 
possible for a perception to exist outside of and independently of any mind (T 1.4.2.40; 
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SBN 207–08).49 At the same time, though, he does seem to think that simple reflection shows 
that one’s perceptions are in fact dependent on one’s mind and, therefore, by his 
understanding of the logic of D&C existence, enjoy neither distinct nor continued existence. I 
will have more to say about the apparent tension between Hume’s conceivability principle 
and his argument against the vulgar belief in relation to my discussion of Loeb (2002) in 
Section 5.2. Overall, the position that Hume arrives at concerning the vulgar belief is that it is 
the product of the imagination and that experimental reasoning confirms its falsity. Hume 
thinks that neither the faculty of the senses nor reason can produce any opinion of distinct or 
continued existence. I maintain that Hume’s style of argument against the vulgar belief is 
characteristic of his experimental approach to philosophy. 
 
2.2 The Content of the Vulgar Belief 
2.2.1 Body 
The vulgar and the philosophical beliefs are both versions of belief in body. In general, 
“body” refers to those composite objects that we take ourselves to be able to encounter in 
sense experience.50 The use of the word “body” in T 1.4.2.1 (SBN 187) might superficially 
suggest that Hume’s topic throughout T 1.4.2 is what he identifies at T 1.2.6.9 (SBN 68) as 
objects specifically different from perceptions. Close attention to the first two paragraphs of 
T 1.4.2, however, tells against such a reading. At the end of T 1.4.2.2, Hume refers back to 
T 1.2.6 with a footnote and makes it clear that the only sense of “body” he could possibly be 
dealing with is to be gleaned from that earlier section. He says that the notion of an external 
                                               
49 For Hume’s statement of the conceivability principle see T 1.1.7.6; SBN 19–20; T 1.2.2.8; SBN 32; T 1.4.5.5; 
SBN 233.  
50 This sense of “body” emerges from T 1.2.4.24; SBN 47–49; T 1.2.5.10; SBN 57; T 1.2.5.16; SBN 59; 
T 1.2.5.24; SBN 63; T 1.2.5.26; SBN 64. Locke has more to say by way of describing “body” than Hume (see 
ECHU 2.23.16–17). It is not built into the definition of “bodies” that they are material or physical objects, since 
phenomenalists and idealists would analyse “body” in terms of perceptions. 
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object as specifically different from perception is absurd (note that Hume inserts his own 
footnote at the end of the following passage): 
 
But tho’ the decision of the one question decides the other [i.e. of distinct and 
continued existence]; yet that we may the more easily discover the principles of 
human nature, from whence the decision arises, we shall carry along with us this 
distinction, and shall consider, whether it be the senses, reason, or the imagination, 
that produces the opinion of a continu’d or of a distinct existence. These are the only 
questions, that are intelligible on the present subject. For as to the notion of external 
existence, when taken for something specifically different from our perceptions, we 
have already shewn its absurdity.[Hume’s footnote to T 1.2.6] 
(T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume is here justifying treating separately the questions of distinct and continued existence, 
and his simple point is that it will ease his genetic investigation. On this distinction Hume 
says: “[…] why we attribute a CONTINU’D existence to objects, even when they are not 
present to the senses; and why we suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT from the mind 
and perception?” (T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188. See also Section 1.1.5 above). Hume says, moreover, 
that “distinct existence” encompasses the external position of perceptions and the 
independence of both their existence and operation (ibid.). Hume understands a logical 
implication to hold both ways between distinct and continued existence: an object has distinct 
existence if and only if it has continued existence. In the secondary literature, it has been 
thought that Hume neglects the possibility that items with distinct existence could come in 
and out of existence at the very moment when they are experienced (see Ainslie (2015, 48); 
Allison (2008, 231); Price (1940, 18)). Such items would enjoy distinct existence without 
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continued existence. Hume himself does not countenance such a possibility, and he utilises 
the biconditional between distinct and continued existence throughout T 1.4.2. As part of his 
genetic investigation, Hume makes it clear that the imagination is led to attribute continued 
existence to perceptions first, and then the mind simply “draws [distinct existence] along with 
it” (T 1.4.2.44; SBN 210; see also T 1.4.2.23; SBN 199).  
At the end of T 1.4.2.2, Hume is contrasting an absurdity with some intelligible 
“questions” (the plural indicating that Hume is counting continued and distinct existence as 
separate). The present task is to identify what the absurd question is. Reading directly off the 
text, the absurdity is “the notion of external existence, when taken for something specifically 
different from our perceptions …”. The footnote at the end of the sentence points us to 
T 1.2.6. There, Hume discusses the possibility of an idea of external existence in the space of 
three paragraphs (he does not draw a distinction between distinct and continued existence at 
this point) and in the final paragraph he concedes the possibility of a relative idea of external 
objects, saying that this is the “farthest we can go towards” an idea of an object specifically 
different from perception (T 1.2.6.7–9; SBN 67–68). I proceed now to clarify the meaning of 
this “relative idea” with the intention of elucidating the subject matter of T 1.4.2. 
 
2.2.2 Relative Ideas 
In this sub-section, I maintain that Hume’s view is that a positive idea of anything 
specifically different from perception (in a word, of a non-perception) is impossible. In 
T 1.4.2.2, Hume is telling us that because of this impossibility he is instead investigating the 
idea of the D&C existence of perceptions themselves.  
The distinction between relative and positive ideas was made by Hume’s 
predecessors, including Locke and Berkeley (Flage 1990, 42–43).51 Flage (1990) stresses the 
                                               
51 Flage draws on Locke (1975/1690), Berkeley (1949), and (Hume’s contemporary) Reid (1969/1788). 
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historical characterisation of positive ideas, by Hume and others, as “images” (1990, 42). 
Positive ideas are those ordinary, imagistic ideas that Hume is generally concerned with 
throughout his entire project. 52 For Hume, the copy principle describes the psychological 
genesis of positive ideas: upon having a complex sensory impression of a fire, for example, 
one retains a positive idea of that fire (indeed, the difference between the impression and the 
idea is just the degree of liveliness. See T 1.1.1.1; SBN 1; T 1.1.1.5; SBN 3). In his chapter in 
The New Hume Debate (2007), Flage takes a different approach to the positive/relative idea 
distinction, arguing that the distinction corresponds roughly to Bertrand Russell’s (1912) 
distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. Such an 
understanding is problematic, however, because the positive/relative idea distinction pertains 
to cognitive content, not to the epistemic question of what we can know or justify. At T 1.2.6, 
Hume allows that we can have the relative idea of an object specifically different from 
perception, but it is not until his criticism of the philosophical system of double existence in 
T 1.4.2 that he shows why the supposition of non-perceptions is unjustified. The two issues 
are therefore distinct for Hume.53 
Flage consistently describes relative ideas in terms of how they function: relative 
ideas refer to an entity (the intentional object of the idea) by means of its relation to other 
things. We have a relative idea of x when we have an idea of some y together with an idea of 
some relation R between x and y. That is all that is requisite to have a relative idea of x;  the x 
is simply, ‘the thing that stands in relation R to the thing y’. Flage (2007) insists that we 
should not commit the mistake of thinking that positive ideas are in all things superior to 
relative ones, since you might have a positive idea of a thing and lack knowledge of the 
                                               
52 Hume defines “ideas” in the opening paragraph of the Treatise as “the faint images” of impressions “in 
thinking and reasoning” (T 1.1.1.1; SBN 1; see also T 1.1.1.11; SBN 6–7). 
53 Furthermore, one of Russell’s illustration of the acquaintance/description distinction involves acquaintance 
with “sense-data” and then description of external objects. To suggest that Hume’s positive/relative idea 
corresponds to this could potentially obfuscate Hume’s views on perception. See Flage (2007, 143) for his 
response to some other charges that the parallel is inappropriate. 
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relations between it and other things, and sometimes knowledge of such relations is more 
practically useful than having a positive idea (compare looking for a book in a library given 
you know its place amongst other books versus holding a picture of it).  
 The mere claim that Hume allows for relative ideas is itself tendentious, given that 
they seem to represent a contravention of Hume’s copy principle, which is his “first principle 
… in the science of human nature” (T 1.1.1.12; SBN 7). In this sub-section, I will defend the 
claim that Hume allows for relative ideas by looking at two passages from the Treatise 
(T 1.2.6.9 (SBN 68) and T 1.4.5.19 (SBN 241)). I will extend my defence in Section 3.2 when 
I argue that the relative idea of an object specifically different from perception features in the 
philosophical system of double existence, drawing on T 1.4.2.46–57 (SBN 211–18) and 
EHU 12.11–14 (SBN 153–54). 
In T 1.2.6, “Of existence and external existence”, Hume comes close to saying that 
there can be no conception whatsoever of the non-mental, since perceptions are mental 
entities and “To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive” 
(T 1.2.6.7; SBN 67. See also Section 1.1.5 above). Hume qualifies this by saying: 
 
The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos’d 
specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without 
pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking we do not suppose 
them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions 
and durations. But of this more fully hereafter.[Hume’s footnote to T 1.4.2] 
(T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68. Original emphasis) 
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At T 1.4.5.19 (SBN 241), Hume repeats the same qualified claim:  
 
[…] as every idea is deriv’d from a preceding perception, ’tis impossible our idea of a 
perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are 
specifically different from each other. Whatever difference we may suppose betwixt 
them, ’tis still incomprehensible to us; and we are oblig’d either to conceive an 
external object merely as a relation without a relative, or to make it the very same 
with a perception or impression. 
(T 1.4.5.19; SBN 241) 
 
Hume here unpacks the notion of a relative idea, saying we have a conception of “an external 
object merely as a relation without a relative …”. What emerges from this description is that 
an ideational relation involves two relata, but that the relative idea involves only a clear idea 
of one relata. The other is supposed as the thing whatever it is that stands in the relationship. 
Hume takes the idea of an object specifically different from perception to be 
compromised. This explains why he appeals to them so scarcely, and seemingly as little more 
than sidenotes when he does. But Hume does not think there is no idea at all of an object 
specifically different from perceptions. This much emerges clearly from a face-value reading 
of the text; the challenge is to sustain such a reading given other things that Hume says about 
external objects and our ideas of them (as we will see in Section 3.2, one of Hume’s 
criticisms of the philosophical system at T 1.4.2.56 (SBN 218) threatens to undermine the 
fact that Hume countenances relative ideas).  
In light of this understanding of how relative ideas work, we can describe the relative 
idea of an object specifically different from perception in the following way: we have a 
positive idea of perception (understood as the general term “perception”, not just any 
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individual perception) and we have an idea of the relation of specific difference, so we have a 
relative idea of ‘the thing that is specifically different from perception’. Norton & Norton 
(2000, 445) simply claim “specific difference” means “of a different kind or species”, and 
this is the reading of “specific difference” that naturally emerges from T 1.2.6, since Hume 
had just emphasised that we are restricted to thought about perceptions themselves and 
nothing else in two paragraphs preceding T 1.2.6.9. 
Hume does not tell us how we derive the idea of the relation of specific difference. 
We can plausibly entertain the idea of specific difference outside of the context of the relative 
idea of an object specifically different from perception. Just as we can have an idea of a 
relation between two things like ‘larger than’, ‘the same shape as’, or ‘the father of’, we can 
observe a specific difference between them. Garrett (2015, 52) similarly maintains that 
Hume’s allowance for ideas of relations opens up the possibility of relative ideas.54 
To return to T 1.2.6.9, Hume says that, with regard to the relative idea of external 
objects, we cannot pretend to “comprehend” the related objects. This failure of 
comprehension signifies that a relative idea is compromised in its representational capacity 
(which coheres with the description of a relative idea involving a clear idea of only one 
relata). Hume also says, “generally ... we do not suppose” objects to be specifically different 
from perceptions and this raises the question of the relevance of relative ideas. What is clear 
is that if there is an idea of objects specifically different from perception, then it is a relative 
idea. If Hume is not investigating a relative idea at the start of T 1.4.2, then it follows that he 
is not investigating an idea of objects specifically different to perception. Since he is 
                                               
54 A potential issue regarding the idea of specific difference arises from T 1.1.5.10 (SBN 15). Hume says that 
difference is always a negation of a relation, and for this reason he opts to exclude the relation of difference 
from his categorization of “several general heads” of relation, in T 1.1.5. However, he does not say there is no 
idea at all of difference. We can indeed have ideas of difference, and they come in two kinds: either when two 
things fail to be identical, or when two things fail to resemble one another. Thus, Hume’s claim that difference 
is reducible to negation is not, in itself, an obstacle to the possibility of the idea of specific difference.  
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investigating some idea of external objects, it must be the idea of external objects that are not 
specifically different from perceptions. As we have seen, the idea that Hume is investigating 
is the alternative to something that is absurd, and we know that this absurdity is identified in 
T 1.2.6. That section revealed that it is absurd to think that we have a non-relative idea (i.e. 
a positive idea) of an object specifically different from perception.  
Hume gives us a hint as to what it could mean to investigate objects that are not 
specifically different from perceptions when he says the following, just before the very end of 
T 1.4.2.2. These are the very objects that we are directly given in sense experience: 
 
These two questions concerning the continu’d and distinct existence of body are 
intimately connected together. For if the objects of our senses continue to exist, even 
when they are not perceiv’d, their existence is of course independent of and distinct 
from the perception.  
(T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188. Added emphasis).  
 
We know from T 1.2.6.8 that Hume is not open to possibility that “the objects of our senses” 
are non-perceptions. Hume confirms this point a couple of paragraphs later: 
 
That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct, or 
independent, and external, is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single 
perception, and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. 
(T 1.4.2.4; SBN 189. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume dismisses the question of the possibility of a positive idea of objects specifically 
different from perceptions, since all we can do is, “attribute to them different relations, 
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connexions and durations” (T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68). The “them” in this sentence refers to objects 
that are not specifically different from perceptions. Putting this together, we can see that 
Hume is investigating at the outset of T 1.4.2 the belief that perceptions themselves enjoy 
D&C existence. This is what Hume goes on to call the “vulgar” belief.55  
The interpretation that I am offering turns on reading the end of T 1.4.2.2 together 
with T 1.2.6. A fair question to ask is, why are there some suggestions that Hume uses 
“objects” in the sense of non-perceptions in the first half of T 1.4.2.2? To pick out the 
relevant statements in the paragraph: (i) “why we attribute a CONTINU’D existence to 
objects”; (ii) “why we suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT from the mind and 
perception?”; (iii) “if the objects of our senses continue to exist, even when they are not 
perceiv’d, their existence is of course independent of and distinct from the perception” 
(T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188. Added emphasis). The term “the perception” suggests the following 
reading of the third quoted portion above: if mind-independent objects continue to exist when 
not perceived, then they are independent of our perceptions of them. However, I maintain 
such a reading is incompatible with the end of the very same paragraph, as per the 
relationship between T 1.2.6 and T 1.4.2 just explained. Can my reading make sense of Hume 
saying that distinct existence means “independent of and distinct from the perception”? An 
answer may be found in reading “the perception” as “the activity of perception”. Suppose one 
experiences an impression. The impression is itself a perception, but also the very experience 
of the impression is an instance of the activity of perception. So we may read Hume as saying 
that, if an impression continues to exist after the act of perception ceases, then, supposing that 
continued existence implies distinct existence, the impression is distinct from one’s 
perceiving it. This sense of “perception”, to broadly cover activities of the mind, is prevalent 
                                               
55 At T 1.4.2.12; SBN 192; T 1.4.2.14; SBN 193; T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202; T 1.4.2.43; SBN 209; T 1.4.2.46; 211; 
T 1.4.2.49; SBN 213; T 1.4.2.53; SBN 216; T 1.4.2.56; SBN 218. 
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in Locke’s philosophy (see ECHU 2.9.1–3; see also Chappell (1994, 26–28)), and is 
employed by Hume outside of T 1.4.2. 56  
This section has established that Hume rejects the possibility of a positive idea of 
specific difference and opts to investigate the belief in the D&C existence of perceptions 
(which is the vulgar belief) at the start of T 1.4.2. We might think that there is a significant 
lacuna in the very last remark of T 1.4.2.2. Hume is there telling us what the “intelligible” 
questions on the present subject are, but he neglects the relative idea altogether. To explain 
this, we have to realise that, in T 1.4.2, Hume is initially concerned with giving an account of 
the psychological origins of the belief in body that humans actually entertain. In T 1.2.6, 
Hume was already aware that an investigation into the beliefs that humans actually have will 
not have to deal with relative ideas. Recall: “Generally speaking we do not suppose them [our 
perceptions] specifically different …” (T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68. Added emphasis). Thus, Hume’s 
concern with the origins of belief explains his initial snubbing of relative ideas in T 1.4.2.2. I 
shall have much more to say about the psychological prevalence of the vulgar view of objects 
in Section 2.4. 
 
2.3 The Falsity of the Vulgar Belief 
2.3.1 The Falsity in the Treatise 
Hume’s outlook on the vulgar opinion is not merely that there is a lack of support for it, but 
that philosophical reflection on perceptual experience confirms its falsity. Hume uses causal 
reasoning, in particular, to establish that this belief is false. Hume argues for the falsity of the 
vulgar supposition in specific places: T 1.4.2.45 (SBN 210–11) and EHU 12.9 (SBN 152). 
Although Hume lists a multitude of potential experiments at T 1.4.2.45 that could confirm the 
                                               
56 Hume uses “perception” in the sense of the activity of perception at T 1.3.10.3; SBN 119; T 1.4.2.13; SBN 
192; T 1.4.2.16; SBN 194; T 1.4.2.18; SBN 194; T 1.4.2.20; SBN 197; EHU 12.7–8; SBN 151–52. 
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falsity of the vulgar belief, he only elaborates on one of them. Hume proceeds differently in 
the Enquiry, as he cites only one experiment, and it is different from the one that he singles 
out in the Treatise.  
A host of issues pertain to Hume’s experiments against the vulgar opinion. Doubts 
about the adequacy of the Treatise version of the experiments, in particular, have been raised 
frequently in the secondary literature. Loeb (2002) considers the experiments to be 
disconnected from the rest of Hume’s metaphysical views, and he exploits this fact to offer an 
amended reading of T 1.4.2 on which Hume does not take the vulgar belief to be false (this 
will be more thoroughly explored in Section 5.2).57 These issues notwithstanding, Hume’s 
official position is that causal reasoning shows the falsity of the vulgar belief. The fact that 
Hume endorses such reasoning, combined with his recognition that the vulgar belief is his 
own actual belief, results in the falsity of the vulgar belief engendering a serious problem for 
Hume.  
In this sub-section and the next, I will consider the relationship between Hume’s 
argument against the vulgar belief and ancient sceptical arguments pertaining to the senses. 
Ancient sceptical arguments are relevant to both the Treatise and Enquiry treatments of the 
vulgar belief. The multitude of experiments listed in the Treatise seem to be direct references 
to ancient sceptical arguments that pertain to the variations of our perceptions due to arbitrary 
changes (as claimed by Norton & Norton (2000, 477)). But the conclusion that Hume intends 
to establish at T 1.4.2.45 is very different to the ancient sceptical conclusions. The need to 
clarify the difference between Hume’s experiments and ancient arguments is even more 
imperative in the Enquiry, because of a textual puzzle that arises from Hume’s distinction 
                                               
57 Doubts about Hume’s experiments have also been raised by Fogelin (2009a), Bennett (1971), Cook (1968), 
and Price (1940).  
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between “trite” and “profound” sceptical arguments against the senses, as we will see in the 
next sub-section (EHU 12.6; SBN 151).  
At T 1.4.2.45, Hume utilises what he takes to be the logical connection between 
distinct existence and continued existence in order to infer that perceptions have neither. In 
the first sentence of T 1.4.2.45, Hume says his experiments will show that “our perceptions 
are not possest of any independent existence” (T 1.4.2.45; SBN 210. Added emphasis). In the 
final sentence of that paragraph, Hume concludes “our sensible perceptions are not possest of 
any distinct or independent existence” (T 1.4.2.45; SBN 211. Added emphasis).58 In the first 
sentence of T 1.4.2.46 (SBN 211), Hume takes himself to have established “that our 
perceptions have no more a continu’d than an independent existence”. 
The one experiment that Hume takes time to describe involves pressing an eye-ball to 
produce double vision (T 1.4.2.45; SBN 210–11). I will refer to this experiment as “DVE” for 
“double vision experiment”. Pressing an eye-ball produces double vision, but Hume takes the 
second, duplicate image to be an artefact of the eyes being manipulated. No one, not even the 
vulgar, would reasonably attribute continued existence to this second image. But Hume 
thinks it is obvious that the original image and the duplicate are of the same nature. He asserts 
the crux of the argument in one sentence: 
 
But as we do not attribute a continu’d existence to both of these perceptions, and as 
they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are 
dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. 
(T 1.4.2.45; SBN 210–11) 
 
                                               
58 Hume had also singled out the dependency of perceptions in his direct foreshadowing of the falsity of the 
vulgar belief at T 1.4.2.10 (SBN 191).  
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Here, Hume infers that the duplicate image lacks distinct existence because it lacks continued 
existence. Since the duplicate image is dependent for its existence on the manipulation of our 
organs, this means the original is too (whether Hume is entitled to make this inference about 
the original image is precisely the point that has been challenged in the literature).  
The DVE is not original to Hume. Hobbes had produced a similar line of reasoning 
concerning double images in his Human Nature (1839–1845/1650, 4–5), as did Jacques 
Rohault in his System of Natural Philosophy (1969/1723, 6–7). Hume mirrors Hobbes’s 
argument especially closely. Hume’s premise that the two images are “of the same nature” 
echoes Hobbes’s claim that “the one of them is no more inherent than the other” (1839–
1845/1650, 5). 
A few more observations are listed in the same paragraph that are supposed to 
confirm the opinion that perceptions lack independent existence. Loeb (2002, 196) describes 
these considerations as appeals to “perceptual relativity”, because they all involve showing 
how perceptions differ as seemingly trivial circumstances change: 
 
This opinion is confirm’d by the seeming encrease and diminution of objects, 
according to their distance; by the apparent alterations in their figure; by the changes 
in their colour and other qualities from our sickness and distempers; and by an infinite 
number of other experiments of the same kind; from all which we learn, that our 
sensible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or independent existence.  
The natural consequence of this reasoning shou’d be, that our perceptions have 
no more a continu’d than an independent existence. 
(T 1.4.2.45–46; SBN 211) 
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Hume identifies these experiments as essentially the same as the DVE, but we should be 
aware of their differences from it. In the DVE, Hume proceeds by saying that we do not 
attribute continued existence to an artificial image and then asserts that our non-artificial 
sensations must be of the same nature. The experiment from the “encrease and diminution of 
objects” does not parallel this. When we stand at a certain distance from a tower, we can 
discern its shape, but from a very long distance we can perhaps hardly see it (let us suppose 
that one sees it shaped differently). It is not obvious that the vulgar would concede that 
neither has a continued existence. Indeed, given that the vulgar do not distinguish between 
towers and impressions of towers at all, it seems that they would attribute continued existence 
to both items (see T 1.4.2.14; SBN 193). Yet, insofar as the impressions are different, they 
cannot both be veridical (assuming, of course, that the same tower does not suffer arbitrary 
changes). For the argument to be successful, Hume needs to establish that at least one 
perception lacks either continued or distinct existence. A different case might be more 
propitious for Hume. One case of “apparent alterations in … figure” would be of an oar that 
appears straight when above water but bent when inserted halfway into water. The vulgar 
would presumably think that the straight oar enjoys a continued existence, but that their 
impression of a bent oar is an illusion. Ultimately, we can see that there are noteworthy 
differences amongst the variety of the “infinite number” of experiments, let alone the DVE. 
Clearly, Hume’s claim that these are all “of the same kind” is made hastily and betrays a lack 
of philosophical rigour on his part.  
Having given an overview of how Hume’s experiments work, I will now explain the 
different ends that Hume and the ancient sceptics have in mind. The ancient sceptical 
tradition expressed doubts over whether appearances were true (I will use the word 
“veridical”), without reducing appearances to internal, mind-dependent mental states 
(Burnyeat 1982, 25–27). In other words, the ancient sceptics raised doubts concerning what 
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the world is like, without ever directly questioning whether anyone can know that there 
actually is a world beyond one’s own mental perceptions. We can clarify the situation by 
distinguishing the following theses (I use “SS” to indicate sceptical arguments pertaining to 
the senses”): 
 
  SS1: Appearances are sometimes non-veridical. 
  SS2: We can never distinguish veridical and non-veridical appearances. 
 SS3: Perceptions are always mind-dependent. 
 
Hume intends the experiments of T 1.4.2.45 to establish SS3. The ancient sceptical thinkers, 
by contrast, intended to arrive at SS2 by compiling examples of SS1 and casting doubt over 
any way of safeguarding against error (via a criterion).59 We should observe that SS3 is 
anachronistic for ancient thinkers, as they did not distinguish between the mind and 
everything external to the mind in the modern, Cartesian fashion (Burnyeat 1982, 29).60  
For Hume, the perceptual relativity experiments show that perceptions are malleable: 
they are easily influenced by trivial changes in the perceiver. Later, at T 1.4.2.56, Hume will 
offer a sweeping indictment of the senses, but he does not immediately employ the relativity 
arguments for this purpose. In the Enquiry, Hume distinguishes between different types of 
relativity arguments. As we will see, he repeats the observation that one has different 
perceptions based on one’s distance from an object in order to establish the mind-dependency 
                                               
59 Sextus contrasts practical and philosophical criteria, the latter being the most relevant here: “the criterion … is 
spoken of in two ways: in one way it is that to which we attend when we do some things and not others, while in 
another way it is that to which we attend when we say that some things are real and others are not real, and that 
these things are true and those things are false” (Sextus Empiricus 2005, 8). 
60 We should also observe a further, subtle difference between Sextus’s use of an eye-pressing experiment (at 
PH 1.14.47) and Hume’s, which shows that Hume was not directly reading Sextus’s Outlines: Sextus says that 
pressing an eye makes objects appear elongated, as opposed to presenting us with two images (Sextus draws a 
comparison with animals that have elongated pupils here). Norton & Norton (2000, 477) cite Sextus Empiricus’s 
Against the Logicians (Book 1, verse 192; see Sextus Empiricus 2005, 40) as a precedent for the DVE. This text 
is more pertinent, as it does indeed reference seeing double (albeit very briefly). 
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of perceptions, but he explicitly rejects the idea that variations due to sickness and health (and 
variations amongst people) push us towards a sceptical attitude towards the senses.  
There are many different strategies for arriving at a position of scepticism with regard 
to the senses. Which arguments or considerations Hume takes seriously will influence how 
we understand and then scrutinise his response. I maintain that to read Hume’s scepticism as 
Pyrrhonian scepticism would potentially be misleading (such a reading is offered by Baxter 
(2008), Maia Neto (1991) and Popkin (1951)). Hume thinks that the problem of the falsity of 
the vulgar belief, compounded by the abject failure of the philosophical position to improve 
on it, is a dire sceptical problem. Hume does not argue that we cannot determine which 
perceptions are veridical. This is what the Pyrrhonists were concerned with when they 
expounded the problem of establishing a criterion. The problem that arises from Hume’s 
scepticism concerns external existence (or, in the case of T 1.4.2.45, one particular aspect of 
D&C existence, namely, independent existence). As we will see more fully in Chapter 4, 
Hume explicitly distances himself from Pyrrhonism in the Enquiry (EHU 12.23; SBN 159–
60).61 In the next sub-section, we will see that the Enquiry involves contrasting what Hume 
considers to be weak, Pyrrhonian arguments for scepticism about the objects of sense and his 
own sceptical predicament about external existence.  
 
2.3.2 The Falsity in the Enquiry  
Hume’s treatment of scepticism pertaining to the senses in the Enquiry is much shorter than 
in the Treatise, mainly due to Hume omitting the labyrinthine account of how the imagination 
produces the vulgar opinion. Hume also omits the details behind how the imagination moves 
from the realisation of the falsity of the vulgar opinion to the philosophical system. The word 
                                               
61 In light of Hume’s identification of Pyrrhonism with extreme scepticism at EHU 12.23, it is also plausible to 
read T 1.4.1.7–8 (SBN 183–84) as a rejection of Pyrrhonism. Even though the exact term is not used there, 
Hume refers to “that fantastic sect” at T 1.4.1.7.8 (SBN 183). 
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“vulgar” is not used in EHU 12, but the dialectic of the sceptical predicament remains the 
same. 
The Enquiry argument against the vulgar belief is similar to the Treatise version 
insofar as Hume shows that the direct objects of sense are merely perceptions that lack D&C 
existence, but the precise means used to arrive at this conclusion are different. Hume draws a 
distinction between “trite” and “profound” sceptical objections (at EHU 12.6; SBN 151) that 
calls for clarification. By rejecting the efficacy of the trite objections, Hume may seem to be 
repudiating the reasons cited in the Treatise for the falsity of the vulgar, since he mentions, 
“the double images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other appearances of a 
like nature” (ibid.). I maintain that the purpose Hume has in mind when rejecting the efficacy 
of the trite sceptical objections is to show that the DVE (and other considerations) cannot be 
used to establish SS2 (the thesis that we can never distinguish between veridical and non-
veridical appearances). In the Enquiry, Hume still thinks that reflection on perceptual 
experience easily allows us to conclude the truth of SS3 (the thesis that perceptions are 
always mind-dependent).  
Since Hume describes the double existence of perceptions and objects in the very 
same paragraph in which he argues for the falsity of the vulgar opinion, he opens up the 
possibility that the supposition of the double existence of objects and perceptions is a direct 
product of the faculty of reason, which would directly contradict the Treatise (see T 1.4.2.47; 
SBN 212). In this sub-section, I will largely agree with Butler’s (2008) reading of the 
development of the philosophical system in the Enquiry. Butler takes the development of the 
philosophical system to be fundamentally the same in the Enquiry as the Treatise: it is not 
reason alone that leads to it, but the desire to reconcile the falsity of the vulgar belief and the 
opinion that there are some D&C existences. In Chapter 3, I will have much more to say 
about the origins of the philosophical system. The topic must be addressed in this sub-section, 
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though, because the references to the philosophical system in the passage that shows the 
falsity of the vulgar in the Enquiry are conspicuous. 
Before describing the vulgar opinion of external existence, Hume observes some 
“trite” attempts to establish scepticism about the senses:  
 
I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics in all ages, 
against the evidence of sense; such as those which are derived from the imperfection 
and fallaciousness of our organs, on numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of 
an oar in water; the various aspects of objects, according to their different distances; 
the double images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other 
appearances of a like nature. 
(EHU 12.6; SBN 151. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume’s assessment of these considerations seems to involve a repudiation of the “infinite 
number” of experiments referenced at T 1.4.2.45. Remarkably, Hume even cites the DVE. 
Hume displays his awareness of the ancient origin of these considerations by referring to “the 
sceptics in all ages”. However, as was observed in the previous sub-section, Hume uses 
traditional sceptical arguments to establish a distinctly modern conclusion about mind-
dependency (“SS3”). The above portion of text considered by itself leaves it unclear exactly 
what Hume is intending to establish. The rest of the paragraph, though, confirms that these 
experiments merely show that sensory impressions can be easily manipulated, and that this 
alone does not rule out the possibility that the senses can be corrected (that is, that we might 
still be able to distinguish veridical from non-veridical appearances). The conclusion that 
Hume draws from the trite experiments is that the senses are not to be “implicitly” depended 
on, but that we must consider the way in which our sensations can be warped by “the nature 
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of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ” (EHU 12.6; SBN 
151). Consider the DVE specifically. When we press an eye-ball, the senses present us with 
two images. The Hume of the Enquiry thinks it obvious that we ought to correct our senses in 
this instance, by not interfering with the function of our eyes. This is what it means to take 
“the disposition of the organ” into consideration. 
We need not read Hume’s assertion that we ought to correct our impressions as an 
endorsement of the distinction between impressions and non-perceptual objects. In the text, 
Hume is about to explain precisely why he thinks such a distinction cannot withstand 
scrutiny. But we need not interpret Hume’s response to the trite objections insincerely either. 
We should see Hume’s response as revealing that some sceptical considerations pertaining to 
the senses are unconvincing even in light of our naïve, commonsensical standards for judging 
the veridicality of sense impressions. More specifically, this means that, even in a vulgar state 
of mind, we still draw distinctions between veridical and non-veridical sense perceptions (we 
imagine that oars have D&C existence, but we do not imagine that they are bent, even though 
they look that way in the water). In light of the sceptical predicament, this ability would 
definitely be called into doubt, insofar as the belief in D&C existences altogether would be 
called into doubt, but Hume can accept that the predicament (which is a “profound” sceptical 
objection; EHU 12.6; SBN 151) troubles us in this way. The reading that we must resist of 
Hume’s response to the trite objections is that he establishes that some fact about external 
existence is immune to sceptical doubt; on the contrary, the purpose of rejecting those 
arguments is to accentuate the arguments that do convincingly establish sceptical doubt. In 
other words, Hume contrasts the trite objections with the objections he endorses because he 
wants to clarify which considerations brings the evidence of sense into doubt. When we 
return to the vulgar opinion, the trite objections will never bother us, but the predicament 
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will. The predicament, unlike the trite objections, plays a role in Hume’s wider sceptical 
crisis.  
Another textual puzzle that arises from Hume’s argument against the vulgar belief in 
the Enquiry is the similarity between the actual experiment that Hume offers against the 
vulgar belief and one of the trite objections from EHU 12.6, namely, “the various aspects of 
objects, according to their different distances”. Before moving on to that, an explication of 
the argument is in place. 
In the very last sentence of EHU 12.6, Hume alludes to some “more profound 
arguments against the senses, which admit not of so easy a solution” (EHU 12.6; SBN 151).  
He then individuates two arguments, which he also calls “topics” (at EHU 12.14–15; 
SBN 153–55) and “objections” (at EHU 12.16; SBN 155). Hume does not employ the terms 
“vulgar”, “philosophical system” or “double existence” at EHU 12.6–16 and he does not 
distinguish between distinct and continued existence. Nonetheless, the parallel between this 
portion of the Enquiry and Hume’s treatment of the vulgar opinion and philosophical system 
in T 1.4.2 is unmistakable. The first of Hume’s two objections is his sceptical predicament 
(EHU 12.6–14). The second objection (EHU 12.15–16) is a version of Hume’s argument 
against the primary/secondary qualities distinction, originally given at T 1.4.4 (“Of the 
modern philosophy”). These two arguments, made together in the space of eleven paragraphs, 
constitute Hume’s entire treatment of scepticism pertaining to external existence in the 
Enquiry. 
Hume provides the background for the first sceptical objection pertaining to the 
senses by describing “a natural instinct or prepossession” (EHU 12.7; SBN 151). He observes 
that human persons are naturally led to “repose faith in their senses” and to presuppose 
external objects to exist in a mind-independent world (ibid.). Hume says that this “blind and 
powerful instinct” also makes us “suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the 
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external objects” (EHU 12.8; SBN 151). This, I maintain, is a description of the same vulgar 
position that was the object of Hume’s investigation in T 1.4.2. We can see the notions of 
distinct existence and continued existence described in different words in the following 
illustration of Hume’s: 
 
This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, 
independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind which 
perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: Our absence does not annihilate it. 
It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent 
beings, who perceive or contemplate it. 
(EHU 12.8; SBN 151–52) 
 
Hume wastes no time in establishing a sceptical argument concerning this opinion. He says 
that “philosophy” tells against it: the direct items of experience are perceptions only, but 
perceptions are mind-dependent existences that do not inform us of anything beyond 
themselves. He says: 
 
[…] the slightest philosophy […] teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the 
mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through 
which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate 
intercourse between the mind and the object.  
(EHU 12.9; SBN 152)62 
 
                                               
62 Hume’s phrasing here is similar to T 1.4.2.38 (SBN 207): “Here then may arise two questions; First, How we 
can satisfy ourselves in supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated? Secondly, 
After what manner we conceive an object to become present to the mind, without some new creation of a 
perception or image …” (original emphasis). 
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No part of this statement directly refers to perceptions lacking continued existence (what 
Hume had referred to as the “fleeting” existence of perceptions in the Treatise), but Hume 
apparently thinks that it is part of what it means to call something a mental “image” that we 
cannot truly say that it enjoys D&C existence (we can neither say that “Our presence bestows 
not being on it” nor that “Our absence does not annihilate it”). Hume follows this with an 
illustration: 
 
The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real 
table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing 
but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of 
reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we 
consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the 
mind […] 
(EHU 12.9; SBN 152. Original emphasis) 
 
This illustration may seem perplexing in light of the distinction between trite and profound 
arguments against the senses, since Hume seemingly employs here a perceptual relativity 
argument based on distance.63 The logic of the argument may seem to depend on positing a 
mind-independent table and insisting that it does not suffer alterations; however, we should 
recall at this point the difference between perceptual relativity arguments as they were 
employed by ancient sceptics and the purpose that Hume has for such arguments. Hume 
admits that the trite sceptical objections show that perceptions are not always perfectly 
veridical; sometimes they make a large tower seem small, and if we press an eye-ball with a 
                                               
63 Sextus Empiricus describes his “argument … depending on positions, distances, and locations” at 
PH 1.14.118–123.  
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finger we can see two images of a table when we think there is actually only one. At 
EHU 12.6, Hume is content to note that it does not follow from these facts that the senses are 
always fallacious. The purpose that Hume has in mind at EHU 12.9, by contrast, is to show 
that the direct items of our experience are mere perceptions: his exact words are, “nothing but 
perceptions in the mind”. I agree with Butler’s (2008, 128) view that the argument ultimately 
supplied against the vulgar belief is essentially the same in the Treatise and Enquiry, and that 
Hume would have considered the DVE adequate if it was employed for the purpose that he 
has in mind in the at EHU 12.9. Ultimately, it is simply a jarring feature of Hume’s text that 
he directly repudiates the consideration from the change in distances at EHU 12.6 and then 
uses it at EHU 12.9, even if it is for a different purpose. 
Although Hume describes the philosophical system immediately after identifying the 
falsity of the vulgar opinion, we should be careful to avoid inferring that the philosophical 
system is a product of reasoning alone. We come to the supposition of double existence not 
because the realisation of the falsity of the vulgar belief makes us realise that there is a good 
argument for such a supposition, but as a result of the psychological fact that we cannot 
forsake all belief in D&C existences. Butler (2008) has previously argued that the 
philosophical system is not a product of reason in the Enquiry, and therefore that the Enquiry 
does not diverge from the Treatise in this regard. I disagree, however, with Butler’s view that 
there is something besides the vulgar belief that accounts for the inclination towards the 
philosophical system. Butler distinguishes two different opinions that are produced without 
any effort or reflection (which she calls effects of “instinct”): (1) the general belief that an 
external world exists – that is, a world that “depends not on our perception” and that “would 
exist, even though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated” (EHU 12.7; 
SBN 151) and (2) the specific, vulgar opinion that the immediate items of experience enjoy 
external existence (Butler 2008, 134–35). Butler’s distinction is supposed to reflect the fact 
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that Hume himself refers to a general “prepossession” to believe in an external world in a 
separate paragraph to that in which he describes the vulgar belief (at EHU 12.7 and EHU 
12.8, respectively). According to Butler, Hume’s argument at EHU 12.9 is targeted against 
the vulgar belief in the D&C existence of the immediate objects of experience and not the 
general belief that something has external existence. She says, “[the argument] need not 
amount to a wholesale rejection of instinct” (2008, 146). In this way, Butler uses the 
distinction between two effects of instinct to extenuate the sceptical implications of Hume’s 
overall argument at EHU 12.7–14. 
However, we can see at EHU 12.14 that Hume really does think that an unanswerable 
sceptical question derives from the fact of the vulgar being false: “This is a topic, therefore, 
in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph” (EHU 12.14; 
SBN 153). I do not read Hume as qualifying this, as if the sceptic’s victory is only over a 
certain group of philosophers from which Hume excludes himself. On Butler’s interpretation, 
Hume has a reply to the trite objections to the evidence and to the “more profound” one 
(EHU 12.6; SBN 151). For Butler, the argument at EHU 12.7–14 is “more profound” perhaps 
only in the sense that it is more intricate or philosophically interesting. I would insist that 
Butler’s reading of Hume’s predicament cannot account for the significance of the sceptical 
predicament for Hume’s scepticism as a whole. Unlike some other sceptical considerations, 
Hume takes the sceptical predicament seriously and personally (this will be taken up more 
directly in Chapter 4). 
Moreover, Butler’s suggestion that there are two distinct effects of instinct at play in 
EHU 12.7–8 is problematic because Hume’s more detailed account in the Treatise reveals 
that the compulsiveness of the vulgar belief specifically is what drives us towards the 
philosophical system in the face of the realisation of the falsity of the vulgar belief: 
“Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be identically the same, and uninterrupted; 
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and yet have so great a propensity to believe them such …” (T 1.4.2.56; SBN 218. Added 
emphasis). Given that Butler (2008, 117) explicitly claims that Hume’s genetic accounts of 
the philosophical system in the Treatise and Enquiry are the same and that she draws on 
parallels in order to support her analysis of the Enquiry, the objection that her distinction 
between different instincts distorts the Treatise’s account carries much weight. Furthermore, 
the text of the Enquiry does not offer an overwhelming reason to distinguish between two 
different effects of instinct in the way that Butler does. The description of the belief in an 
external world at EHU 12.8 can be seen as part of Hume’s attempt to convince his reader that 
the problem with the vulgar belief really is a problem with the ordinary approach that we take 
to external existences. The belief that sensory images enjoy external existence may seem 
bizarre considered alone (since we generally do not entertain de dicto beliefs about images) 
and so it may seem an implausible description of ordinary phenomenology, but the belief that 
there is an objective, shared, external world would seem familiar to Hume’s readers. Hume’s 
description of our “prepossession” towards the belief in an external world, therefore, would 
serve an expository purpose.  
 
2.4 The Universality of the Vulgar Belief 
2.4.1 Reflection and Default Belief 
So far I have established that Hume takes experimental reasoning to reveal the falsity of the 
vulgar belief. In this section, I show that Hume takes the vulgar belief to be a universal belief. 
I adopt the term “universal” from Hume’s own description of the vulgar belief in the Enquiry 
(EHU 12.9; SBN 152).64 I use the term “universality” to characterise Hume’s references to 
the prevalence of the vulgar belief amongst people, as well as its naturalness and 
                                               
64 Gaskin (1974, 286) also describes the belief in a mind-independent world as “universally” held (in the context 
of describing how natural beliefs work in general). 
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instinctiveness. The “naturalness” of the belief refers to the fact that the vulgar belief is the 
product of the normal functioning of the human mind, and the “instinctiveness” of the belief 
refers to the fact that it is produced without attention or effort. I also understand the 
naturalness of the vulgar belief to mean that it is a compulsive belief that we inevitably 
entertain as our default belief.  
Hume’s project is a science of human nature, and one of the results of this project is 
the realisation that the human person is naturally inclined to imagine that non-identical 
resembling perceptions are objects that enjoy D&C existence. Hume clearly thinks that we 
can reflect so as to have conscious thoughts about our own mental processes, such as about 
how the imagination operates on ideas and impressions. Hume engages in such reflection all 
throughout his philosophy. A more specific sort of reflection that is relevant for 
understanding the vulgar belief involves reflection on perceptual experience, whereby we 
may realise that the immediate data of such experience are perceptions.  
In both the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume very often contrasts vulgar and 
philosophical opinions, or at least mentions them together.65 Hume’s references to the 
“vulgar” confirm that vulgar opinions are common, instinctive and unreflective. Hume comes 
close to offering a definition in the following remark: “The vulgar, who take things according 
to their first appearance…”  (T 1.3.12.5; SBN 132). Hume repeats this phrase verbatim at 
EHU 8.13 (SBN 86). Even if Hume is describing a fact about vulgar people, rather than 
making a conceptual claim about all vulgar opinions, the repetition reveals that he takes it to 
be central to his understanding of vulgarity. It is no wonder, then, that Hume should 
                                               
65 Instances from Treatise Book One (excluding T 1.4.2) are: T 1.2.1.1; SBN 26; T 1.2.3.11; SBN 37; T 1.3.12.1; 
SBN 129; T 1.3.12.6; SBN 132–33; T 1.3.12.20; SBN 138–39; T 1.3.14.4; SBN 157; T 1.3.14.7; SBN 158–59; 
T 1.4.3.9; SBN 222–23. Instances from the Enquiry are: EHU 7.21; SBN 69–71; EHU 9.5; SBN 106–07; 
EHU 11.3; SBN 133. 
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characterise the natural, default view of external existence as the vulgar opinion.66 Before any 
reflection or philosophy is done, human persons take their perceptions to enjoy D&C 
existence. To become aware of our own vulgar opinions, or to adopt the philosophical view, 
requires reflection on perceptual experience. When we specifically reflect on the fact that the 
immediate objects of experience are perceptions only, we can cognise our perceptions as 
such. For Hume, this reflection cannot be more than momentarily sustained. 
The description just offered of the universality of the vulgar belief calls to mind the 
notion of natural beliefs, which has been a prominent feature in the literature on Hume’s 
epistemology since Kemp Smith’s (2005/1941; 1905a; 1905b) seminal scholarship. The 
notion of natural belief is closely associated with psychological imperviousness to sceptical 
challenge: we do not (and cannot) relinquish natural beliefs in face of sceptical doubt, and we 
do not choose to adopt natural beliefs into our belief system because of argument or evidence 
(Gaskin (1974, 284–86) describes this as the “non-rational” nature of those beliefs). I take it 
that the universality of the vulgar belief means that it enjoys such imperviousness, but I 
distance myself from the suggestion that it is therefore inappropriate or illegitimate to ask 
sceptical questions about that belief. While we cannot relinquish the vulgar belief, we can 
still be troubled by a negative epistemic evaluation of it. The fact remains that, for Hume, the 
merit of our natural beliefs can be called into question. The fact of the universality of the 
vulgar belief does not provide an answer to the challenge of reading Hume’s scepticism about 
objects; rather, it allows us to fully appreciate that scepticism. 
The problem with the vulgar belief is not a problem with some special theory adopted 
by a select group of people; it is a problem for our instinct, for what we naturally believe. 
Hume’s sceptical predicament is an epistemological problem that is realised once we reflect, 
                                               
66 There is one aberrational usage of the term “vulgar” at T 1.4.5.15 (SBN 239), where Hume uses it to describe 
philosophy. Hume here uses “vulgar” as a modifier to capture the way in which some philosophical reflections 
are unsophisticated or unrefined. 
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but it is a problem that applies to us even outside of the philosophical study. In brief, the 
universality of the vulgar opinion contributes to the plight of Hume’s predicament. 
In the next two sub-sections, I will clarify the way in which the vulgar belief is 
universal and display the full textual evidence for taking Hume it as such. The abundance of 
references to the universality of the vulgar belief is a clear sign Hume wants to emphasise this 
point. The universality of the vulgar belief creates a dire problem when combined with the 
falsity of that opinion, and Hume is fully aware of this. 
 
2.4.2 The Universality in the Treatise 
Although the opening paragraph of T 1.4.2 (“That is a point that we must take for granted 
…”) is Hume’s most famous statement about the naturalness of a specific belief, the extent to 
which it can be used as textual evidence for the universality of the vulgar belief is limited. 
That passage, considered alone, only shows the naturalness of some belief in body. Only from 
T 1.4.2.2 does it emerge that the topic of T 1.4.2 is the belief in the D&C existence of 
perceptions (this was argued for in Section 2.2 above). For the purpose of displaying the 
universality of the vulgar opinion, we should recall that T 1.2.6 informs Hume’s choice of 
topic at the start of T 1.4.2. At T 1.2.6.9, Hume said that we can have a relative idea of an 
object specifically different from perceptions, but that this is largely irrelevant: “Generally 
speaking we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different 
relations, connexions, and durations” (T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68). For Hume, the belief that we take 
for granted is absolutely not that of “something specifically different from our perceptions” 
(T 1.4.2.4; SBN 188). Rather, what we take for granted is that perceptions themselves enjoy 
D&C existence. 
In the course of Hume’s investigation into the genesis of the vulgar opinion, we see 
several clear references to the universality of that opinion. In Section 2.1, I quoted T 1.4.2.14 
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(SBN 193) as signifying the content of the vulgar belief (“the vulgar confound perceptions 
and objects, and attribute a distinct continu’d existence to the very things they feel or see”). 
The paragraph as a whole reveals Hume’s commitment to the instinctiveness and prevalence 
of the vulgar belief. Hume argues that the belief in D&C existences could not be due to 
reason by appealing to the fact that most people do not concern themselves with arguments 
for the existence of an external world. This would be irrelevant unless he was accounting for 
the belief that most people actually have: 
 
[…] we can attribute a distinct continu’d existence to objects without ever consulting 
REASON, or weighing our opinions by any philosophical principles. And indeed, 
whatever convincing arguments philosophers may fancy they can produce to establish 
the belief of objects independent of the mind, ’tis obvious these arguments are known 
but to very few, and that ’tis not by them, that children, peasants, and the greatest part 
of mankind are induc’d to attribute objects to some impressions, and deny them to 
others.  
(T 1.4.2.14; SBN 193) 
 
The operations of reason are not needed to make us attribute D&C existence to perceptions. 
The number of people who are aware of any purported reasons is much smaller than the 
number that holds the vulgar belief.  
Later in T 1.4.2, Hume reiterates the universality of the vulgar belief by stating that 
the large part of all mankind ascribes identity to resembling perceptions. In the following, 
Hume contrasts the natural vulgar supposition with the confabulated belief in double 
existence: 
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The persons, who entertain this opinion concerning the identity of our resembling 
perceptions, are in general all the unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind, 
(that is, all of us, at one time or other) and consequently such as suppose their 
perceptions to be their only objects, and never think of a double existence internal and 
existence, representing and represent. The very image, which is present to the senses, 
is with us the real body; and ’tis to these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect 
identity. 
(T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205. Added emphasis) 
 
For this to be consistent with Hume’s claim that the vulgar “confound” perceptions and 
objects, we have to render a de re reading of “suppose their perceptions to be their only 
objects”. The vulgar suppose that what are in fact perceptions are their only objects.67 
In the course of his investigation into the genesis of the vulgar belief, Hume feels the 
need to clarify the way in which we could possibly entertain “so palpable a contradiction” as 
the D&C existence of perceptions. He finds it germane to remind his reader of the content 
and significance of the vulgar belief. He says that the vulgar opinion is not a contradiction in 
terms and that his task is to find the means by which we come to believe it: 
 
[…] it may be doubted, whether we can ever assent to so palpable a contradiction, and 
suppose a perception to exist without being present to the mind […]. 
We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not 
concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion 
concerning the continu’d existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner 
                                               
67 Ainslie (2015, 101) also cites T 1.4.2.36 as evidence that the belief we generally always have is the vulgar. 
See also T 1.4.2.31 (SBN 201–02) for Hume’s description of the vulgar belief as considering only “a single 
existence”. 
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in which the conclusion is form’d, and principles from which it is deriv’d. ’Tis 
certain, that almost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest 
part of their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the 
very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material 
existence.  
(T 1.4.2.37–38; SBN 206–07. Added emphasis) 
  
This passage displays that the distinction between the generality of “mankind” and 
“philosophers” is not a sharp one. Crucially for Hume, assent to the philosophical system can 
only be temporary, since all people, even those who devise theories about the external world, 
return to the common vulgar position. Hume makes this same point again in the context of 
offering an account of the psychological origins of the philosophical system. For Hume, the 
vulgar and the philosophical systems are similar insofar as the philosopher still holds that 
there are D&C existences that bear some relevant relation to our immediate objects of 
experience: 
 
Another advantage of this philosophical system is … [that] we can humour our reason 
for a moment, when it becomes troublesome and sollicitous [sic]; and yet upon its 
least negligence or inattention, can easily return to the vulgar and natural notions. 
Accordingly we find, that philosophers neglect not this advantage; but immediately 
upon leaving their closets, mingle with the rest of mankind in those exploded 
opinions, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue identically and 
uninterruptedly the same in all their interrupted appearances. 
(T 1.4.2.53; SBN 216. Added emphasis) 
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Hume is here expressing the view that the proponents of the philosophical system naturally 
fall back on the compulsive vulgar opinion that they ostensibly reject.  
 
2.4.3 The Universality in the Enquiry 
The universality of the belief that perceptions themselves enjoy external existence emerges 
clearly at EHU 12.7–14 (SBN 151–54). Hume introduces the first sceptical objection 
pertaining to the faculty of the senses as follows: 
 
It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose 
faith in their senses; and […] always suppose an external universe, which depends not 
on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent 
or annihilated. 
(EHU 12.7; SBN 151) 
 
Hume here connects “faith” in the senses to the supposition of an external and thoroughly 
mind-independent world (betraying no interest in the genetic question of what may give rise 
to such notions). Hume describes such a supposition as the result of “a natural instinct or 
prepossession” and he says that we “always” make it. In the same paragraph, he adds that 
animals “are governed by” the same supposition. This is stated simply in one sentence, so 
Hume evidently thinks it requires no argument or evidential support. The following replaces 
the Treatise’s exposition of the meaning of “body” in terms of “distinct” and “continued” 
existence:  
 
It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of 
nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the 
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external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but 
representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel 
hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception […]  
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the 
slightest philosophy […] 
(EHU 12.8–9; SBN 151–152. Added emphasis) 
 
Hume repeats here the strong influence of the instinctive, vulgar view and immediately 
reveals that it cannot withstand the slightest scrutiny. Hume clearly thinks it is relevant that 
the sceptical objection at hand pertains to a natural belief. The fact that the belief in question 
is natural and universal amplifies the seriousness of the sceptical objection.  
At EHU 12.10, Hume turns to the attempted philosophical remedy to the vulgar 
opinion and its deficiency. Hume finds it worth stating that this remedy is not the natural and 
instinctive position: when we turn to the philosophical system we “can no longer plead the 
infallible and irresistible instinct of nature” (EHU 12.10; SBN 152). In the following, Hume 
contrasts the philosophical system about external existence with “the instincts and 
propensities of nature” while recapitulating his evaluations of the vulgar opinion and 
philosophical systems: 
 
This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics 
will always triumph […] Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may 
they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe, that the 
very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this 
principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only 
representations of something external? You here depart from your natural 
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propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, 
which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the 
perceptions are connected with any external objects. 
(EHU 12.14; SBN 153–54. Added emphasis) 
 
It is worth stressing that Hume singles out the unnaturalness of the philosophical system. For 
Hume, the situation is as follows: either we assent to the plainly false, but natural, vulgar 
system, or we attempt to improve on it with an unnatural and unjustified system.  
Overall, Hume takes the vulgar believe to be a universal belief: it applies to all 
people, and even non-human creatures. Hume begins T 1.4.2 as an investigation into the 
genesis of this vulgar belief. He is abundantly aware that the philosophical system is a view 
that cannot be sustained, and that any popularity it has must be explained by its psychological 
dependence on the vulgar belief. In the Enquiry, the detail behind the dependence of the 
philosophical system on the vulgar belief is dropped. Instead of a sceptical problem emerging 
from what began as a genetic investigation, Hume begins with a sceptical objection about the 
senses and makes his psychological claims in order to whet his objection.  
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3. The Philosophical System 
 
3.1 Overview and Preliminaries 
In the Treatise and Enquiry, Hume examines the philosophical system after displaying the 
falsity of the vulgar opinion. Hume treats the philosophical system from the very beginning 
as an attempted, but failed, remedy for the vulgar view; it arises from a desire to 
accommodate the falsity of the vulgar while still allowing that there are some D&C 
existences.  
The Treatise account of the transition from the vulgar opinion to the philosophical 
system exemplifies Hume’s aptitude for keen psychological analysis. Hume accounts for the 
motivations behind the transition and the mechanisms that facilitate it. He finds that the 
philosophical system is a product of the faculty of the imagination, but that it does not have 
any “primary recommendation” to this faculty, since the philosophical system derives any 
psychological vivacity it has from the very conviction behind the vulgar opinion itself 
(T 1.4.2.47; SBN 212. Original emphasis). This means that the associative principles of the 
imagination would not be led by the raw data of experience to the philosophical system; the 
imagination arrives at it only by passing through some medium (the acceptance of some other 
belief, namely, the vulgar opinion). The details of Hume’s analysis are delicate: it is not 
merely the realisation of the falsity of the vulgar belief that pushes us towards the 
philosophical system, but it is actually the underlying, universal conviction towards the 
vulgar opinion itself that accounts for the system. The philosophical system emerges as the 
means for satisfying “contrary principles” that push us towards and pull us away from the 
vulgar opinion (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 216). Hume’s first statement of the origin of the 
philosophical system is difficult to parse and even appears contradictory: 
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Were we not first perswaded, [1] that our perceptions are our only objects, and 
continue to exist even when they no longer make their appearance to the senses, we 
shou’d never be led to think, [2] that our perceptions and objects are different, and 
that our objects alone preserve a continu’d existence. 
(T 1.4.2.46; SBN 211) 
 
The two propositions identified here are jointly inconsistent, because we cannot hold both 
that perceptions enjoy continued existence and that “objects alone” enjoy continued 
existence. But Hume is saying we only come to believe [2] in virtue of believing [1]. The 
explanation for this is that we do not consciously believe two contradictory things at the same 
time, but we sometimes briefly convince ourselves of [2] even though we return to [1] in the 
course of ordinary life. The philosophical system pleases our reason insofar as [1] arises from 
the recognition of the falsity of the vulgar belief. But there is inherent tension in the 
philosophical system, deriving from the fact that it “at once denies and establishes the vulgar 
supposition” (T 1.4.2.56; SBN 218). Hume cites this inherent tension in the philosophical 
system as evidence of its “absurdity” (ibid.). In the Enquiry, Hume does not describe the 
genesis of the philosophical system in detail; he does not directly say that the underlying 
conviction towards the vulgar belief pushes us towards the philosophical system, but just that 
we are “necessitated by reasoning … to embrace a new system” once we realise the falsity of 
the vulgar opinion (EHU 12.10; SBN 152). We could only be “necessitated” to embrace the 
philosophical system if abandoning all belief in D&C existences was not an option. That we 
cannot abandon the belief that there are D&C existences is implicit in the Enquiry, whereas in 
the Treatise Hume states that even the self-declared sceptics “maintained that opinion [that 
there are no D&C existences] in words only, and were never able to bring themselves 
sincerely to believe it” (T 1.4.2.50; SBN 214). 
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Although Hume stresses that the vulgar opinion is the singular, natural belief in D&C 
existences, we should realise that, in terms of a response to the falsity of the vulgar opinion, 
the philosophical system is not merely one choice from amongst many options. Hume thinks 
that positing the double existence of objects and perceptions is itself intuitive once we realise 
the deficiency of the vulgar view. Hume does not emphasise this point, but it is unmistakable. 
Hume thinks the connection between the philosophical system and the universal vulgar belief 
offers an explanation for how the philosophical system could be so widespread: 
 
For as the philosophical system is found by experience to take hold of many minds, 
and in particular of all those, who reflect ever so little on this subject, it must derive 
all its authority from the vulgar system; since it has no original authority of its own. 
(T 1.4.2.49; SBN 213. Added emphasis) 
 
So, while the philosophical system is not a direct product of the imagination, Hume thinks it 
is necessary to account for the prevalence of it. Earlier, Hume had said that the majority of 
mankind never thinks of a double existence (T 1.4.2.14; SBN 193), but we can see that there 
is no contradiction between this and the above quote if we realise that the majority of 
mankind never reflects on the nature of perceptual experience. In stressing that the 
philosophical system is a confabulation, Hume is deriding it for being impermanent. The 
philosophical system is not entirely impossible to entertain. As an impermanent belief, it is 
entertained by a noteworthy number of people. 
As much as Hume characterises the movement towards the philosophical system as a 
prevalent response to the falsity of the vulgar opinion, he also seemingly refers to 
“philosophers” as if it were a more or less identifiable group that he excludes himself from. 
Fogelin (2009a, 78–79) suggests that Hume turns to the philosophical system precisely 
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because it was widely endorsed by other philosophers in Hume’s time. Hume does not cite 
any names himself, but the standard proponent of the philosophical system is taken to be 
Locke. Ainslie treats Hume’s attack on the philosophical system as primarily targeted against 
Locke (2015, 57), but he briefly notes that “suitably modified versions” of the philosophical 
system may be attributed to “Descartes, Hobbes, and others” (2015, 138).68 We may also 
plausibly include Malebranche here, controversies around the correct interpretation of his 
views notwithstanding (see Ayers (1984, 314–23); see Scott (1996) for discussion on 
interpreting Malebranche’s view). Hume certainly does not pay attention to the idiosyncrasies 
of Malebranche’s system, or indeed, any one particular philosopher, but we know from 
Hume’s 1737 letter to his friend Michael Ramsay that he took Malebranche to be a central 
influence on the “metaphysical Parts” of his philosophy.69  
There is no reason why the philosophical system cannot be both a prevalent theory in 
the intellectual world of Hume’s time and a common, intuitive response to realisation of the 
falsity of the vulgar opinion. Seeing the philosophical system as the intuitive response to the 
vulgar opinion allows us to appreciate the significance of Hume’s treatment of it. The fact 
that prominent philosophers in his own time advocated it is not the only reason that Hume 
includes discussion of the philosophical system in both the Treatise and Enquiry. The non-
justification of the philosophical system really does compound the problem of the falsity of 
the vulgar. The sceptical predicament is a problem that applies to “all those, who reflect ever 
so little” (T 1.4.2.49; SBN 213). 
                                               
68 Beauchamp (1999, 57) makes the same claim about the salience of Locke. Butler (2008, 147) cites proponents 
of the system as “Descartes, Locke, among others”. 
69 “I shall submit all my Performances to your Examination, & to make you enter into them more easily, I desire 
of you, if you have Leizure, to read over once le Recherche de la Verité of Pere Malebranche, the Principles of 
Human Knowledge by Dr Berkeley, some of the more metaphysical Articles of Bailes Dictionary; such as those 
[of] Zeno, & Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations would also be useful but don’t know if you will find it easily 
among your Acquaintances. These Books will make you easily comprehend the metaphysical Parts of my 
Reasoning and as to the rest, they have so little Dependence on all former systems of Philosophy, that your 
natural Good Sense will afford you Light enough to judge of their Force & Solidity” (cited in Mossner 
1980/1954, 627). 
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In the next section of this chapter, I clarify the content of the philosophical system by 
paying close attention to Hume’s description of it at T 1.4.2.46–57 (SBN 211–18) and 
EHU 12.11–14 (SBN 153–54). In Section 3.3, I explicate Hume’s argument against the 
justification of the philosophical system. Hume’s scepticism about the philosophical system 
is his scepticism about objects specifically different from perceptions. As such, my view has 
affinity with readings of Hume as a sceptic about non-perceptions, such as Fogelin (2009a; 
2009b; 1985), Hakkarainen (2012a; 2012b), Inukai (2011), and Price (1940). In Section 3.4, I 
consider Hume’s discussion of the primary/secondary qualities distinction at T 1.4.4 and 
EHU 12.15–16. My argument in this section will be that Hume considers both the sceptical 
predicament and the argument against the modern philosophy to present sceptical problems 
and that the two problems involve distinct issues. 
Overall, the philosophical system is a disappointing remedy for the vulgar opinion. In 
T 1.4.2.46, when Hume is still introducing the philosophical system to his reader, he observes 
that “’tis only a palliative remedy” and, remarkably, that “it contains all the difficulties of the 
vulgar system, with some others, that are peculiar to itself” (T 1.4.2.46; SBN 211. Added 
emphasis). Hume summarises his criticisms of the philosophical system before he clarifies 
the content of it, which suggests that Hume takes his reader to be familiar with the proposal 
(the fuller description comes at T 1.4.2.54–55 (SBN 216–17)). Hume maintains that neither 
reason nor the natural principles of the imagination can lead us to the philosophical system. 
Hume’s final position is that, while can become aware of the falsity of the vulgar belief, even 
then we are still compelled by that very belief. 
 
3.2 The Content of the Philosophical System 
In this section, I specify the nature of the “objects” that the philosophical system posits. I 
argue that Hume understands these objects to be specifically different from perceptions. As I 
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argued in Section 2.2.2, Hume allows only for a relative idea of objects specifically different 
from perceptions. A challenge for my view is that Hume does not use the term “relative idea” 
when introducing the philosophical system in the Treatise and he does not explicitly mention 
relative ideas anywhere in EHU 12.  
A further problem is that at T 1.4.2.56 – the penultimate paragraph of T 1.4.2 – Hume 
characterises the philosophical system as positing two sets of perceptions, which is contrary 
to the present suggestion that he posits objects in contrast to perceptions. While disparaging 
the philosophical system, Hume observes: 
 
Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be identically the same, and 
uninterrupted; and yet have so great a propensity to believe them such, that they 
arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they attribute these qualities. I 
say, a new set of perceptions: For we may well suppose in general, but ’tis impossible 
for us distinctly to conceive, objects to be in their nature any thing but exactly the 
same with perceptions. 
(T 1.4.2.56; SBN 218. Added emphasis) 
 
This seems to indicate that relative ideas play no role at all in the philosophical system. My 
first point of reply to this is to highlight the second half of the above quote. Hume says, “For 
we may well suppose in general, but ’tis impossible for us distinctly to conceive …”, which 
indicates that the philosopher might indistinctly conceive objects specifically different from 
perceptions. That the relative idea of objects is indistinctly conceived coheres with the claim 
at T 1.2.6.9 that we fail to “comprehend” one of the related objects in a relative idea. 
I read Hume as endorsing a disjunction at T 1.4.2.56: the philosopher either has a 
positive idea of a perception or they have a relative idea of an object specifically different 
 - 107 - 
from perception. This is consonant with the text, because Hume admits “we may well 
suppose in general” that objects are specifically different from perceptions. It may be 
protested, however, that the supposition is a mere possibility, and that Hume thinks that what 
the philosopher actually does is posit two sets of perceptions. I will argue shortly that we 
should not regard the philosophical system as always involving two sets of perceptions 
because it strains Hume’s contrast between objects and perceptions. Essentially, there is more 
reason to think that those who entertain the philosophical system successfully distinguish 
between objects and perceptions in thought than that they do not. 
Instead of the philosophical system involving ideas of two sets of perceptions, another 
alternative to my reading of the philosophical system is that the distinction between 
perceptions and objects is made in words only and that no idea, positive or relative, 
corresponds to the words “object” and “objects”. I will refer to this as the linguistic 
interpretation of the philosophical system. This interpretation has some prima facie 
feasibility, insofar as Hume criticises, at various places, standard metaphysical theories for 
employing words but having no idea attached to their words. Hume thinks empty concepts 
can be found in the ancient and scholastic notions of “faculty” and “occult quality”, which are 
discussed at T 1.4.3.10 (SBN 224), and the notions of “substance” and “inhesion”, which are 
treated at T 1.4.5.6 (SBN 234).70 Early on in the examination of the philosophical system, 
Hume says that the proponent of the philosophical system “calls” a set of things “objects”, 
and Hume’s choice of verb here might potentially invite us to read the philosophical system 
as making a mere linguistic distinction (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 215. Original emphasis). 
The Enquiry description of the philosophical system is much shorter than the Treatise 
version. No part of this text indicates that Hume takes the second set of objects to be always 
reducible to perceptions themselves, which is a point in favour of my view. However, 
                                               
70 At T 1.4.5.26–27 (SBN 244–46), Hume also criticises the emptiness of the phrase “action [of the mind]”.  
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EHU 12 by itself does not allow us grasp how the idea of objects specifically different from 
perceptions is possible, as there is no direct reference to relative ideas in this section of text.71 
Therefore, in this section, I mainly rely on the detail of the Treatise version in order to 
understand Hume’s considered view. 
When Hume turns to an examination of the philosophical system, he does not describe 
the way in which the philosopher takes objects to relate to perceptions (which is of objects 
causing perceptions, and of resemblance between them; see T 1.4.2.54–55; SBN 216–17). 
Hume launches into invective against the philosophical system as soon as he presents it:  
 
[Philosophers] change their system, and distinguish, (as we shall do for the future) 
betwixt perceptions and objects, of which the former are suppos’d to be interrupted, 
and perishing, and different at every return; the latter to be uninterrupted, and to 
preserve a continu’d existence and identity. But however philosophical this new 
system may be esteem’d, I assert that ’tis only a palliative remedy, and that it contains 
all the difficulties of the vulgar system, with some others, that are peculiar to itself. 
(T 1.4.2.46; SBN 211) 
 
Before this paragraph, Hume had been using “perception” and “object” interchangeably, 
since this way of expressing the matter is appropriate when discussing the vulgar belief (see 
T 1.4.2.31; SBN 201–02). He now tells his reader that he will not take perceptions and 
objects to be the same. The proponent of the philosophical system only assigns D&C 
existence to objects, not perceptions. In this way, the philosophical system is an (attempted) 
remedy for the vulgar opinion; it is specifically designed to accommodate for the falsity of 
                                               
71 There is a direct reference to an “imperfect notion” of external existences at EHU 12.16 (SBN 155). The 
context of this reference will be addressed in Section 3.4.2. 
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the vulgar opinion. Therefore, given that the proponents of the philosophical system actually 
make this accommodation in thought – that is, that they consistently deny distinct and 
continued existence to perceptions – then, if they have any idea corresponding to the term 
“objects”, it will be an idea of non-perceptions. In order to justify this reading, I will offer a 
reading of Hume’s account of the transition from the vulgar belief to the philosophical 
system. 
In T 1.4.2.48, Hume argues that the imagination offers no primary recommendation of 
the philosophical system. He describes the lack of primary recommendation as follows: “[the 
imagination] wou’d never, of itself, and by its original tendency, have fallen upon [the 
philosophical system]” (T 1.4.2.48; SBN 212). It is the conviction towards the vulgar belief in 
conjunction with the realisation of the falsity that belief that pushes us towards the 
philosophical system. The mind is drawn to the philosophical system only once we 
specifically reflect on the nature of perceptual experience and realise that the vulgar opinion 
is false. The fact that the philosophical system arises in this way is a sign that the 
philosophical system cannot be permanently entertained, since the principles pushing us 
towards it will not always be active.  
Hume admits that he cannot rigorously prove that the philosophical system lacks 
primary recommendation from the imagination, but he thinks that anyone who would 
contradict him on this point is faced with a challenge. He says that, given that perceptions are 
in fact dependent and interrupted, “[let] any one upon this supposition show why the fancy, 
directly and immediately, proceeds to the belief of another existence … and … I promise to 
renounce my present opinion” (T 1.4.2.48; SBN 218).72 According to Hume, we can realise 
the falsity of the vulgar belief, but cannot possibly give up believing in D&C existences 
                                               
72 The full paragraph also marks the first time Hume informs his reader that the philosophical system posits 
objects that resemble perceptions. This is stated more directly at T 1.4.2.54 (SBN 216). 
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altogether. The human mind experiences a “struggle” (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 215) between the 
natural, vulgar opinion and the realisation of the falsity of the vulgar belief. The philosophical 
system allows for the coexistence of the falsity of the vulgar opinion and belief in the D&C 
existences. In the first regard, the philosophical system pleases reason, and in the second 
regard, the philosophical system pleases the imagination: 
 
In order to set ourselves at ease in this particular, we contrive a new hypothesis, 
which seems to comprehend both these principles of reason and imagination. This 
hypothesis is the philosophical one of the double existence of perceptions and objects; 
which pleases our reason, in allowing, that our dependent perceptions are interrupted 
and different; and at the same time is agreeable to the imagination, in attributing a 
continu’d existence to something else, which we call objects. […] [We] set ourselves 
at ease as much as possible, by successively granting to each whatever it demands, 
and by feigning a double existence, where each may find something, that has all the 
conditions it desires. 
  (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 215. Original emphasis) 
 
The philosopher posits objects in contrast to perceptions, and each of these play different 
roles in the philosophical system. Hume grants that the lack of D&C existence for 
perceptions would be successfully accounted for by the philosophical system, but his 
criticism is that the belief in D&C non-perceptual objects does not withstand scrutiny. There 
is a difference between the content of the philosophical system not even putatively satisfying 
reason, and the content representing what reason wants but failing to be justified. To put the 
matter differently, the philosophical system pleases reason insofar as it denies that 
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perceptions enjoy D&C existence, but the separate claim of the philosophical system about 
non-perceptions enjoying D&C existence does not satisfy reason. 
In the Enquiry version, Hume no longer takes time to explain the way in which the 
philosophical system is able to please both reason and the imagination. He merely says, “So 
far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts 
of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our sense” 
(EHU 12.10; SBN 152). It is clear in this text, though, that the objects that the philosophical 
system posits are to be contrasted with perceptions. Hume describes the philosophical system 
as positing the existence of objects “entirely different from” perceptions (EHU 12.11; 
SBN 152–3) and as holding that “perceptions are only representations of something external” 
(EHU 12.14; SBN 154). In none of these passages does Hume even hint at any doubt over the 
conceivability of such things.  
Even if there is a case to be made for interpreting the philosophical system as positing 
objects in contrast to perceptions, we still need to account for the reference to “a new set of 
perceptions” at T 1.4.2.56, as remarked earlier. I have already observed that Hume expresses 
a disjunction at T 1.4.2.56: we either have a positive idea of a perception, or we have a 
relative idea of something specifically different. It is incumbent upon me to explain how the 
philosophical system involves two sets of perceptions at least sometimes. We may offer up 
the following picture on Hume’s behalf. So long as the philosopher realises that the vulgar 
belief is false, he or she will be convinced that perceptions lack D&C existence, and so they 
will please their reason by positing the existence of non-perceptions. In this case, the 
philosopher supposes “in general” that D&C non-perceptions exist. However, the philosopher 
may attempt to conceive of objects specifically different from perceptions imagistically, such 
as when they try to conceive of a literal visual resemblance between their perception of a 
table and the purported non-perceptual table that is supposed to cause it and resemble it. In 
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this case, the philosopher could only conceive another perception, as per Hume’s assumption 
from T 1.2.6.7–8.  
We cannot interpret the philosophical system as always involving two sets of 
perceptions, even if the philosopher falls into this mistake some of the time. Hume has 
already conceded that the philosophical system “pleases our reason” by “allowing, that our 
dependent perceptions are interrupted and different” (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 215). By attempting to 
conceive of objects imagistically, the philosopher can only conceive further perceptions, and 
in this regard the philosophical system would not please reason in the way Hume describes it. 
But conceiving of objects imagistically represents a departure from what the philosopher 
typically does anyway. The reference to a second set of perceptions in T 1.4.2.56 is a 
parenthetical remark; the sense of “object” as specifically different from perception (that is, 
as drawn in explicit contrast to “perception”) predominates in Hume’s treatment of the 
philosophical system in the Treatise, not to mention that the Enquiry contains not a shred of 
evidence that the philosopher posits two sets of perceptions. 
Another interpretation of the philosophical system is what I have called the linguistic 
interpretation, according to which the philosopher has no idea at all when they refer to 
“objects” in their system. Powell (2013) has shown that Hume does not think that 
understanding what words mean is sufficient for being able to conceive what those words 
express. Accordingly, we can understand what it means to say that some things are 
impossible, such as “We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley” (T 1.2.2.8; 
SBN 32), without having ideas of impossible things. This means that we cannot infer that 
there must be some idea of objects in the philosophical system just because Hume does not 
say that the system is meaningless. It could be the case that philosophers understand what 
they assert when they say perceptions are caused by and resemble objects, but that they have 
no idea, positive or relative, corresponding to such objects. It seems like one of the textual 
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advantages of this linguistic interpretation is that it is consonant with the fact that Hume does 
not directly refer to relative ideas throughout most of T 1.4.2 
However, there are a couple of considerations that problematise the linguistic 
interpretation of the philosophical system. Firstly, Hume’s statement about what the 
philosopher can conceive at T 1.4.2.56 is supposed to present a challenge to my view, but the 
linguistic interpretation does a worse job of accounting for this passage. As we have seen, 
Hume expresses a disjunction there: we either have a positive idea of a perception, or we 
have a relative idea of an object specifically different from perception. On my reading, the 
philosopher can alternate between the two, but on the linguistic reading the philosopher can 
only alternate between an idea of perception and a mere term with no idea attached. So, the 
linguistic reading would misrender the situation. Secondly, while there are no references to 
relative ideas in the bulk of T 1.4.2, there are no references to mere empty words either, so 
the linguistic interpretation does not fare better than my own in this regard. Hume criticises 
the notions of “faculty” and “occult quality” at T 1.4.3.10 (SBN 224) and “substance” and 
“inhesion” at T 1.4.5.2 (SBN 215) for involving mere wordage. These terms, like the 
philosophical system, are employed by philosophers to put themselves at ease (see T 1.4.2.52; 
SBN 215; T 1.4.3.10; SBN 224). But Hume never criticises the philosophical system of 
double existence for involving mere wordage; on the contrary, he grants that philosophers 
may distinguish between objects and perceptions but then insists that they cannot justify the 
belief in the existence of the objects they posit. So, while the linguistic interpretation 
represents an intriguing suggestion, it struggles to account for the things that Hume does and 
does not say about the conceivability of objects in the philosophical system. 
I do not see Hume’s reference to “two sets of perceptions” at T 1.4.2.56 as entirely 
irrelevant, as if it were an unfortunate phrase or a mistake on Hume’s part. Hume compiles a 
number of criticisms of the philosophical system together in T 1.4.2.46–56 and one of them 
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concerns the ideational content of the items that the philosophers posit. Hume’s view is that 
we ought to suspend judgement about the truth or falsity of the system of double existence (as 
we will see in the next section), and that the idea of the objects specifically different from 
perceptions is compromised because even this thing we suspend judgement about is a thing-
we-know-not-what. As soon as we try to conceive of it imagistically, we revert to having an 
idea of what is in fact a perception, contrary to the very intentions of the philosophers. 
Ultimately, the supposition of a relative idea in the philosophical system has three 
advantages: (1) it coheres with the fact that Hume says in T 1.4.2.56 (in the very sentence that 
is supposed to be a stumbling block for my reading, no less) that we may “suppose in 
general” that objects specifically different to perceptions exist; (2) it gives a less strained 
distinction between “perceptions” and “objects” at T 1.4.2.46–56 and EHU 12.11–14; and (3) 
it accounts for the fact that Hume does not develop the same criticism of the philosophical 
system as he develops of our ideas of substance, faculty, and occult quality. 
 
3.3 Hume’s Scepticism of Double Existence 
3.3.1 Hume’s Scepticism in the Treatise 
In this section, I address Hume’s rationale for taking the philosophical system to be devoid of 
justification. Hume’s reasoning against the philosophical system is elegant and establishes a 
firm conclusion. In both the Treatise and Enquiry versions, Hume’s argument hearkens back 
to his account of causal reasoning provided in early sections of the text (T 1.3 (esp. T 1.3.6–7, 
12–13) and EHU 4–5). Hume officially suspends belief about the causes of perception. He 
does not dogmatically think that there could not be objects that cause and resemble our 
perceptions. He just thinks that we cannot offer any evidence in favour of this proposal. 
The use of causal reasoning to establish a sceptical conclusion raises an issue, since 
Hume adopts some sceptical attitude to such reasoning himself (even if the details remain 
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contentious). What is clear, though, is that Hume does not refrain from causal science and 
experimental philosophy in light of his scepticism. Hume does not pause to reflect on 
sceptical results established by his own philosophy until the end of his metaphysical and 
epistemological investigations (at T 1.4.7 and EHU 12). Any potential problem about Hume’s 
scepticism and his use of causal reasoning will concern his entitlement to confidently engage 
in causal reasoning after this encounter with scepticism. I will have much more to say about 
the challenge of integrating Hume’s scepticism within his philosophy in Sections 4.1.2 and 
5.3 below. For now, suffice it to say that Hume himself does not raise any doubts concerning 
causation when he criticises the philosophical system. Realising that Hume’s scepticism 
about that system emerges from what he considers to be appropriate causal reasoning will 
help us appreciate the force of that scepticism for Hume, and, consequently, the seriousness 
of the sceptical predicament. 
In the Treatise Hume provides a detailed account of the genesis of the philosophical 
system, and, in particular, of the way in which the conviction towards the vulgar belief itself 
accounts for it. Hume shows that reason cannot lead us directly to embrace it. Proponents of 
the philosophical system hold that only perceptions are the direct items of experience but that 
non-perceptions also exist. Hume turns to causal reasoning because it represents the only 
means by which reason could potentially infer the existence of a non-present object: 
 
The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being 
immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are 
the first foundation of all our conclusions. The only conclusion we can draw from the 
existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and 
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effect, which shows, that there is connexion betwixt them, and that the existence of 
one is dependent on that of the other. 
(T 1.4.2.47; SBN 212) 
 
Next, Hume observes that causal inferences depend on the past experience of the conjunction 
of items or events. Since non-perceptions are not experienced, it follows that causal reasoning 
can never allow us to conclude that such things exist: 
 
The idea of this relation [cause and effect] is deriv’d from past experience, by which 
we find, that two beings are constantly conjoin’d together, and are always present at 
once to the mind. But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it 
follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect betwixt 
different perceptions, but can never observe it betwixt perceptions and objects. 
(T 1.4.2.47; SBN 212. Added emphasis) 
 
For Hume, we simply do not experience non-perceptions conjoined with perceptions. So, 
while we can have some justified beliefs in the existence of things not present to us – for 
example, the existence of fire somewhere because we see smoke in the distance – this is 
impossible in the case of non-perceptions. It is worth highlighting that Hume thinks the 
proponents of the philosophical system share with him the assumption that only perceptions 
are the direct objects of experience. They do not realise the fallacy of their opinion, then, due 
to their erroneous conception of causal reasoning. Hume would hold that his own philosophy 
offers the proper understanding of causal inference; such an understanding, combined with 
the fact about perceptions only being the direct items of experience, allows Hume to establish 
scepticism about the philosophical system. In short, for Hume, to believe in the external 
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existence of non-perceptions is to defy causal reasoning. Causal reasoning allows us to infer 
from a perceived to an unperceived thing, but it can never make an inference to a thing that is 
altogether by its nature unperceivable. 
Hume only countenances causal reasoning as a possible means for justifying the 
philosophical system. One might criticise Hume for overlooking other options, especially 
given that the philosophical system might be true (in contrast to the downright false vulgar 
belief). Given that objects specifically different from perceptions may exist, might it be 
reasonable to suppose that they exist? Might it be the most plausible way of explaining for 
the coherence of perceptual experience? Indeed, Hume himself admits that the similitude 
between the vulgar and philosophical systems is an “advantage” of the philosophical system 
(T 1.4.2.53; SBN 216), which suggests that the philosophical system may indeed play some 
positive function for philosophy. I will return to this suggestion in Section 5.1. For now, it is 
important to note that, although Hume negatively assesses both the vulgar and philosophical 
systems, he establishes the falsity of the opinion in the first case and the lack of justification 
in the second. 
 
3.3.2 Hume’s Scepticism in the Enquiry 
At EHU 12.10, the very paragraph in which Hume describes being “necessitated” to depart 
from the vulgar view, he lambastes the philosophical system. As I have repeated throughout, 
Hume stresses that it is both unjustified and a psychological confabulation. Remarkably, 
Hume criticises the “new system” before he even describes it: 
 
So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning […] to embrace a new system with 
regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely 
embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and 
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objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible 
instinct of nature: For that led us to quite a different system […] And to justify this 
pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even 
any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity. 
(EHU 12.10; SBN 152) 
 
Hume clearly has a low opinion of the merit of the philosophical system. He thinks we cannot 
even put forward the mere “appearance” of argument in its favour. Hume also says that 
philosophy “can no longer plead the infallible … instinct of nature” when she abandons the 
universal vulgar opinion for the confabulated philosophical system. Hume, of course, does 
not think nature is infallible, as his commitment to the falsity of the vulgar belief reveals. But 
he thinks that one of the costs of endorsing the philosophical system in response to the 
problem of the falsity of the vulgar view is that we must forsake our ordinary, pretheoretical 
assumption that there is no need to justify what is naturally obvious to us. 
The rationale behind Hume’s scathing assessment of the philosophical system comes 
in the next two paragraphs. Hume’s first point of criticism is that there are many potential 
causes that could give rise to perceptions. He also raises a parenthetical doubt about the 
possibility of external objects resembling perceptions: 
 
By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused 
by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be 
possible) and could not arise from either the energy of the mind itself, or from the 
suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more 
unknown to us? 
(EHU 12.11; SBN 153) 
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Hume here appeals to the fact that the cause or causes of our perceptions cannot be 
determined. He even suggests that the cause might be something we cannot even guess at.  
He ends the paragraph by adding that, even if we suppose that external objects cause 
perceptions, it would be beyond our human capacity to explain the manner in which objects 
give rise to perceptions: 
 
It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from any thing 
external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more 
inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to 
convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed so different, and even contrary a 
nature. 
(EHU 12.11; SBN 153) 
 
Hume adds one more paragraph that tells us what kind of argument could putatively justify 
the philosophical system. It is not abstruse metaphysics that could establish the philosophical 
system, but only reasoning based on experience. Specifically, it is causal reasoning that, on 
Hume’s own account, gives us assurance of matters of fact, and Hume finds that such 
reasoning is derived from the constant conjunction of objects in experience (see EHU 5.5; 
SBN 43). We simply do not experience our perceptions conjoined with external objects: 
 
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external 
objects, resembling them: How shall this question be determined? By experience 
surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be 
entirely silent. The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and 
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cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition 
of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. 
(EHU 12.12; SBN 153) 
 
This paragraph lucidly displays Hume’s reasoning against the philosophical system. Hume is 
an experimental philosopher, so the philosophical system should be scrutinised with reference 
to what we experience. But the philosophical system posits objects that are not the direct 
items of experience. So, our reason cannot recommend the philosophical system to us. 
Consequently, it is a spurious remedy for the false vulgar opinion. 
Before summarising his sceptical predicament at EHU 12.14 (SBN 153–54), Hume 
considers the possibility of justifying the philosophical system by appealing to existence of a 
deity. Hume raises two points in objection to such a suggestion. The first is that, if we 
suppose that God can never deceive, then God cannot always be responsible for our senses, 
since our senses clearly do deceive us at least some of the time, as even the trite sceptical 
objections from EHU 12.6 reveal (Hume here echoes Descartes (1996/1641, 14, 55)). The 
second point is that, once we seriously doubt the existence of the external world, we do not 
then have any resources to prove that a deity exists (Hume does not explain or justify this 
point). 
 Hume concludes his first sceptical objection pertaining to the senses by summarising 
the problems with both the vulgar opinion and the philosophical system (EHU 12.14;  
SBN 153–54). He reiterates that the philosophical system lacks justification and is a 
confabulation: 
 
Do you disclaim this principle [that perceptions enjoy D&C existence], in order to 
embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of 
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something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious 
sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any 
convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected 
with any external objects. 
(EHU 12.14; SBN 153–54) 
 
Overall, Hume’s negative assessment of the philosophical system is one of the results of his 
experimental approach to philosophy that privileges the place of causal reasoning. I maintain 
that the argument expressed at EHU 12.11–14 is essentially the same as the argument from 
T 1.4.2.47: in order for the philosophical system to be justified, we would need to establish a 
causal link between objects and perceptions in experience, but once we admit that only 
perceptions are the items of experience, then there is no way of establishing such a link. 
 
3.4 Hume on Modern Philosophy 
3.4.1 The Place of Hume’s Predicament 
Although Hume’s sceptical predicament presents a vexing sceptical challenge, T 1.4.2 and 
EHU 12.6–14 are not the only places in which Hume deals with the topic of external 
existence. The very end of T 1.4.2 indicates as much. As part of his cursory response to the 
sceptical predicament, Hume says: 
 
[…] whatever may be the reader’s opinion at this present moment […] an hour hence 
he will be perswaded there is both an external and internal world; and going upon that 
supposition, I intend to examine some general systems both antient and modern, 
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which have been propos’d of both, before I proceed to a more particular enquiry 
concerning our impressions. 
(T 1.4.2.57; SBN 218) 
 
Norton & Norton’s (2000, 477) gloss on “a more particular enquiry concerning our 
impressions” is that this refers to the topic matter of Book Two of the Treatise. Ainslie 
(2015, 8) agrees with this, as he informs us that Book Two is devoted to an analysis of the 
passions, which are secondary impressions (see T 2.1.1.1; SBN 275). Hume is concerned, 
therefore, with systems of “an external and internal world” in the sections of T 1.4 following 
T 1.4.2, and this means that several sections of the Treatise have implications for the question 
of external existence.73 In T 1.4.4 (“Of the modern philosophy”), Hume critiques the 
distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent qualities of physical objects. 
Hume does not frame this section as pertaining to scepticism, but he perceives the conclusion 
of this section to have sceptical implications (at T 1.4.7.4; SBN 265–66). I will adopt Hume’s 
own shorthand and refer to the primary/secondary qualities distinction as “the modern 
philosophy”. 
There is some superficial textual evidence that suggests the argument concerning the 
modern philosophy is more important to Hume than the sceptical predicament. Hume 
presents it after the sceptical predicament, so it seems to bring out a new problem or issue 
that the predicament did not cover. In the Treatise version of the sceptical crisis, Hume uses a 
footnote to explicitly refer back to T 1.4.4 but not T 1.4.2. And in the Enquiry, Hume directly 
                                               
73 Ainslie analyses how the sections of Part 4 harmonise in the following way: T 1.4.3 and T 1.4.4 are the 
examinations of ancient and modern systems of the external world, respectively, and 1.4.5 and 1.4.6 are of 
ancient and modern systems of the internal world, respectively (2015, 8–9). As evidence for this reading of the 
structure, Ainslie points us to the first sentence of the final paragraph of T 1.4.6, which reads, “Thus we have 
finish’d our examination of the several systems of philosophy, both of the intellectual and natural world”  
(T 1.4.6.23; SBN 263). 
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says “the second objection [to the evidence of sense] goes farther [than the first]” 
(EHU 12.16; SBN 155). Amongst commentators who accept that Hume entertains serious 
sceptical doubts about external objects, it is somewhat of an orthodoxy that the argument 
concerning the modern philosophy presents a more penetrating problem than the worry 
concerning the vulgar and philosophical systems (see De Pierris (2015, 285), Winkler (2015), 
Hakkarainen (2012a; 2012b), Broughton (2003), Morris (2000), and Garrett (1997, 215–18)). 
I do not intend to relinquish the significance of Hume’s argument concerning modern 
philosophy. Hume finds this argument at least important enough to warrant an appearance in 
his condensed Enquiry. I suggest, however, that the predicament is a distinct sceptical 
challenge that is important in its own right, and that both the predicament and the argument 
concerning modern philosophy are relevant to Hume’s wider sceptical crisis. My view is that 
Hume’s argument against the modern philosophy concerns the idea of an object that has 
primary qualities but lack secondary qualities. For Hume, such an idea can only be of a bare 
something. The predicament, by contrast, presents a distinct epistemological challenge for the 
ordinary, unreflective belief about D&C existence and the philosophical attempt to correct 
this belief. 74 
The parallel section to T 1.4.4 in the Enquiry is just two dense paragraphs 
(EHU 12.15–16; SBN 154–55). For ease of explication, I will proceed by first interpreting 
this later text and then use some of the ideas developed here for my exposition of T 1.4.4. The 
argument of this section will also be supplemented by my reading of T 1.4.7 (in Section 4.2), 
as there I will consider the explicit reference to T 1.4.4 at T 1.4.7.4, which is one of the 
sources that has led commentators to assert the priority of the argument concerning the 
modern philosophy over Hume’s sceptical predicament. 
                                               
74 Winkler (2015, 158–59) also observes that the end of T 1.4.2 establishes an epistemological conclusion in 
contrast to the cognitive or conceptual conclusion of T 1.4.4. But in the same paper, Winkler also makes the 
exact point that I am contradicting, namely, that T 1.4.4 presents a deeper sceptical problem for Hume’s 
philosophy than T 1.4.2. 
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3.4.2 The Second Objection to the Evidence of Sense (EHU 12.15–16) 
In EHU 12, Hume runs through a number of sceptical arguments, and he includes a couple 
that are “against the evidence of sense” (EHU 12.6; SBN 151. Original emphasis). Later, 
Hume calls each of these an “objection”, so we may refer to these as the first and second 
objections (EHU 12.16; SBN 155). The first objection is Hume’s sceptical predicament 
(EHU 12.6–14; SBN 151–154). Hume turns to his second objection by observing that the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities is “universally allowed by all modern 
enquirers” (EHU 12.15; SBN 154). Very roughly, the modern philosophy holds that some of 
our ideas of physical objects correspond to mind-independent existences and others do not. 
The mind-independent existences are primary qualities and the mind-dependent existences 
are secondary qualities. 
Jani Hakkarainen (2012a; 2012b) has argued that EHU 12.15–16, (which he calls 
Hume’s “second profound argument”) establishes a more decisive sceptical conclusion than 
Hume’s first objection because it reveals Hume’s commitment to the total inconceivability of 
non-perceptions.75 The second objection does indeed pertain to the content of ideas, in 
contrast to the first objection. Hakkarainen’s inconceivability interpretation, however, is 
flatly incompatible with my reading of relative ideas in Hume’s philosophy (see Sections 
2.2.2 and 3.2 above). Although Hume does not overtly reference relative ideas in EHU 12, at 
EHU 12.16 he allows that we may have an “imperfect notion” of a bare something that is 
devoid of secondary qualities (EHU 12.16; SBN 155). Hume considers this a sufficient 
objection to the modern philosophy because such an idea would not be of an object that has 
primary qualities but lack secondary qualities. 
                                               
75 In this sub-section, I argue against Hakkarainen’s interpretation of EHU 12.15–16. In Section 5.4, I argue 
against a different feature of Hakkarainen’s interpretation, namely, his distinction between two domains in 
which Hume is taken to have different epistemic attitudes towards external existence. 
 - 125 - 
That the second objection “goes farther” than the first suggests that the second is more 
penetrating than the first and that there is a common theme to both. However, as we will soon 
see, in the very sentence in which Hume says the second objection “goes farther” than the 
first, he also qualifies the conclusion of the second objection. I maintain that Hume says that 
the second objection “goes farther” than the first just because it represents the only time in 
the Enquiry that Hume addresses the idea of a thing-we-know-not-what that might cause our 
perceptions (since there is no parallel to T 1.2.6 in the Enquiry). The common theme that 
unites the two objections is their shared, general subject matter: they both concern our senses, 
and the assumption that there are external existences (in the Enquiry, Hume drops the 
nuanced terminology of D&C existence and refers to the objections to the evidence of sense 
as concerning external existence; see EHU 12.16; SBN 155). Hume’s predicament represents 
a dire problem because the vulgar is a universal opinion and the philosophical system 
represents the intuitive attempt to improve on it and which, “is found by experience to take 
hold of many minds” (T 1.4.2.49; SBN 213). The modern philosophy, by contrast, was a 
particular theory that was popular amongst intellectuals in Hume’s day. The second objection 
does indeed have significance for the wider context of EHU 12, which is that it is one of 
several sceptical considerations that Hume compiles in his recount of consequent scepticism, 
and it is the first time that Hume makes a point about a possible idea of a bare something that 
is different from and the cause of our perceptions. I now proceed to a close analysis of the 
text. 
At EHU 12.15 (SBN 154–55), Hume rehearses Berkeley’s arguments against the 
modern philosophy. According to Buckle (2001, 304–05) and Beauchamp (1999, 57), Hume, 
like Berkeley before him, chiefly had Locke in mind as the target of this argument. 
Problematically, though, Hume’s description of the modern philosophy would be a 
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misinterpretation of the Lockean position (Buckle 2001, 305, n. 12).76 For Locke, qualities in 
general are mind-independent powers that produce ideas (ECHU 2.8.8). Locke defines 
primary qualities as qualities that are “utterly inseparable” from an object (ECHU 2.8.9).77 He 
defines secondary qualities as those that, “are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers 
to produce various sensations in us by their primary Qualities” (ECHU 2.8.10. Added 
emphasis). Fortunately, we need not read Hume as making an error in describing the modern 
philosophy, since there is no reason why Hume must be targeting Locke specifically. Kail 
(2010/2007, 151–58) has convincingly argued that Hume is accurately describing versions of 
the modern philosophy found in the works of Malebranche and Bayle. Malebranche modified 
the Cartesian view according to which colour properties in objects are themselves unknown 
and do not resemble our perceptions of colour (Kail 2010/2007, 154–55). For Malebranche, it 
was essential that colours be considered phenomenal qualities that human persons actually 
experience, and so, instead of drawing a distinction between colour properties in objects and 
colours as they are experienced, he says that colours just are the mind-dependent, 
phenomenal qualities (Kail 2010/2007, 156. See also Malebranche 1997/1674–75, 58–59). 
So, if one has this view in mind, it would be right to say that the modern philosophy asserts 
the mind-dependency of secondary qualities. In any case, whether we are considering the 
Lockean/Cartesian power view of secondary qualities or the phenomenalist Malebranchean 
view, the modern philosophy holds that our ideas of colours do not resemble anything in 
external objects, and it is this that Hume exploits in order to derive a problem for the modern 
philosophy. 
                                               
76 According to Dancy (1998, 64–65), the Berkeleyan description of the modern philosophy mischaracterises not 
only Locke, but Descartes and Boyle too.   
77 Locke illustrates this by taking an example of a divided grain of wheat. He identifies the following as qualities 
that would be impervious to destruction, even when the miniscule parts of the grain become insensible: 
“Solidity, Extension, Figure, and Mobility” (ECHU 2.8.9. Original emphasis). 
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At the start of EHU 12.15, Hume recounts the modern philosophy not explicitly in 
terms of secondary qualities, but sensible qualities: he lists, “hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black 
&c.” (EHU 12.15; SBN 154).78 Hume reads the modern philosophical view as encompassing 
the following theses about sensible qualities:  
 
MP1: Sensible qualities “exist not in the objects themselves” (EHU 12.15; SBN 154). 
MP2: Sensible qualities are (a) “perceptions of the mind”, and (b) “without any 
external archetype or model” (ibid.). 
 
Hume’s objection to the modern philosophy at EHU 12.15 is remarkably swift. He puts 
forward a conditional that says, “if this [MP1, MP2(a), and MP2(b)], be allowed with regard 
to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of 
extension and solidity” (EHU 12.15; SBN 154). Hume argues in a couple of sentences that 
our ideas of primary qualities must supervene on our ideas of secondary qualities, and that the 
claims of the modern philosophy about secondary qualities must thereby apply to primary 
qualities too. Taking the example of extension, he says: 
 
The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling; and if 
all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same 
conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent on the 
sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. 
(EHU 12.15; SBN 154) 
 
                                               
78 Berkeley also refers to sensible qualities at PHK 14. Hakkarainen (2012a, 292) opts to call secondary qualities 
“proper sensibles” (original emphasis). 
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Hume then anticipates the suggestion that this conclusion can be avoided by means of a non-
imagistic account of abstract ideas. Hume thoroughly rejects the possibility of such ideas. He 
reasons as follows: an invisible extension cannot be conceived, but a visible extension cannot 
lack colour; in the same way, a triangle cannot have any number of sides except three, and 
those sides cannot have no length, so these lengths must be determinate and stand in 
determinate proportion to each other (see also T 1.1.7; SBN 17–25). In neither case, for 
Hume, can there be a non-imagistic idea in question. Hume’s reasoning in this paragraph 
mirrors Berkeley’s at PHK 10–15.  
After this, Hume proceeds to summarise both of his objections to the evidence of 
sense. He also reveals, for the first time, exactly what he takes the significance of the 
argument at EHU 12.15 to be. Referring to “the opinion of external existence”, he 
summarises the first objection by saying: 
 
[…] such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if referred 
to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time carries no rational 
evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer. 
(EHU 12.16; SBN 155) 
 
He says of the second objection: 
 
The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as contrary to reason; at 
least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the 
object. Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you 
in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, 
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as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it 
worth while [sic] to contend against it. 
(EHU 12.16; SBN 155. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume has already established that if ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble objects, 
then ideas of primary qualities do not resemble objects. Hume is now revealing that the 
second objection “goes farther” than the first, and that it shows the opinion of external 
existence to be “contrary to reason”. It is curious why the possibility of an “inexplicable 
something” does not mean that the opinion of external existence is not altogether contrary to 
reason. Why does Hume seem to make such a strong claim in one sentence, and then offer 
quite a substantial qualification in the next? I maintain that the argument reveals that there 
may be an “imperfect notion” at play in the modern philosophy and that Hume takes this to 
suffice as an objection to that system.  
Hume’s conclusion is that we have no idea of an object that has primary qualities but 
lacks secondary qualities. Hume allows that the modern philosopher may have an idea of a 
bare something that is devoid of both primary and secondary qualities, but this is not a clear 
idea at all. This is why Hume dismisses the relevance of such a notion by saying, “no sceptic 
will think it worth while to contend against it” (EHU 12.16; SBN 155. Original emphasis). It 
is implicit in this remark that the modern philosopher him or herself will also find the 
imperfect notion inadequate. The proponents of the modern philosophical system 
countenance clear, positive ideas of primary qualities, not imperfect ones. The modern 
philosopher is content to concede that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble external 
existences so long as some of our other ideas do. The question of whether a bare something 
exists would be susceptible to the same argument that Hume had just used against the 
philosophical system of double existence at EHU 12.11–12 (SBN 153). 
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Contrary to Hakkarainen’s (2012a; 2012b) interpretation, Hume himself describes the 
way in which the second objection goes “farther” than the first by saying that it reveals the 
belief in D&C existence to be “contrary to reason” (EHU 12.16; SBN 155). He adds a 
qualification to this remark: “… if it be a principle of reason that all sensible qualities are in 
the mind, not in the object” (EHU 12.16; SBN 155. Added emphasis).79 Hume’s summary of 
his sceptical objections at EHU 12.16 is perplexing because the first argument already 
revealed that the belief in D&C existence “if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason” 
(ibid.). We have to realise that Hume’s first objection consists of two parts, the first of which 
establishes the falsity of the vulgar belief (EHU 12.8–9) and the second of which establishes 
the non-justification of the philosophical system (EHU 12.10–14). This understanding aligns 
with the grammar of EHU 12.16, as Hume uses an “and” when recapitulating the first 
objection. So, the second objection does indeed go further than the second part of the first 
objection, since that only revealed the non-justification of the supposition that a bare 
something exists that causes our perceptions. The second objection reveals that we cannot 
have a positive idea of this bare something. The second part of the first objection and the 
second objection have in common the fact that they do not refer to the vulgar view of objects. 
 
3.4.3 Modern Philosophy in the Treatise (T 1.4.4) 
We are now in a position to return to Hume’s earlier and lengthier discussion of modern 
philosophy in the Treatise. Hume introduces “The modern philosophy” (T 1.4.4.2; SBN 226. 
                                               
79 The fact that Hume uses a conditional here invites the interpretation that he is not in fact committed to claims 
MP1, MP2(a) and MP2(b) himself. I will not investigate this issue in detail here. Some scholars have thought 
that Hume must be offering premises that he does not accept because it is implausible to read him as being 
straightforwardly committed to the conclusion of the argument (see Kail 2010/2007, 70; Blackburn 1993; Baier 
1991). Recall also that it is not just the mind-dependency of secondary qualities that Hume capitalises on, but 
the claim that such qualities definitely do not resemble external existences. At EHU 12.11 (SBN 153), Hume 
expresses suspicion towards the claim that mind-dependent existences could resemble external existences, but 
he does not definitely say they must lack resemblance: “By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions 
of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be 
possible) […]”. 
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Original emphasis) by describing it as a failed attempt to avoid the defects of the ancient 
metaphysical system of substances, accidents, substantial forms, and occult qualities (which 
was the topic of T 1.4.3). This ancient philosophical system, for Hume, derives from trivial 
mental operations and is practically useless (by calling it “the ancient system”, Hume does 
not take it to be an artefact from the past, since proponents of the system carried on into 
Hume’s own time; see Ainslie 2015, 9–11). Hume says that the modern philosophy 
“pretends” to be free from such defects, and he sets out to discover, “Upon what grounds this 
pretension is founded” (T 1.4.4.2; SBN 226). The common theme that unites T 1.4.3 and 
T 1.4.4 is that they examine unnatural, confabulated attempts at explaining what mind-
independent existences are, how we supposedly know about them, and the relationship 
between them and mind-dependent realities. Hume criticises the purported ideas of external 
existence of both the ancient and modern systems.80 
The underlying logic of the argument presented against the modern philosophy in 
T 1.4.4 is the same as in the corresponding portion of EHU 12, but Hume takes time in the 
Treatise to describe a reason for believing in the claims of the modern philosophy and he also 
describes the inference from this reason to the conclusion about the mind-dependency of 
sensible qualities. Hume introduces the modern philosophical view as follows: 
 
The fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, 
sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in 
                                               
80 Hume had previously briefly mentioned the system of modern philosophy at T 1.4.2.13 (SBN 192–93), where 
he criticised it for being a confabulation: “Now ’tis evident, that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, 
colours, sounds, heat and cold, as far as appear to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and 
solidity […]. So strong is the prejudice for the distinct and continu’d existence of the former qualities, that when 
the contrary opinion is advanc’d by modern philosophers, people imagine they can almost refute it from their 
feeling and experience, and that their very senses contradict this philosophy.” 
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the mind, deriv’d from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance 
to the qualities of the objects. 
(T 1.4.4.3; SBN 226) 
 
Soon after, he describes the system again, this time elucidating the notion of primary 
qualities. He lists more examples of primary qualities than in the Enquiry: 
 
[…] upon the removal of sounds, colours, heat, cold, and other sensible qualities, 
from the rank of continu’d independent existences, we are reduc’d merely to what are 
called primary qualities, as the only real ones, of which we have any adequate notion. 
These primary qualities are extension and solidity, with their different mixtures and 
modifications; figure, motion, gravity, and cohesion. 
(T 1.4.4.5; SBN 227. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume recounts only one “satisfactory” reason for believing that secondary qualities do not 
resemble anything in objects (T 1.4.4.3; SBN 226). The reason is that impressions vary 
between different people, and within the same person, depending on time, state of health, and 
other circumstances.81 Hume calls “the conclusion drawn from them” – where “them” refers 
to “instances” of variation that Hume has just listed – “as satisfactory as can possibly be 
imagin’d” (T 1.4.4.4; SBN 227). Modern philosophers draw the conclusion that secondary or 
sensible qualities are merely internal realities. We can have ideas of such things, but they do 
not resemble external, mind-independent objects. Hume introduces a causal principle as a 
premise that works towards the conclusion that secondary qualities lack resemblance: since 
                                               
81 We should be aware that this is not in conflict with Hume’s rejection of the “popular” sceptical objections to 
matters of fact at EHU 12.21 (SBN 158–59. Original emphasis). There, Hume says it would be a non sequitur to 
infer that no opinion is better than any other from the fact that opinions widely vary. The point being raised at 
T 1.4.4.3, by contrast, is that impressions are totally determined by conditions that pertain to a subject.  
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“from like effects we presume like causes”, the fact that “Many of the impressions of colour, 
sound, &c. are confest to be nothing but internal existences” means that we can infer that, “all 
of them, [are] deriv’d from a like origin” (T 1.4.4.4; SBN 227).82 The problem that Hume 
finds is that modern philosophers unwarrantedly supplement their claim about secondary 
qualities with the view that primary qualities enjoy mind-independent existence. 
Hume presents several objections to the modern philosophy in T 1.4.4. The first, 
which is the same as that presented at EHU 12.15, Hume describes as “very decisive” 
(T 1.4.4.6; SBN 227). From the claim that secondary qualities are mind-dependent, modern 
philosophers should actually infer that so-called primary qualities are mind-dependent as 
well: 
 
I assert, that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means [i.e. 
by the system of modern philosophy], we utterly annihilate all these objects, and 
reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them. 
If colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive 
is possest of a real, continu’d, and independent existence; not even motion, extension 
and solidity, which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on. 
(T 1.4.4.6; SBN 227–228). 
 
Hume then goes on to explicate his argument that ideas of primary qualities supervene on 
ideas of secondary qualities. He goes through motion, extension, and solidity separately 
(T 1.4.4.7–9; SBN 228–29). After confessing that his reasoning “may seem abstruse and 
intricate to the generality of readers” (T 1.4.4.10; SBN 229), he adds some further objections 
                                               
82 Butler (2009) observes that, by introducing this causal principle, Hume does not directly mimic the actual 
arguments of the proponents of the modern philosophy.  
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to the modern philosophy (narrowing his focus to the primary quality of solidity). Hume 
applies his copy principle of the origin of ideas to the idea of solidity (T 1.4.4.12–14; SBN 
230–31). He insists that even the proponents of the modern system would agree that sensory 
qualities do not give us an idea of solidity, and so the only candidate could be the feeling of 
touching something and experiencing its solidity. In a similar line of reasoning to that which 
was used to show that sensations are not images of distinct existence (at T 1.4.2.4; SBN 189), 
Hume shows there is a gap between the feeling of touch and the idea of solidity: impressions 
of touch, “neither represent solidity nor any real object” (T 1.4.4.14; SBN 231). 
I will conclude this discussion of T 1.4.4 by considering the final, enigmatic 
paragraph of that section. This paragraph plays a conspicuous role in Hume’s expression of 
his sceptical crisis in T 1.4.7, and I will have more to say about it in Section 4.2.1. The full 
paragraph reads: 
 
Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more 
properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and 
those that perswade us of the continu’d and independent existence of body. When we 
reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell 
have a continu’d and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities 
there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence. 
(T 1.4.4.15; SBN 231) 
 
Here, unlike at EHU 12.16, Hume does not remind his reader of the possibility of an 
imperfect notion of a bare something. There are two passages in T 1.4.4, though, that make it 
clear that it is the limitedness of any putative idea of primary qualities that is being called 
into question. Hume says, “Our modern philosophy … leaves us no just nor satisfactory idea 
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of solidity; nor consequently of matter” (T 1.4.4.9; SBN 229. Added emphasis), and, “there 
remains nothing, which can afford us a just and consistent idea of body” (T 1.4.4.10; SBN 
229. Added emphasis). If we were to consider T 1.4.4 in isolation, we would be left in the 
dark with regard to what the alternative to a “just” or “satisfactory” idea is, but we can read 
this section as harmonising with EHU 12 if we allow that there is an idea of a bare something 
that the modern philosopher could appeal to, but that such an idea would not be of a primary 
quality at all. 
In summary, Hume’s argument against the modern philosophy is included in both his 
Treatise and Enquiry, which is a sign that he attaches significance to it. Hume disparages the 
modern philosophical distinction between primary and secondary qualities because he does 
not think that we can have a clear idea of an object that has primary qualities but lacks 
secondary qualities. Hume thinks it suffices as an objection to the modern philosophical 
system to say that, at most, the modern philosopher can have an imperfect notion of an 
external existence that is devoid of both primary and secondary qualities. I will have more to 
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4. Hume’s Sceptical Crisis 
 
4.1 Overview 
4.1.1 The Terms of Hume’s Crisis 
So far, I have analysed Hume’s accounts of the vulgar belief and the philosophical system of 
double existence. Hume’s negative outlook on these beliefs engenders a sceptical 
predicament concerning external objects. In the Treatise, Hume offers a rudimentary reply to 
this predicament at the end of T 1.4.2 and deals with it again later in the context of a myriad 
of other sceptical worries in T 1.4.7. In the Enquiry, Hume’s discussion of objects and his 
wider treatment of scepticism occur in a single section, EHU 12. The aim of this chapter is to 
understand these difficult texts by tracing the development of Hume’s thoughts within them. 
There are different parts of these texts in which Hume expresses markedly different attitudes. 
In both the Treatise and Enquiry, Hume’s expression of sceptical despair proceeds as 
a progression of loosely connected worries. The disconnectedness of Hume’s different 
sceptical worries is especially apparent in the Treatise version. In this chapter, I characterise 
Hume’s sceptical crisis as an encounter with a cluster or compilation of sceptical 
considerations.84 Regarding any unifying theme to Hume’s doubts, the most we can say is that 
they all pertain to the faculty of the imagination in the Treatise, and that they are all versions 
of consequent scepticism (that is, scepticism that derives from the results of investigation, as 
opposed to being taken up before any investigation) in the Enquiry.  
Hume’s “very dangerous dilemma” is sometimes given pride of place in the sceptical 
crisis of the Treatise (as in Ainslie (2015), Schafer (2014), Qu (2014), Durland (2011), 
Loeb (2002), and Maia Neto (1991)). It is the most elaborate of Hume’s doubts in the 
                                               
84 In this one respect, Hume’s scepticism resembles Pyrrhonism: the Pyrrhonist strategy was to compile a variety 
of arguments in the hope of inducing a response of suspension of belief (epochê). See PH 1.13.31–1.14.35. 
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Treatise, and it is the only one that Hume plainly says is insoluble: “I know not what ought to 
be done …” (T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268). It is also the final doubt before Hume’s most despairing 
expression of sceptical doom at T 1.4.7.8. However, I maintain that a close analysis of 
Hume’s worries reveals that the dilemma cannot be the encapsulation of all of Hume’s 
sceptical doubts in the Treatise. In T 1.4.7.3–4, Hume entertains the doubt that all of the 
products of the imagination are bereft of justification. The dangerous dilemma concerns the 
possibility of rejecting some products of the imagination in order to avoid “errors, 
absurdities, and obscurities” (T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267). Hume considers the possibility that we 
could reject all products of the imagination except for “the understanding” (T 1.4.7.7; SBN 
267). But in T 1.4.7.3, Hume establishes a sceptical doubt pertaining to all of the imagination, 
explicitly including the understanding. I do not intend to accuse Hume of an oversight. I 
maintain that Hume did not intend the dangerous dilemma, or indeed any individual sceptical 
worry, to encapsulate all of his sceptical doubt. This is evident from his response to his crisis, 
which lacks close reference to any particular doubt.  
There is another reason why we should not overstate the importance of the dangerous 
dilemma for Hume’s scepticism. Hume expresses sceptical crises in both the Treatise and 
Enquiry, but the dangerous dilemma does not make an appearance in the Enquiry (nor does 
anything remotely resembling it). So, even if Hume places some rhetorical emphasis on it in 
the Treatise, he does not find it worth reiterating in the Enquiry. There are other sceptical 
doubts that appear in both texts, as we will see. One of these is Hume’s sceptical predicament 
between the vulgar and philosophical systems of external existence.  
The view of Hume’s sceptical crisis as a compilation of doubts is supported by the 
presentation of Hume’s encounter with scepticism. Hume’s various worries build up to a 
climax of despair, in which he enters a moment of cognitive paralysis and wishes to renounce 
all belief. Hume’s response is framed in terms of healing this paralysis, not in terms of 
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resolving any one of his sceptical worries. This reading goes some way towards addressing a 
puzzling feature of Hume’s response to scepticism, which is that he does not refer back to 
any of his specific doubts. We may still find it unsatisfying that Hume does not recall his 
specific sceptical considerations in his response, but we can at least explain why Hume 
proceeds the way he does. 
In this chapter, I show the place of Hume’s sceptical predicament concerning objects 
within his wider sceptical crisis. In neither T 1.4.7 nor EHU 12 is it obvious that the vulgar or 
philosophical systems of external objects are front-and-centre in Hume’s cluster of sceptical 
doubts. In the Treatise, Hume even seems to prioritise the sceptical implications of T 1.4.4 
(“Of the modern philosophy”) over any relevant doubt from T 1.4.2, since he directly 
references T 1.4.4 with a footnote. I show that such a view is misplaced, and that the sceptical 
predicament is a central part of the sceptical crisis of T 1.4.7. In the Enquiry, Hume’s 
sceptical predicament is given pride of place. Sceptical objections to the evidence of sense 
are the first efficacious sceptical doubts that Hume presents. 
I defend my reading of Hume’s position as residual scepticism in this chapter by 
paying close attention to his response to his sceptical crisis (at T 1.4.7.9–15 (SBN 269–74) 
and EHU 12.23–34 (SBN 159–65)). In the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume considers and 
rejects an extreme position (which he calls “PYRRHONISM” at EHU 12.23 (SBN 161)) 
whereby one chooses to relinquish all belief as a response to scepticism. Hume provides a 
rationale for rejecting this extreme position by claiming, amongst other things, that living 
without beliefs is not even possible. Crucially, though, Hume does not take his rationale for 
rejecting Pyrrhonism as a solution to the negative, sceptical evaluations that he expressed in 
his sceptical crisis. I maintain that reading Hume as a residual sceptic captures the way in 
which he moderates the impact of his sceptical doubts. Hume incorporates scepticism into his 
final, considered position, even as he continues to pursue philosophy. Ultimately, Hume 
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accepts the psychological impossibility of living radical scepticism at the same time that he 
accepts the “triumph” of sceptical doubts.85 For Hume, becoming aware of the irrefutability of 
sceptical arguments leads us to modify the very life that we are necessitated to live, one in 
which we mingle with fellow humans and pursue intellectual inquiries. 
A theme that has garnered much attention in the secondary literature on Hume’s 
response to scepticism is that he finds the pursuit of philosophy after his crisis to bring with it 
both psychological pleasure and practical utility. Any reading of Hume’s scepticism has to 
account for this. According to my view, Hume certainly thinks that pursuing philosophy 
brings with it more pleasure and practical benefits than abandoning philosophy. However, I 
depart from what has been called the “usefulness and agreeableness” (or “U&A”) 
interpretation of Hume’s epistemology (as Qu (2014, 501) calls it), according to which Hume 
appeals to the pleasure and practical benefits attached to pursuing philosophy in order to 
reject various sceptical doubts. The U&A interpretation is often (but not always) coupled 
with a focus on the role of Hume’s title principle: “Where reason is lively, and mixes itself 
with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title 
to operate on us” (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270. See also Garrett (1997, 234–37; 2015, 227–33)).  
Qu (2014, 509 ff.) and Durland (2011, 79–84) have offered some objections to the U&A 
interpretation of Hume’s scepticism generally and to the title principle being used to support 
this reading. Qu insists that there is ample textual evidence for the practical utility of belief 
and reasoning coming apart for Hume, including in T 1.4.7 itself.86 On my account of Hume’s 
residual scepticism, I will similarly problematise the U&A interpretation. Hume does not 
count the practical shortcomings attached to endorsing radical scepticism as a rebuttal of 
sceptical challenges; he admits those shortcomings at the same time that he integrates 
                                               
85 Hume refers to the “triumph” of scepticism at several places: EHU 12.14; SBN 153; EHU 12.18; SBN 156; 
EHU 12.21; SBN 159; EHU 12.22; 159. 
86 Qu (2014, 509) cites T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272; T 2.3.2.3; SBN 409; EHU 1.3; SBN 6–7. 
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scepticism into his wider epistemological outlook. In my explication of T 1.4.7, I will suggest 
that the passage in which Hume states his title principle is one of the most direct statements 
of him conceding the triumph of scepticism in the Treatise. In Section 1.3, I claimed that 
Hume’s sceptical crisis may be more accurately characterised as involving doubts, worries, or 
concerns, rather than explicit sceptical arguments. I make sense of Hume conceding the 
“triumph” of scepticism with reference to the insolubility of the problems that sceptical 
doubts, worries, or concerns present. These are problems that pertain to a negative verdict on 
the justification of our beliefs (even if Hume tends to directly refer to our faculties rather than 
classes of belief). What Hume does reject is that we are obliged to give up pursuing 
philosophy as a result of the insolubility of these problems; indeed, he thinks that the fact that 
such problems are insoluble plays a positive role in inspiring modesty, cautiousness and 
reserve in our continuation of philosophical pursuits. This is what the residually sceptical 
reading is intended to capture. 
 
4.1.2 Residual Scepticism and the Integration Problem 
It is commonly accepted that the challenge of reading T 1.4.7 is to account for the transition 
of Hume’s thought in that section. A corresponding challenge pertains to EHU 12, in which 
Hume moves from a presentation of antecedent and consequent scepticism, to a long 
discussion of various consequent sceptical considerations, to the endorsement of mitigated 
scepticism. The challenge of accounting for the transitions in EHU 12 has not yet gained a 
reputation in the literature, because that section has been unduly neglected, as Qu (2017) has 
observed. In this sub-section, I will take Ainslie’s (2015) analysis of the interpretive issues 
pertaining to T 1.4.7 to demarcate my own position on interpreting Hume’s response to his 
sceptical crisis. Ainslie (2015) describes the “sceptical” interpretation of T 1.4.7 as follows: 
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An interpretation of CtB [T 1.4.7] counts as sceptical to the extent that it sees Hume 
as endorsing the “desponding reflections.” They are not merely prima facie justified, 
awaiting further ratification or rebuttal (say by nature), but speak to our true cognitive 
condition. 
(Ainslie 2015, 226. Original emphasis) 
 
The “desponding reflections”, for Ainslie, are the sceptical worries expressed in the first 
seven paragraphs of T 1.4.7 (2015, 222–24). On the reading I offer, Hume thinks we ought to 
moderate the impact that these sceptical reflections have on us. Crucially, though, Hume also 
thinks we lack a certain kind of solution to the problems that the desponding reflections 
present; he thinks that there is no way to show that the products of the imagination are 
justified, but he maintains that we continue to hold beliefs and to pursue philosophy anyway. 
On the residually sceptical reading, Hume calls himself a sceptic at the same time that he 
denies that it is possible to reject all belief as a result of scepticism (which he thinks is the 
course of action that the extreme sceptic takes). As we will see shortly, Ainslie’s objections 
to the sceptical reading of T 1.4.7 (endorsed by Durland (2011), Broughton (2008; 2004; 
2003) and Cummins (1999)) apply to my reading, notwithstanding the distinctive features of 
my residually sceptical interpretation.  
The framework for understanding Hume’s residual scepticism can be represented by 
the following broad summary of Hume’s sceptical crisis (“SC” for “sceptical crisis”): 
 
SC1: A rehearsal of sceptical worries that, collectively, lead to the consideration that 
important beliefs for philosophy and everyday life are to be rejected. 
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SC2: A rejection of the possibility of living according to such scepticism (i.e. the 
denial of the practical possibility of such scepticism). 
SC3: A statement of moderate scepticism. 
 
Such a framework is non-controversial in itself and is apparent in both Ainslie’s (2015) and 
Garrett’s (2015; 1997) readings. The notion of a residual scepticism that emerges from 
Hume’s response to his sceptical crisis has been alluded to in various readings of Hume’s 
scepticism. Cummins (1999, 57) indicates that any residual scepticism must end before we 
return to philosophy. On my view, by contrast, we can only understand Hume’s residual 
scepticism by seeing how sceptical doubts come with Hume as he returns to philosophy 
(Hume’s transition from his most despairing moment at T 1.4.7.8 to his recommendation to 
pursue philosophy at T 1.4.7.11 will be vital for explicating this aspect of my interpretation). 
Michaud (1985) offers an interpretation of EHU 12 that pays close attention to the way in 
which Hume uses “PYRRHONISM” (EHU 12.24; SBN 161) to motivate his final, moderately 
sceptical position. Maia Neto (1991) similarly maintains that Hume keeps scepticism close at 
hand after his sceptical crisis and that his final position moderates the radical scepticism that 
he briefly entertains. I agree that Hume does not think that the philosophical triumph of 
scepticism requires him to jettison philosophy altogether and that the notion of “residual 
scepticism” is of central importance to Hume’s final, considered view. In my reading, I 
emphasise the way in which Hume needs to remind himself of the facts derived from his 
sceptical crisis in order to motivate his final position. We cannot make sense of Hume’s 
recommendation that “a small tincture of PYRRHONISM” (EHU 12.24; SBN 161) can lead us 
to moderate scepticism without this view in mind. In this way, I show how Hume’s negative 
evaluations of the vulgar opinion and philosophical system constitutes Hume’s final, 
considered view on external existence. This present chapter will be concerned with an 
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explication of Hume’s thought in T 1.4.7 and EHU 12. In Chapter 5, I will offer a more direct 
defence of my claim that the negative evaluations that Hume expresses in his sceptical 
predicament constitute his final, considered views on opinions of external existence. 
Many commentators have found it deeply perplexing that Hume continues to pursue 
philosophy despite the sweeping sceptical challenges he encounters. Fogelin (2009a, 137) 
sees it as a problem that Hume continues to philosophise despite conceding the triumph of 
scepticism, and he even labels Hume’s response a “palliative remedy”, hearkening back to 
Hume’s criticism of the philosophical system (T 1.4.2.46; SBN 211). Other interpreters, such 
as Broughton (2004) and Cummins (1999), have sought to respond to this problem on 
Hume’s behalf. Ainslie (2015) criticises sceptical readings of Hume’s crisis because they 
cannot solve this problem. The “integration problem”, as Ainslie calls it, is the challenge of 
integrating Hume’s sceptical moments into his philosophy as a whole.87 Ainslie (2015, 227) 
identifies three related worries that are attached to the integration problem: 
 
- “It is […] unclear how human faculties can be disciplined to stay within the modest 
bounds that Hume, in his calmer moments, prescribes” (Fogelin 2009a, 137). 
- “Hume appears paradoxically to endorse the triumph of skepticism, and, yet, continue 
his pursuit of just the kind of knowledge the triumph of scepticism would entirely 
preclude” (Cummins 1999, 43). 
                                               
87 Greenberg (2008, 722) refers to the question of how Hume can continue philosophising as “the question of 
warrant”. Greenberg cites Owen (1999, 211) as having used this terminology. However, Owen also uses that 
term to refer to Hume’s considerations of the evaluation of belief in contrast to cognitive psychological analysis 
(see Owen 1999, 137–39). This makes “the question of warrant” a matter of topic, and not necessarily a broad 
interpretive challenge. The term “integration problem” is therefore more pertinent.  
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-  “[…] in Book 2, Hume resumes his investigation of the causal structure of the human 
mind with detailed analyses of the passions, but does not pause once to worry about 
(what sceptical interpreters see as) his negative epistemic verdict on the very activity 
of causal reasoning” (Ainslie 2015, 227). 
 
The first point, which Ainslie draws from Fogelin, is a complaint about what I have called 
Hume’s “residual scepticism”. Fogelin’s worry is that Hume’s response to scepticism might 
not secure the result that Hume wants. At T 1.4.7.9–10, Hume attempts to show how the total 
rejection of philosophy is impeded because of the impermanency of the feelings prompted by 
sceptical worries. Although Hume prescribes some boundaries for philosophy to operate in, 
Fogelin describes his situation as “fragile” because it is unclear why sceptical worries do not 
have a more enduring and devastating impact on philosophy (2009a, 136). In his explication 
of his moderately sceptical position, Hume appeals to the fact that he ought not be obliged to 
forsake philosophy: he says he has no obligation to torture himself with sceptical doubts (see 
T 1.4.7.10; SBN 269–70) and that philosophy “has nothing to oppose” the sentiments of his 
“spleen and indolence” which lead him back to philosophy (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270). Fogelin 
evidently finds Hume’s attempts to provide a rationale for his continuation of philosophy 
unsatisfactory.  
Cummins’s worry is closely related to Fogelin’s, but is less directly a criticism of the 
immediate response to scepticism that Hume provides at T 1.4.7.9–10. Cummins finds that 
Hume’s concession of the triumph of scepticism is in conflict with his desire to continue his 
own philosophical investigations. The problem partly concerns the legitimation of Hume’s 
pursuit of philosophy after the crisis, but also what entitlement he has to not abandon his 
earlier established results. 
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The third point, raised directly by Ainslie, has to do with Books Two and Three of the 
Treatise specifically. It is a textual point, about the sceptical doubts that Hume raises about 
philosophy in T 1.4.7 threatening the unity, consistency, and coherence of the Treatise. This 
point encompasses Cummins’s concern that Hume illegitimately continues his pursuit of 
philosophy, as well as the fact that Hume fails to refer back to the new outlook that he 
establishes for philosophy in T 1.4.7. The question is, how can we make sense of the very 
existence of Books Two and Three given what Hume has to say in T 1.4.7? Additionally, how 
do the general metaphilosophical and methodological claims established in T 1.4.7 inform the 
rest of the Treatise? In Books Two and Three, Hume does not remind his readers that he is 
aiming to bring a new style of philosophising into fashion (as he says at T 1.4.7.14; SBN 273) 
or that pleasure is the origin of his philosophy (as he says T 1.4.7.12; SBN 271). Even in the 
section titled “Of curiosity, or the love of truth” (T 2.3.10), we find no reference to the 
triumph of scepticism, or to the fact that scepticism should inspire epistemic modesty, or to 
the fact that a system of philosophy that might be true is “too much to be hop’d for” 
(T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272). We might even think that the attitudes Hume implicitly adopts in 
Books Two and Three are in conflict with the attitudes that he endorses as part of his 
moderate scepticism. Hume’s accounts of the passions and morals seem so ambitious that it 
may seem implausible to interpret him as merely gesturing towards an appropriate way of 
conducting philosophical investigation or being in some other way detached from his results. 
In the very last section of Book Three (which shares a title with T 1.4.7: “Conclusion of this 
book” (T 3.3.6)), Hume emphasises the way in which the conclusions of his theory are 
beyond a shadow of a doubt.88  
                                               
88 For instance, the very start of this section (T 3.3.6.1; SBN 618) reads: “Thus upon the whole I am hopeful, 
that nothing is wanting to an accurate proof of this system of ethics. We are certain, that sympathy is a very 
powerful principle in human nature. We are also certain, that it has a great influence on our sense of beauty, 
when we regard external objects, as well as when we judge of morals” (added emphasis). 
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I understand “the integration problem” to capture all of these related worries. Ainslie 
maintains that an advantage of his reading is that Hume comes to resolve the triumph of 
scepticism. It is worth noting, though, that some aspects of the integration problem remain 
even on Ainslie’s account. It still is perplexing why Hume does not refer back to T 1.4.7 in 
Books Two and Three of the Treatise. Even if his outlook on philosophy is not fundamentally 
and irredeemably sceptical, Hume still does not remind his reader of that outlook in Books 
Two and Three (T 2.3.10 omits reference to the positive elements of T 1.4.7 as much as it 
omits references to the despairing elements). Hume does not refer back to the moderate or 
“true” scepticism that Ainslie thinks Hume develops in that section.89 
I will explicate my views on the integration problem more fully in Section 5.3.1 
below. For now, I will observe that it is questionable whether a total solution to the 
integration problem is a requirement for any successful reading of Hume’s philosophy. 
Ainslie thinks the problem applies to sceptical readings of T 1.4.7 (that is, those readings that 
take Hume to endorse the negative assessments that he expresses at T 1.4.7.1–7). For Ainslie, 
the fundamental problem with sceptical readings of T 1.4.7 is that, once they concede that 
scepticism triumphs, there is no way to account for Hume holding that some beliefs are better 
than others and, therefore, no legitimation for him continuing to pursue philosophy. I will 
argue in Section 5.3.1 for the textual advantage of my reading of T 1.4.7 over Ainslie’s. I 
hold that Ainslie’s appeal to “true” philosophy in T 1.4.7 enjoys minimal textual support. 
Ainslie appeals to Hume’s reference to “true” philosophy at T 1.4.3.9 (SBN 222–23) as 
corroborating evidence for his reading of T 1.4.7. The textual advantage of my view is that I 
extract Hume’s response to the triumph of scepticism from what he has to say at T 1.4.7.9–
                                               
89 This integration problem applies equally to the Enquiry. Hume expresses sceptical doubt and offers his 
response to such doubt in the very last section of this text. The textual element of the integration problem in the 
Enquiry is the challenge of understanding the earlier sections of that work in light of Hume conceding the 
triumph of scepticism at EHU 12. 
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15. In this portion of text, Hume explicitly addresses the fact that he will continue to pursue 
philosophy in the face of extreme sceptical doubt. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I 
display the evidence for Hume carrying on philosophising while keeping the sceptical 
considerations from his crisis close at hand. In Section 5.3.1, I will reinterpret Ainslie’s 
charge against the sceptical reading of T 1.4.7 not as a decisive blow for interpretations that 
see Hume as accepting the philosophical triumph of scepticism, but as a complaint about 
Hume’s response being unsatisfying. 
 
4.2 Hume’s Scepticism in the “Conclusion of this book” (T 1.4.7) 
4.2.1 Hume’s Doubts about the Imagination 
The final section of Book One of the Treatise is very dense. Hume is also very unsystematic 
in this section, as he fails to clearly identify any view, or even a set of views, as his actual 
conclusion.90 As we will see, Hume sometimes makes forceful points and then backtracks on 
what he has said.  
Hume’s conclusion begins remarkably. Way back at the start of the Treatise, Hume 
announced a bold new positive project based on experimental principles that would resolve 
perennial debates and aggrandise philosophical endeavour. There, Hume says that with 
careful experiment, mirroring the fruitful method of experimental natural philosophy, “we 
may hope to establish on them [i.e. our experiments] a science, which will not be inferior in 
certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension” 
(T Introduction 10; SBN xix). The tone at the start of T 1.4.7 could not be more different. In 
the very first paragraph, Hume deploys a rhetorical image of himself as a man travelling on a 
ship, and he says that to have confidence in philosophical endeavour at this point would be to 
                                               
90 In this way, the prosaic title of the section belies its complexity, as noted by Ainslie (2015, 218) and Qu 
(2014, 501). 
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have the ambition of “compassing the globe” despite having narrowly escaped shipwreck in a 
“leaky weather-beaten vessel (T 1.4.7.1; SBN 263–64). He cites his awareness of “past errors 
and perplexities”, the “disorder of the faculties” and “the impossibility of amending or 
correcting these faculties” as motivating factors for his despair (ibid.). 
In T 1.4.7.2, Hume reflects generally on his project, finding that he has rendered 
himself a social pariah and that he cannot even have confidence in the truth of his antisocial 
opinions: 
 
I have expos’d myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, 
and even theologians; and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I have declar’d 
my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surpriz’d, if they shou’d express a 
hatred of mine and of my person? When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, 
dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I 
find nothing but doubt and ignorance. 
(T 1.4.7.2; SBN 264).  
 
Here, Hume is expressing his anxiety towards his own project. In T 1.4.2, Hume calumniated 
the philosophical system of double existence, and in T 1.4.3 and T 1.4.4 he reduced the 
substance/accidents distinction and the primary/secondary qualities distinction to absurdity. 
In the immediately preceding section, T 1.4.6, he had contradicted philosophical attempts to 
understand the nature of personal identity. But we have no reason to restrict our reading of 
Hume’s worries to only T 1.4. By failing to single out any specific worry, Hume invites a 
reading on which he has the general features and characteristics of his entire project in mind. 
Hume indeed gains the disapprobation of metaphysicians from Parts 1–3 of Book One of the 
Treatise, such as with his rejection of non-imagistic abstract ideas (T 1.1.7; SBN 17–25), his 
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rejection of the infinite divisibility of space and time (T 1.2.1–2; SBN 26–33), and his 
rejection of a clear idea of causal power (T 1.3.14; SBN 155–72).91 
In T 1.4.7.3, Hume comes to his first more focused sceptical worry, which pertains to 
the justification of the products of the imagination. Hume had previously treated the 
imagination as if it unproblematically produced justified beliefs at least some of the time, 
especially in his science of correct causal reasoning (given at T 1.3.11–12 and T 1.3.15) and 
with his confident distinction between approved and “irregular” principles of the imagination 
at T 1.4.4.1 (SBN 225–26). In Part 4 of the Treatise, though, Hume had displayed how the 
imagination produces unjustified, unintelligible and, in the case of the vulgar belief in 
external existence, downright false beliefs. The suddenness of Hume’s realisation of the 
unreliability of the imagination is remarkable (indeed, the reference to approved principles of 
the imagination at T 1.4.4.1 reveals that even in the middle of T 1.4 he has not yet had his 
confidence shaken). Hume considers the possibility that the enlivening of ideas via the 
imagination might be totally independent of the truth of those ideas. The following is what 
Garrett (2015, 218–27; 1997, 208) identifies as the first of Hume’s sceptical worries in 
T 1.4.7: 
 
Can I be sure, that in leaving all establish’d opinions I am following truth; and by 
what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune shou’d at last guide me on her 
foot-steps? After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason 
why I shou’d assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects 
strongly in that view, under which they appear to me. Experience is a principle, which 
                                               
91 The opening comment of T 1.2 is worth noting: “Whatever has the air of paradox, and is contrary to the first 
and most unprejudic’d notions of mankind is often greedily embrac’d by philosophers, as showing the 
superiority of their science […] From these dispositions in philosophers and their disciples arises that mutual 
complaisance betwixt them […] Of this mutual complaisance I cannot give a more evident instance than in the 
doctrine of infinite divisibility …” (T 1.2.1.1; SBN 26). Hume also derides mathematicians specifically in T 1.2 
(e.g. at T 1.2.2.7; SBN 32; T 1.2.4.18–19; SBN 45; T 1.2.4.31; SBN 638). 
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instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is another 
principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them 
conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more 
intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same 
advantages. Without this quality, by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond 
others (which seemingly is so trivial, and so little founded on reason) we cou’d never 
assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects, which are 
present to our senses. 
(T 1.4.7.3; SBN 265. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume is telling us here that the principles of experience and habit work together on the 
faculty of the imagination to produce the liveliness of beliefs. But there is a gap, evidently, 
between what the mind has evidence for and what our lively beliefs boldly assert. Hume 
describes the enlivening of ideas in order to produce belief as “trivial”: by this, he does not 
mean that this operation is inconsequential, but that the enlivening of ideas is independent of 
the justification of our beliefs (see Allison (2005, 321) and Stroud (1991, 274)).92 As Allison 
(2005, 324) and Singer (1995, 598) have observed, the entire passage asserts a criterion 
challenge: what feature of our ideas functions as a mark of justification? As a matter of fact, 
our beliefs are the result of the enlivening of our ideas (see T 1.3.7.5–8; SBN 96–98; 
T 1.4.1.8–10; SBN 183–85), but Hume does not consider this feature to be necessarily truth-
tracking.  
Later in the same paragraph, Hume states that the trivial enlivening of ideas makes us 
attribute external existence to the immediate objects of our senses, recalling T 1.4.2. Hume 
                                               
92 Besides a reference to “the most trivial question” in the “Introduction” to the Treatise (SBN xiii–xiv), the only 
uses of the word “trivial” in Book One of the Treatise are from Part 4. Outside of T 1.4.7, these occur at: 
1.4.2.56; SBN 217–218; 1.4.3.11; SBN 224–225; 1.4.6.8; SBN 255–256; 1.4.6.14; SBN 258. 
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even challenges the veracity of memory by questioning whether perceptions “immediately 
present” to the mind can be counted “as true pictures of past perceptions” (T 1.4.7.3; 
SBN 265). Hume’s conclusion in this paragraph is that the senses, the understanding, and 
memory are all founded on the imagination. Hume’s sceptical worry about the senses is the 
only one that is sufficiently foreshadowed in the text (precisely at T 1.4.2.56), even though 
the terms of his precise worry have changed, since, in T 1.4.2, Hume lamented over the 
deficiencies of the vulgar and philosophical systems without referencing the triviality of the 
imagination.93 
Not dwelling too long on this sweeping challenge, Hume moves on to a further worry 
in the next paragraph, which is that causal reasoning and the belief in external existence are 
in conflict (T 1.4.7.4; SBN 265–66). Hume thinks that the operations of the imagination push 
us towards inconsistent beliefs: 
 
’Tis this principle [the enlivening of ideas via the imagination], which makes us 
reason from causes and effects; and ’tis the same principle, which convinces us of the 
continu’d existence of external objects, when absent from the senses. But tho’ these 
two operations be equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some 
circumstances they are directly contrary,[Hume’s footnote to T 1.4.4] nor is it possible for us to 
reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe in 
the continu’d existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? 
Which of them shall we prefer? Or in case we prefer neither of them, but successively 
assent to both, as is usual amongst philosophers, with what confidence can we 
                                               
93 Later in T 1.4.7, Hume will raise a doubt related to the understanding from T 1.4.1. But to reiterate a claim 
made earlier, there is no parallel to T 1.4.2.56–57 in T 1.4.1. Furthermore, the sense of “understanding” at play 
will shift substantially in T 1.4.7.7 (as we will shortly see). 
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afterwards usurp that glorious title, when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest 
contradiction? 
(T 1.4.7.4; SBN 266) 
 
Although Hume includes a footnote to his discussion of modern philosophy at T 1.4.4 here, I 
insist that we should read him as referring to the sceptical predicament from T 1.4.2 also. I do 
not intend to make the case that T 1.4.4 is irrelevant to this paragraph, but only that there are 
clear indications that Hume does not have this section alone in mind. Hume says that the 
imagination “convinces us of the continu’d existence of external objects, when absent from 
the senses”. This has to be construed as a reference to the vulgar belief. In T 1.4.2, Hume 
painstakingly explained how we come to believe in the existence of objects when not present 
to the senses. Hume’s examination of the primary/secondary quality distinction does not 
address the question of objects existing when they are not present to the senses, but concerns, 
rather, the idea of an object that has primary qualities but lacks secondary qualities (as I 
argued in Section 3.4). Furthermore, consider that Hume says that the operations of causal 
reasoning and belief in the continued existence of objects are, “in some circumstances … 
directly contrary”, and that he repeats himself by saying it is not even “possible” for us to 
apply consistent causal reasoning and believe in the continued existence of objects (Hume 
uses the word “matter”, which he also used while describing the vulgar view at T 1.4.2.43 
(SBN 209)). The conflict is between two cognitive operations that are “natural and 
necessary”; however, in T 1.4.4, Hume declares from the very outset that the belief in the 
primary/secondary qualities distinction is unnatural. He compares it to the ancient 
metaphysical system from T 1.4.3 when he says: 
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The opinions of the antient philosophers, their fictions of substance and accident, and 
their reasonings concerning substantial forms and occult qualities, are like the spectres 
in the dark, and are deriv’d from principles, which, however common, are neither 
universal nor unavoidable in human nature. The modern philosophy pretends to be 
entirely free from this defect, and to arise only from the solid, permanent, and 
consistent principles of the imagination. Upon what grounds this pretension is 
founded must now be the subject of our enquiry. 
(T 1.4.4.2; SBN 226. Original emphasis)94 
 
Of course, T 1.4.4 is still relevant to T 1.4.7.4, and any reading that suggests otherwise would 
strain the text, since Hume references that section with his own footnote. To grasp how the 
passage can consistently cite “a natural and necessary operation” and the system of modern 
philosophy at the same time, we should read Hume as addressing the general conviction that 
there must be D&C existences. The system of modern philosophy represents one way of 
holding onto an internal/external distinction. Even though that system is neither natural nor 
universal, it is still relevant to the point at hand because the general conviction that it purports 
to satisfy is natural and universal. There is a further reason why Hume would cite T 1.4.4 at 
T 1.4.7.4. Hume’s opponents endorse the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, and so for them a reference to T 1.4.4 in the context of the sceptical doubt of 
T 1.4.7.4 would be vexing.95  
Further evidence that Hume refers back to his sceptical predicament at T 1.4.7.4 is 
found in Hume’s response to his own questions, “How then shall we adjust those principles 
                                               
94 My reading of this passage is corroborated by Hume’s reference to the modern philosophy at T 1.4.2.13 (SBN 
192–93), where he says: “Now ’tis evident, that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colours, sounds, 
heat and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity … [and] 
when the contrary opinion is advanc’d by modern philosophers, people imagine they can almost refute it from 
their feeling and experience, and that their very senses contradict this philosophy”. 
95 I am grateful to Louis E. Loeb for suggesting this last point to me in conversation. 
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together? Which of them shall we prefer?” Hume immediately observes that philosophers 
“successively assent to both”, but he does not accuse modern philosophers of successively 
assenting to anything in T 1.4.4. The only place where Hume mentions successive assent 
anywhere in the Treatise besides T 1.4.7.4 is in his discussion of the philosophical system in 
T 1.4.2. The passage is worth recalling. Hume presents nature and reflection as “enemies”, 
the first pushing us towards the belief in the D&C existence of perceptions and the second 
pushing us away from it: 
 
Not being able to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavour to set ourselves at ease 
as much as possible, by successively granting to each whatever it demands, and by 
feigning a double existence, where each may find something, that has all the 
conditions it desires. 
(T 1.4.2.52; SBN 215. Added emphasis) 
 
Now, this is not directly framed in terms of causal reasoning and the belief in D&C 
existence, but the type of reflection Hume has in mind here is that of reflection upon the 
nature of perceptual experience, whereupon we may use causal reasoning to arrive at the 
falsity of the vulgar belief. Such reasoning clashes with “nature”, which is what pushes 
us towards the belief in D&C existence of perceptions.  
Finally, consider how my suggestion that T 1.4.7.4 makes reference to Hume’s 
sceptical predicament would make sense of the last sentence of that paragraph. Hume 
criticises the move of successively assenting to causal reasoning and the belief in D&C 
existence by saying that it is a “manifest contradiction”, and that the philosopher has to 
forfeit the claim that he or she follows evidence, consistency, and the dictates of reason. 
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This coheres with the “absurdity” that Hume attributes to the philosophical system at 
T 1.4.2.56 (SBN 218), which is that it both affirms and denies the vulgar opinion. 
At T 1.4.7.5, Hume moves on to yet another distinct worry, which is the 
dissatisfaction that results from his own causal theory.96 Hume does not dwell on the 
non-justification of causal beliefs in this paragraph, but instead shows that there is a 
contradiction between our pretheoretical suppositions about the universe and the results 
of his theory. Such a contradiction results in disappointment, which, compounded on top 
of other sceptical worries, leads to “such sentiments, as seem to turn to ridicule all our 
past pains and industry, and to discourage us from future enquiries” (T 1.4.7.5; 
SBN 266). 
The natural curiosity of our reason compels us to find the ultimate and most 
general principles that unite natural phenomena. Hume’s investigation in T 1.3, 
however, revealed that we do not have a clear meaning when we talk of causal power 
residing in objects. For Hume, any such idea of power, or necessary connection, is 
derived from the mental transition of anticipating an effect upon experiencing a cause.97 
Hume had previously alluded to the disappointment attached to his causal theory at 
T 1.3.14.24–27 (SBN 166–68). In this earlier section, Hume had defended the results of 
his theory, but in T 1.4.7 he himself laments over the disappointment attached to it:98  
 
                                               
96 De Pierris (2015, 285–86) emphasises the place of this sceptical worry in her reading of T 1.4.7. 
97 Hume offers several arguments for this. Hume argues that since we have no impression of power or necessary 
connection (he officially draws no distinction between these; see T 1.3.14.4; SBN 157), then we must have no 
idea (T 1.3.14.11; SBN 161). Hume also exploits the high demands that would be placed on an idea of power, in 
order to argue against any way of getting such an idea (T 1.3.14.13; SBN 161–62). An abstract idea for Hume 
depends on having a particular idea (annexed to an appropriate ‘revival’ set; see Garrett (1997, 103–04)), but the 
general idea of a power in a cause that makes it bring about its effect would entail the inseparability of the cause 
and effect in thought, and this is patently false. Hume considers that we misapply the word “power” when we 
apply it to external objects, because any such idea of power can only derive from the mere mental transition 
from an idea of a cause to an effect: the idea of power is, “nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a 
determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another” (T 1.3.14.20; SBN 165). 
98 The first sentence of T 1.4.7.5 (omitted from the quotation) references T 1.3.14 in a footnote.  
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We wou’d not willingly stop before we are acquainted with that energy in the cause, 
by which it operates on its effect; that tie, which connects them together; and that 
efficacious quality, on which the tie depends. This is our aim in all our studies and 
reflections: And how must we be disappointed, when we learn, that this connexion, tie, 
or energy lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but that determination of the mind, 
which is acquir’d by custom, and causes us to make a transition from an object to its 
usual attendant, and from the impression of one to the lively idea of the other?  
(T 1.4.7.5; SBN 266–67. Added emphasis) 
 
Evidently, our desire to understand the world better is thwarted when the search for 
causal principles leads us back to our own minds. As humans, we desire to extend our 
view further beyond ourselves, but the direction of our researches is entirely reversed 
when we discover the intimate connection between causal beliefs and our own human 
nature. The disillusionment of this passage represents a stark contrast between T 1.4.7 
and the Introduction to the Treatise, since there Hume declared that directing 
philosophical research towards the human person would advance philosophy.  
Next, Hume connects the disillusionment of T 1.4.7.5 to the status of the faculty of the 
imagination generally, prompting his consideration of “a very dangerous dilemma” 
(T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267). Hume recalls that the “deficiency” of failing to discover causal powers 
does not take hold of our minds in the course of ordinary or “common” life (ibid.). For Hume, 
we simply do not realise that our ignorance of such power in ordinary cases of cause and 
effect is on par with our ignorance in extraordinary cases. Hume is here pointing out that we 
are as ignorant of the power that resides in fire that makes it produce smoke as we are of, 
say, the forces that move celestial bodies. Hume calls the thought that we can discern causal 
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powers in some cases an “illusion”. He states a question that will soon lead him to his 
infamous dangerous dilemma: 
 
This deficiency in our ideas is not, indeed, perceiv’d in common life […] But this 
proceeds merely from an illusion of the imagination; and the question is, how far we 
ought to yield to these illusions[?] 
(T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267) 
 
This question may be read in different ways, depending on what falls under the scope of 
“these illusions”. The illusions may be a specific subset of products of the imagination, 
namely, those cases of imagining we are in touch with causal powers. We may also plausibly 
read “these illusions” as referring to all illusions of the imagination. The question, then, is 
whether “illusions” itself refers to all of the imagination or only a subset of it? The answer is 
found at the end of T 1.4.7.6 and the start of T 1.4.7.7: Hume presents a dilemma between 
assenting to “every trivial suggestion” and rejecting all of them except the understanding. 
Hume also presents the problem with the first option at the end of T 1.4.7.6: 
 
[…] if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy; besides that these suggestions 
are often contrary to each other; they lead us into such errors, absurdities, and 
obscurities, that we must at last become asham’d of our credulity […] This has already 
appear’d in so many instances, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of enlarging 
upon it farther […]  
But on the other hand, if the consideration of these instances makes us take a 
resolution to reject all the trivial suggestions of the fancy, and adhere to the 
understanding, that is, to the general and more establish’d properties of the 
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imagination; even this resolution, if steadily executed, wou’d be dangerous, and 
attended with the most fatal consequences. 
(T 1.4.7.6–7; SBN 267. Added emphasis)99 
 
Hume continues the rest of T 1.4.7.7 carrying on this distinction between trivial suggestions 
and established properties of the imagination. We should observe the way in which such a 
distinction sets aside the worry raised at T 1.4.7.3. There, Hume had established that all of the 
imagination – explicitly including the understanding – is founded on the trivial property of 
the enlivening of ideas. There was no suggestion that the understanding is either more general 
or more established than other aspects of the imagination. If Hume’s worry there was that the 
imagination is based on vivacity and that there is no link between the enlivening of ideas and 
truth, then how could signalling out a more established subset of products of the imagination 
be relevant? This is a sign of the fact that Hume expresses a compilation of doubts that 
generally pertain to the imagination in T 1.4.7. Close attention is required to perceive this, 
however, since the set-up of the dilemma suggests a reading of the dilemma as the 
culmination of sceptical doubt. But it cannot be considered a logical culmination.  
It is not clear exactly what counts as a trivial suggestion and what counts as an 
established property of the imagination. As we have seen, Hume had called all products of 
the imagination “trivial” at T 1.4.7.3, and this itself was a new term, not directly drawn from 
a previous result that Hume had established in another section of the Treatise. Some clues as 
to what Hume means by the more “establish’d” products of the imagination can be 
ascertained from what he says later in T 1.4.7.7. For one thing, Hume says he dealt with 
general and established properties of “the understanding” in T 1.4.1 (“Of scepticism with 
                                               
99 Hume uses the word “fancy” here as a synonym for “imagination”. 
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regard to reason”). The very beginning of that section reveals a rational requirement that goes 
on to directly feature in part of the dilemma: 
 
In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply 
them, our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall 
into error. We must, therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgment, as a check or 
controul [sic] on our first judgment or belief; and must enlarge our view to 
comprehend a kind of history of all the instances, wherein our understanding has 
deceiv’d us, compar’d with those, wherein its testimony was just and true. 
(T 1.4.1.1; SBN 180. Added emphasis) 
 
Hume evidently understands this rational requirement to be a general, “more establish’d” 
principle of reason. In T 1.4.1, Hume showed that a problem would arise, if, counterfactually, 
we followed this principle rigorously, and this fact will turn out to be one element of the 
second horn of the dangerous dilemma.  
The difficulty with assenting to all of the suggestions of the fancy is that some 
individual ones are false and/or absurd, and sometimes they are collectively inconsistent. An 
example of conflict was given at T 1.4.7.4 (Hume’s sceptical predicament arises from a 
conflict between causal reasoning and the belief in external existence). Hume in fact says, 
“This has already appear’d in so many instances, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of 
enlarging upon it farther” (T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267). The problem with the first horn of the 
dilemma, then, is of the multiplicity of disreputable products of the imagination. 
The other option is to use the understanding alone, but Hume thinks he has shown in 
T 1.4.1 that this would be destructive of all reasoning, since we would be constantly lowering 
our confidence in our beliefs to the point of “a total extinction of belief and evidence” 
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(T 1.4.1.6; SBN 182). This dire result is prevented only by a peculiar quality of our 
psychology kicking in. We carry on the sort of reasoning that diminishes our confidence in 
our beliefs, but, after an indeterminate while, our reasoning loses its force and we arbitrarily 
stop at some point. Hume tells us that the purpose of T 1.4.1 is to display the necessity of this 
property of our psychological lives kicking in: 
 
[…] as the action of the mind becomes forc’d and unnatural, and the ideas faint and 
obscure; tho’ the principles of judgement, and the balancing of opposite causes be the 
same as at the very beginning; yet their influence on the imagination, and the vigour 
they add to, or diminish from the thought, is by no means equal. Where the mind 
reaches not its objects with easiness and facility, the same principles have not the 
same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas; nor does the imagination feel 
a sensation, which holds any proportion with that which arises from its common 
judgements and opinions.  
(T 1.4.1.10; SBN 185) 
 
In order to embrace the understanding and circumvent the extermination of our beliefs, we 
would have to endorse one of the trivial qualities of the imagination. As a matter of fact, our 
ideas lose vivacity as our reasoning becomes more elaborate, but Hume thinks to adopt this as 
a rule would amount to, “[establishing] it for a general maxim that no refin’d or elaborate 
reasoning is ever to be receiv’d” (T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268). Hume presents, in quick succession, 
three different problems with embracing the maxim:  
 
By this means you cut off entirely all science and philosophy: You proceed upon one 
singular quality of the imagination, and by a parity of reason you must embrace all of 
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them: And you expressly contradict yourself; since this maxim must be built on the 
preceding reasoning, which will be allow’d to be sufficiently refin’d and 
metaphysical. 
(T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268) 
 
The first problem with embracing the maxim described above is that it would leave no room 
for science and philosophy. Hume would have to abandon his science of human nature in 
order to reject all refined reasoning. A second problem, which is by no means less dire, is that 
our endorsement of the requisite quality of the imagination would be ad hoc if we claim to 
reject all the trivial qualities of the imagination (“… by a parity of reason you must embrace 
all of them …”). The third problem is that refined reasoning leads us to the opinion that we 
only need the understanding plus the maxim that no refined reasoning is to be received, and 
this is a blatant contradiction. So it turns out that, despite the result of T 1.4.1, there is no 
principled way of distinguishing better products of the imagination from worse ones. 
The difficulty of the dilemma, in short, is that at least some of the influence of the 
imagination is necessary to sustain any belief at all, let alone for philosophy and science to 
continue, but some of the suggestions of the imagination are epistemically disreputable. 
Hume says the problem can be forgotten about, but not solved: 
 
We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my 
part, I know not what ought to be done in the present case. I can only observe what is 
commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even 
where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small 
impression behind it. 
(T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268. Added emphasis) 
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Hume’s response to the dangerous dilemma leaves him (and his reader) in a cheerless 
situation, yet we are not even halfway through the conclusion at this point. In the next sub-
section, I turn to the task of interpreting Hume’s response to the sceptical doubts that he has 
raised. At the very end of the explication of the problem of the dilemma, Hume recalls that:  
 
Very refin’d reflections have little or no influence upon us; and yet we do not, and 
cannot establish it for a rule, that they ought not to have any influence; which implies 
a manifest contradiction. 
(T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268) 
 
The first sentence of the next paragraph will involve Hume backtracking on this claim about 
“refin’d reflections”. 
  
4.2.2 Hume’s Slow Return to Philosophy 
At T 1.4.7.8, Hume says that refined and metaphysical reasoning can indeed have an 
influence on him. The reasoning by which Hume has considered the products of the 
imagination to be epistemically disreputable is “refined and metaphysical”, but it has a 
patently negative influence on him.100 So, far from offering any solace from the dilemma – as 
if Hume had realised that some part of it was mistaken – by backtracking on the claim that 
metaphysical reasoning never has any influence on him, Hume is led to his most direct 
statement of sceptical doom expressed anywhere in his writings, the very nadir of his 
philosophical thought: 
                                               
100 Hume describes some of his own philosophy as “metaphysical” in his 1737 letter to Michael Ramsay (cited 
in Mossner 1980/1954, 627). Hume also has a tendency to use “metaphysical” as a pejorative description (see 
T Introduction 3; SBN xiv–xv; T 1.4.2.51; SBN 214; T 1.4.5.35; SBN 250; EHU 1.12; SBN 12–13; EHU 2.9; 
SBN 21; EHU 7.2; SBN 61).  
 - 163 - 
 
But what have I here said, that reflections very refin’d and metaphysical have little or 
no influence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forebear retracting, and condemning 
from my present feeling and experience. The intense view of these manifold 
contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and 
heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon 
no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From 
what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose 
favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on 
whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? 
(T 1.4.7.8; SBN 269. Original emphasis) 
 
Hume’s self-conscious reflections on his own philosophy produce in him the view that “all 
belief” is to be rejected and that he cannot even be sure of what he is. Hume then 
immediately tells us how these dreadful thoughts are dispelled. He points to “nature”, which 
can work to “obliterate” his despondency via, “some avocation, and lively impression of my 
senses” (T 1.4.7.9; SBN 269).101 The word “nature” refers not just to human nature, but also 
to a natural, shared, social environment (as Maia Neto (1991, 42) observes). The famous 
illustration has a vivid social dimension: 
 
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, 
nature herself suffices to that purpose […] I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I 
converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour’s 
                                               
101 Norton & Norton (2000, 573) define “avocation” as “distraction, diversion”. 
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amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, 
and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. 
(T 1.4.7.9; SBN 269) 
 
Here, nature steps in precisely where reason has fallen short and dispels the doubts that 
inspired the rejection of belief. However, the normative import of this is unclear. This 
ambivalence in Hume’s response is at the heart of the challenge of reading Hume’s 
scepticism: does being relieved of sceptical worries merely mean losing interest in them 
despite remaining normatively undefeated, or does it mean that there is a normative solution, 
after all, to the very problems that were raised? In what way does Hume’s doubts appearing 
“cold”, “strain’d”, and “ridiculous” entail a different response to scepticism than he had 
offered to the dangerous dilemma, in which he explicitly distinguished “what is commonly 
done” from “what ought to be done” (T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268)? Hume has much more to say 
about his removal from extreme despair to a return to philosophy, to which we have to look 
to find an answer. 
Although T 1.4.7.9 represents a fairly straightforward, if inchoate, response to 
scepticism, T 1.4.7.10 complicates the picture with some delicate ideas. In this paragraph, 
Hume emphasises the psychological pleasure that motivates doing philosophy, and he also 
suggests that admitting the irrefutability of scepticism does not entail that he must abandon 
philosophy altogether. It is in this paragraph that Hume’s moderate, residual scepticism 
emerges. Hume both reminds his reader of the irrefutability of scepticism and describes his 
own, considered position as sceptical. It is vital to realise that Hume does not instantly 
develop a total psychological dismissal of scepticism, as if he were just expanding the same 
basic point of T 1.4.7.9. 
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Hume summarises the situation in which social preoccupations prompt his disposal of 
scepticism by saying he finds himself “necessarily determin’d to live, and talk, and act like 
other people in the common affairs of life” – that is, like people who are not in a state of 
sceptical despair (T 1.4.7.10; SBN 269. Added emphasis). Hume adds that he has resigned 
himself “to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world” (T 1.4.7.10; SBN 256. 
Added emphasis). He does not specify these maxims, but from the context, we can 
understand them to be those that lead him to assurance about the questions that he raised in 
T 1.4.7.8 (they are, in other words, maxims that “other people” would accept). Crucially, 
Hume is quick to observe that his previous, sceptical mood has not been entirely eradicated. 
Scepticism still lingers, and threatens his intellectual pursuits and personal happiness: 
 
But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits 
and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I 
still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books 
and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for 
the sake of reasoning and philosophy. For these are the sentiments in that splenetic 
humour, which governs me at present. I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, 
in submitting to my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission I show 
most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles. 
(T 1.4.7.10; SBN 269. Added emphasis) 
 
Yet again, Hume here backtracks on what he previously said. Sceptical considerations do not 
seem cold, strained or ridiculous at all, if these are taken to signify that scepticism is 
irrelevant or unworthy of attention. To engage in philosophy, evidently, would involve a 
renunciation of the pleasures of life, because of the attendant sceptical worries. Hume 
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characterises this as a sceptical position: “I must yield to the current of nature, in submitting 
to my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission I show most perfectly my 
sceptical disposition and principles” (T 1.4.7.10; SBN 269). The meaning of this sentence has 
to be grasped in the light of the remainder of the paragraph. Hume asks himself whether he 
needs to strive against the gloom of scepticism, and he finds that, even though scepticism has 
the philosophical victory, it cannot require him to struggle or battle against the indolent 
position to which he has returned: 
 
But does it follow, that I must strive against the current of nature, which leads me to 
indolence and pleasure; that I must seclude myself, in some measure, from the 
commerce and society of men, which is so agreeable; and that I must torture my brain 
with subtilities and sophistries, at the very time that I cannot satisfy myself 
concerning the reasonableness of so painful an application, nor have any tolerable 
prospect of arriving by its means at truth and certainty? 
(T 1.4.7.10; SBN 269–70)     
 
Hume asserts a major point here: scepticism itself cannot say anything for the reasonableness 
of actively choosing despair and gloom (i.e. what Hume describes as “torture”) as a response 
to scepticism. In light of this, Hume then makes a claim about doing philosophy: he says if he 
is going to have follies, they are at least going to be natural and agreeable: 
 
Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? And to what end can 
it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? No: if I must 
be a fool, as all those who reason or believe any thing certainly are, my follies shall at 
least be natural and agreeable. Where I strive against my inclination, I shall have a 
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good reason for my resistance, and will no more be led wandering into such dreary 
solitudes, and rough passages, as I have hitherto met with. 
(T 1.4.7.10; SBN 270. Original emphasis)  
 
Evidently, Hume is committed to striving against his inclination only if he has good practical 
reason for it, and this precludes him from entering the delirious state of T 1.4.7.8. Therefore, 
this paragraph represents a dismissal of the practical influence of radical scepticism. Hume, 
in the course of his work, has stumbled upon the unsettling truth that our important beliefs 
and belief-forming mechanisms are founded on the imagination, and yet he thinks there is no 
way out of the epistemological worry that this engenders other than to say that we can push it 
aside.  
At T 1.4.7.11, Hume says that philosophy has nothing to oppose the previously 
stated sentiments of spleen and indolence and that philosophy “expects a victory more from 
the returns of a serious good-humour’d disposition, than from the force of reason and 
conviction” (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270). We alter our attitudes to philosophy in virtue of the 
following dual awareness: sceptical problems cannot be solved, and we are driven by nature 
to continue pursuing philosophy. Hume says:  
 
In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe, 
that fire warms, or water refreshes, ’tis only because it costs us too much pains to 
think otherwise. Nay if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical 
principles, and from an inclination which we feel to the employing ourselves after 
that manner. Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought 
to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate on us. 
(T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270. Added emphasis) 
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Here, Hume does not appeal to the pleasure attached to pursuing philosophy as a solution to 
sceptical doubt. He will indeed carry on philosophising, but he does so with an avowedly 
sceptical spirit.  
Next, Hume emphasises the way in which he is inclined to think about philosophical 
topics, by saying, “I am uneasy to think I approve of one object, and disprove of another 
[etc.] … without knowing upon what principles I proceed” (T 1.4.7.12; SBN 271). He will 
carry on with his project, investigating topics such as moral vice and virtue, the nature of 
government, and the passions belonging to human nature (T 1.4.7.12; SBN 270–71). He 
even goes so far as to say, “even suppose this curiosity and ambition shou’d not transport 
me into speculations … it wou’d necessarily happen, that from my very weakness I must be 
led into such enquiries” (T 1.4.7.13; SBN 271). As much as the despair of scepticism 
threatens to creep in and undermine philosophy, the pondering of philosophical questions is 
natural, to the point of being inevitable. It turns out, then, that not only is the doom of 
sceptical despair impermanent, but the desire to reject philosophy is also unsustainable. 
Hume recommends that, since human nature will lead us to speculate beyond the realm of 
everyday experience, we might as well follow philosophy instead of superstition, because 
the errors of superstition are “dangerous” but the errors of philosophy are “only ridiculous” 
(T 1.4.7.13; SBN 272). This point about the consequences of pursuing philosophy versus 
superstition is an indication that pragmatic concerns are driving Hume’s return to 
philosophy. 
In the last three paragraphs of T 1.4.7, Hume references the “true sceptic” and 
explicitly lowers his ambitions from seeking ultimate truth to merely bringing a certain style 
of philosophising into fashion. Hume moves on to the point about lowering his ambitions by 
rejecting the frivolity of assenting to beliefs merely because of their agreeableness: 
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While a warm imagination is allow’d to enter into philosophy, and hypotheses 
embrac’d merely for being specious and agreeable, we can never have any steady 
principles, nor any sentiments, which will suit with common practice and experience. 
But were these hypotheses remov’d, we might hope to establish a system or set of 
opinions, which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop’d for) might at 
least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical 
examination. 
(T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272. Added emphasis) 
 
Hume hopes that the brand of philosophy that emerges from his encounter with scepticism 
will at least be satisfactory to the human mind (this satisfaction requires, of course, that the 
temptation to relinquish all belief has dissipated). This passage indicates that Hume’s 
scepticism is moderated instead of rejected. 
There are a number of questions and issues that arise from Hume’s response to 
scepticism, and different statements of Hume’s push us in different directions. One part of 
the text that has been recently exploited by Ainslie (2015) is the reference to true scepticism, 
at T 1.4.7.14. The notion of true scepticism could suggest that Hume is reflexively applying 
sceptical doubts to scepticism itself. In other words, Hume’s sceptical attitude towards the 
rational capacities of the human person could mean that even his sceptical musings are 
subject to doubt. I resist such a reading. In order to grasp the meaning of Hume’s reference 
to “true” scepticism, we have to understand that that notion is connected in the text to 
Hume’s statement about bringing a style of philosophising into fashion. Hume says: 
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Human Nature is the only science of man; and yet has been hitherto the most 
neglected. ’Twill be sufficient for me, if I can bring it a little more into fashion; and 
the hope of this serves to compose my temper from that spleen, and invigorate it from 
that indolence, which sometimes prevail upon me. If the reader finds himself in the 
same easy disposition, let him follow me in my future speculations. If not, let him 
follow his inclination, and wait the returns of application and good humour. The 
conduct of a man, who studies philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly 
sceptical than that of one, who feeling in himself an inclination to it, is yet so over-
whelm’d with doubts and scruples, as totally to reject it. A true sceptic will be 
diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and 
will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either 
of them. 
(T 1.4.7.14; SBN 273. Added emphasis) 
 
We can see here that Hume’s considered outlook is a result of his encounter with sceptical 
despair. Hume explicitly lowers his ambitions from the introduction to the Treatise (see 
especially T Introduction 10; SBN xix). Hume here also presents two attitudes towards 
philosophy: one is to reject the pursuit of philosophy on the grounds that human 
understanding is tainted by the imagination, and the other is to follow the natural inclination 
to wonder about the world and to pursue an experimental philosophy that takes human nature 
as its focus. Hume suggests a reason to prefer the second attitude, which is that the first 
dogmatically follows the conviction that the human mind is tainted and doomed to arrive at 
falsehoods. The second attitude represents a “true” scepticism since it holds nothing at all 
with certain conviction. I will return to the theme of Hume’s “true” scepticism in Section 
5.3.1. 
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Overall, my view is that Hume’s final position should be characterised as residual 
scepticism, that is, a moderate form of scepticism that is the product of his encounter with 
extreme scepticism. Extreme scepticism, it turns out, is unliveable, but it leaves its mark, or 
its residue, on the way we go about in philosophy, science, and ordinary life. There are three 
textual elements that residual scepticism accounts for (see Section 4.1.2 above). Any reading 
of Hume’s scepticism in T 1.4.7 needs to account for these. What is distinctive about my 
approach is that I hold that SC3 (Hume’s statement of moderate scepticism) comes about as a 
product of SC1 (his sceptical worries) and SC2 (his rejection of the possibility of rejecting all 
belief). The sceptical considerations of SC1 are not rejected, except insofar as Hume decides 
that is impossible to live by the initial reaction that they prompt, which is the removal of all 
belief.  
All interpretations agree that Hume moves, at least, from statements of extreme 
scepticism to statements of moderate scepticism. The divisive question – as Ainslie 
(2015, 226) has acknowledged – is in what way, if any, does Hume in the end accept the 
sceptical considerations of T 1.4.7.1–7 as his own view? Here, I have argued that Hume’s 
final position emerges from his confrontation with extreme doubts: Hume arrives at his final, 
moderate sceptical position in virtue of accepting the insolubility of the sceptical problems 
that the doubts of T 1.4.7.3–7 engender, together with his awareness of the impossibility of 
rejecting all belief as a response to scepticism. Hume does not abandon investigation as a 
response to scepticism, but he does alter the way he pursues it. 
If we read Hume as having a robust solution to sceptical problems, then it is not clear 
why he would adopt a moderate sceptical position. It could be replied that in moving from 
SC1 to SC3, none of SC1 is left behind. Thus, Hume would simply be a moderate sceptic. 
The problem is that this would be a distortion of the text. If Hume thought there was a 
normative response to the doubts that sceptical problems engender, then presenting SC2 as 
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his response would be a superfluity if not entirely misleading. If Hume had a normative 
reason to reject SC1 he would appeal to it in his extreme moment of despair, but this he does 
not do, or even hint at doing.  
 
4.3 Hume’s Scepticism in “Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy” (EHU 12) 
4.3.1 Hume’s Consequent Sceptical Doubts 
Hume’s overt reflections on the nature of scepticism are more organised in the Enquiry than 
in the Treatise. In this later text, Hume does not express profound anxiety towards scepticism 
and he introduces new terminology that helps structure his discussion. Most helpful is 
Hume’s distinction between “excessive” and “mitigated” scepticism. Hume explicitly 
endorses the latter of these. As in T 1.4.7, Hume’s final sceptical position is a product of his 
encounter with extreme scepticism; Hume is pushed towards mitigated scepticism by the 
irrefutability of sceptical concerns and the impossibility of rejecting all belief. Hume states 
very clearly that the “chief” objection to excessive scepticism is the fact that the 
extermination of all belief is psychologically impossible and that, if it were possible, it would 
have disastrous practical consequences (EHU 12.23; SBN 159). Hume does not find a 
problem with the negative assessments that the sceptic expresses, but only with the 
implications that the excessive sceptic draws from these assessments. 
Hume begins EHU 12 by declaring his intention to answer a couple of questions 
pertaining to scepticism. Ostensibly, Hume is prompted by the consideration that the sceptic 
is a feared and calumniated figure in philosophical literature, but seems to have no concrete 
reality: 
 
[…] it is certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or conversed 
with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, either of action 
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or speculation. This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a sceptic? And 
how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?  
(EHU 12.2; SBN 149)  
 
Hume begins his answer by distinguishing two species (or kinds, or varieties) of scepticism. 
Hume identifies antecedent scepticism as the adoption of a sceptical position prior to any 
particular discovery. Consequent scepticism is the adoption of scepticism as the result of 
some discovery, and Hume turns to this at EHU 12.5 (SBN 150). Hume goes through two 
varieties of antecedent scepticism. The first involves an attitude of radical suspicion towards 
the truth of one’s opinions and the “veracity” of the faculties (EHU 12.3; SBN 149). Those 
who take this stance, Hume says, do so in the hope of finding some indubitable principle that 
will eventually justify our original opinions and faculties. Hume, therefore, understands 
antecedent scepticism to be bound up with a foundationalist epistemological project, and he 
explicitly characterises it as Cartesian (EHU 12.3; SBN 149). This approach to philosophy is 
wrongheaded for Hume because (a) there just is no indubitable foundational principle, and (b) 
even if there were, we would need to use our faculties to get beyond it, and this would 
contradict the intentions of the radical antecedent sceptic. But even more, Hume thinks such 
radical antecedent scepticism is fanciful because sweeping doubt about all our faculties 
cannot actually be entertained: “The CARTESIAN doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be 
attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable” (EHU 12.3; 
SBN 150. Added emphasis).102  
Hume favours a second, less radical, form of antecedent scepticism. He endorses 
assiduousness in the search for evidence and the active avoidance of common errors and 
                                               
102 Buckle (2001, 298) suggests that this is an overly simplified presentation of Descartes’ views and that, 
although that project is flawed in other ways, Hume’s dismissal is “too swift to be compelling”.  
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biases. He calls the adoption of such attitudes “very reasonable”, “a necessary preparative to 
the study of philosophy”, and says that it will have a positive effect on the search for truth 
(EHU 12.4; SBN 150). Hume does not attempt to justify this endorsement. Williams (2008) 
has observed that the attitudes Hume identifies are more appropriately understood as 
consequent to philosophy. Williams perceives that moderate scepticism does not represent 
“an attitude that we can just take up but rather one that we induce” (2008, 98). What Hume 
says later on in EHU 12 even confirms that such moderate scepticism is arrived after 
philosophising. What emerges from this later part of his text is the reason why moderate 
scepticism is appropriate, which is that the human person is naturally prone to error and 
arrogance, as sceptical considerations amply show. Hume’s view that such attitudes are 
necessary as a “preparative” to philosophy can be defended as an institutional or social fact: 
teachers of philosophy who have encountered scepticism can encourage their students to be 
careful in forming their opinions and wary of common errors and biases. But now, the 
moderately sceptical attitudes would not be totally independent of study and investigation, 
even if they precede investigation from the perspective of some individuals. Overall, I do not 
put too much weight on Hume’s endorsement of moderate antecedent scepticism, seeing it 
instead as a qualification of his total rejection of antecedent scepticism that he suggests by his 
criticism of Cartesian antecedent scepticism. Hume spells out a more robust and cogent 
account of moderate sceptical attitudes at EHU 12.24–34 (SBN 161–65) and this will be the 
topic of the next sub-section. 
Unlike the radical antecedent variety, Hume has no sweeping dismissal of scepticism 
that is consequent to “science and enquiry” (EHU 12.5; SBN 150). Hume goes through a 
number of consideration in EHU 12 that fall under this heading. Before launching into these, 
we should observe a couple of differences between Hume’s encounter with scepticism in the 
Enquiry and Treatise. Firstly, EHU 12 does not, for the most part, involve turning back to 
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Hume’s previous results and extricating potential sceptical consequences. The majority of 
sceptical considerations are being raised for the first time. Secondly, Hume does not directly 
refer to the faculty of the imagination in EHU 12. Despite this, there is a high degree of 
similarity between the doubts raised in the Treatise and Enquiry. Hume’s prose in the 
Enquiry is less emotionally charged, but the philosophical significance of his sceptical doubts 
is in no way pared down. Although Hume does not actually use the term “imagination” in 
EHU 12, he does present the same criterion challenge as T 1.4.7.3 and this is drawn directly 
from the theory of causation Hume offers EHU 4–5. The challenge is expressed in the 
Enquiry in terms of uncertainty deriving from the role of custom in causal belief formation, 
and the similarity between this doubt and T 1.4.7.3 is unmistakable, as we will see shortly.  
The most important commonality between the Treatise and Enquiry versions of the 
crisis is that Hume’s doubts concern the mind naturally being led into falsities, absurdities, 
and uncertainties (as we will see with Hume’s sceptical objections to the evidence of sense). 
Furthermore, Hume’s sceptical predicament concerning external existence features in both 
the Treatise and Enquiry. Hume clearly thinks it is an efficacious means for displaying the 
triumph of philosophical scepticism. 
As in the Treatise, Hume moves between different sceptical doubts without dwelling 
too long on any particular one. But in the Enquiry, Hume provides examples of weak 
sceptical considerations (indeed, this is evident from the very outset with his dismissal of 
radical antecedent scepticism). Ultimately, the gravity of the doubts that Hume does take 
seriously is not something that changes between the texts; Hume does not think that sceptical 
doubts are innocuous, even if radical scepticism cannot be lived. 
As recounted in Section 2.3.2 above, Hume first rules out the “trite” sceptical 
objections to the evidence of sense, before turning to a couple of efficacious sceptical doubts 
that pertain to “the evidence of sense” (EHU 12.6; SBN 151. Original emphasis). The first is 
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Hume’s sceptical predicament concerning the vulgar opinion and the philosophical system. 
Hume shows the falsity of the vulgar opinion and the non-justification of the philosophical 
system. The outcome of Hume’s first objection against the evidence of sense is a sweeping 
indictment against our natural, instinctive opinion of D&C existence and of the intuitive 
response to it. Hume is convinced that reflection on sensory experiences results in an 
insoluble epistemological predicament. When we reflect, we can easily perceive the fallacy of 
the vulgar opinion, and the most natural way to remedy it is to posit the double existence of 
perceptions and objects. But this system of double existence is devoid of justification and 
lacks psychological permanency. Hume also goes through a second objection to the evidence 
of sense, which is a reworked version of his argument concerning modern philosophy from 
T 1.4.4. Hume says that this argument “goes farther” than the argument concerning only the 
vulgar and philosophical systems, but, as argued in Section 3.4 above, this is a sign of the fact 
that Hume reveals that the idea of a bare something that is entirely different from our 
perceptions is compromised (which, in the Treatise, was established in T 1.2.6). It is worth 
observing that Hume does not repeat the sceptical argument from T 1.4.1, or anything like it, 
in EHU 12. This corroborates my view that the arguments in T 1.4.1 and T 1.4.2 do not 
necessarily have to be read together. 
Hume next goes through sceptical considerations pertaining to “abstract reasonings” 
(EHU 12.18; SBN 156. Original emphasis). Hume finds that geometrical reasoning leads us 
to the conclusion that space and time are infinitely divisible, but that this means that our ideas 
of space and time must be full of “absurdity” (EHU 12.19; SBN 157). Hume actually thinks 
that such a sceptical consideration is rather weak, because the very thought that ideas that we 
otherwise take to be clear are so egregiously absurd is itself “absolutely incomprehensible” 
(EHU 12.20; SBN 157). Hume finds it intolerable to think that when a moment of time passes 
an infinite number of smaller moments could have passed each other in succession or, 
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likewise, that a visible extension could be made up of an infinite number of miniscule parts 
(see also T 1.2.1–2; SBN 26–33). Sceptical considerations pertaining to abstract reasonings, 
therefore, are more like the “trite” objections to the evidence of sense.  
Next, Hume moves on to sceptical considerations pertaining to “moral evidence” (that 
is, matters of fact) (EHU 12.21; SBN 158. Original emphasis).103 Hume draws a distinction 
between “popular” and “philosophical” objections against moral evidence. The latter are 
sceptical doubts deriving from Hume’s theory of causation, and the former are reminiscent of 
Pyrrhonian arguments concerning “the natural weakness of human understanding … 
contradictory opinions, which have been entertained in different ages … [and] the variations 
of our judgement” (EHU 12.21; SBN 158). Hume evidently does not think that variations in 
opinions means that no opinion is better than any other. He says that only the philosophical 
objections supply the sceptic with “ample matter of triumph” (EHU 12.22; SBN 159).  
Hume first concedes the triumph of the philosophical objections to moral evidence 
before moving to his full rejection of radical consequent scepticism. The basic logic of this 
sceptical doubt is the same as that which Hume expresses at T 1.4.7.3, even though Hume 
refers to custom instead of the faculty of imagination: 
 
Here he [i.e., the sceptic] seems to have ample matter of triumph; while he justly 
insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of 
sense or memory, is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect; that we 
have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects, which have been 
frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to convince us, that objects, 
which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other 
                                               
103 Hume had drawn the distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas earlier in the text (see EHU 
4.1; SBN 25; EHU 4.18; SBN 35). 
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instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference 
but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which it is difficult to resist, but which, 
like other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon 
these topics, he shows his force […].  
(EHU 12.22; SBN 159. Added emphasis) 
 
Hume is saying here that one of the sceptic’s most incisive moves is to insist that our causal 
inferences are products of custom and that custom is not determined by evidence.104 The 
sceptic has “ample matter of triumph” and “shows his force” by this consideration because 
there is no ready reply that we can make that will show the sceptic to be mistaken.  
 
4.3.2 Hume’s Mitigated Scepticism 
At the end of the same paragraph in which Hume concedes the philosophical triumph of 
scepticism, he also identifies that “the chief and most confounding objection to excessive 
scepticism” is its impracticability (EHU 12.23; SBN 159. Original emphasis). Hume says that 
“no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour” (ibid.). 
The paragraph as a whole makes clear that Hume has two thoughts in mind: excessive 
sceptical doubt is impermanent and if it were permanent it would have destructive results. 
Hume contrasts Pyrrhonism with other ancient and modern schools of thought when he says: 
 
A COPERNICAN or PTOLEMAIC, who supports each his different system of astronomy, 
may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant and durable, with his 
audience. A STOIC or EPICUREAN displays principles, which may not only be durable, 
                                               
104 De Pierris (2015, 290–91) claims that the paragraph does not only show that the enlivening of ideas may 
function independently of the truth of our ideas, but it also reveals that some instincts actually are fallacious (she 
claims that EHU 12.22 mirrors T 1.4.7.4 in this regard). I beg to differ, since Hume is just claiming that instincts 
“may be fallacious” here.  
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but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour. But a PYRRHONIAN cannot 
expect, that his philosophy, will have any constant influence on the mind: Or if it had, 
that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must 
acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish, were 
his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would 
immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, 
unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. 
(EHU 12.23; SBN 160) 
 
Other schools of thought, Hume tells us, at least produce beliefs that have a lasting influence 
on the mind and that have identifiable practical consequences. If Pyrrhonism had a lasting 
effect on the mind, Hume thinks it would result in social breakdown, and eventually the 
termination of life itself. It just so happens, though, that nature always kicks in, and 
thankfully that, “so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded” (EHU 12.23; SBN 160). Hume 
says that any confrontation with Pyrrhonism cannot lead to the extermination of all belief; 
rather, the realisation of this very fact about continuing to believe in the face of sceptical 
argumentation is itself the lesson to be learned from Pyrrhonism: 
 
[…] all his [i.e. the Pyrrhonist’s] objections are mere amusement, and can have no 
other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and 
reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy 
themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the 
objections, which may be raised against them. 
(EHU 12.23; SBN 160) 
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The view Hume expresses here is that we always revert to having beliefs and acting in the 
world – just like those who never encounter sceptical argumentation – but that there is still no 
solid reply to be made when confronted with the Pyrrhonist’s arguments. Buckle (2001, 314) 
insists that this view of the “whimsical condition of mankind” is not Hume’s own, but that of 
the extreme sceptic when he or she realises the impossibility of their own purported way of 
life. According to Buckle, Hume accepting such a view is in conflict with the account of 
mitigated scepticism that Hume is about to develop in the text. In contrast to this, I maintain 
that Hume does indeed incorporate the fact that we cannot answer sceptical challenges into 
his final view. Hume’s final, moderate sceptical position is motivated by the very fact that we 
cannot adequately answer sceptical challenges. I turn now to Hume’s statement of his 
moderate scepticism.  
In the last part of EHU 12 (paragraphs 24–34), Hume offers his positive interpretation 
of scepticism. Hume’s thought here revolves around “mitigated scepticism” (which he also 
identifies as “ACADEMICAL philosophy”; EHU 12.24; SBN 161. See also EHU 5.1;  
SBN 40–41). Striker (1996) and Annas (1994) have both argued that it is a mistake to align 
extreme scepticism with Pyrrhonism and mitigated scepticism with Academic Scepticism, but 
this is clearly how Hume himself takes the situation to be.105 As per his description of 
Pyrrhonism at EHU 12.23, Hume understands excessive scepticism to entail the abandonment 
of intellectual pursuits. Mitigated scepticism, by contrast, allows us to carry on with science 
and philosophy: Hume introduces it as “both durable and useful” (EHU 12.24; SBN 161).  
Hume recognises at least two “species” of mitigated scepticism, though he does not 
initially signpost this at the start. He also says, rather tentatively, that mitigated scepticism, 
“may, in part, be the result of this PYRRHONISM or excessive scepticism” (EHU 12.24; SBN 
                                               
105 Striker (2010, 196) even labels this mistaken dichotomy as “the Humean distinction”. 
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161. Original emphasis). Hume says that the “undistinguished” doubts can be, “corrected by 
common sense and reflection” (ibid.).106 Hume explicitly characterises each of the two species 
of scepticism as outcomes of sceptical reflection. This is indicative of Hume’s moderate 
scepticism being a residual product of his concession of the triumph of scepticism. 
The first species is a curbing of the natural inclination towards hastiness in forming 
opinions and dogmatism of belief. We may summarise this as epistemic modesty. Hume 
distinguishes here between how the illiterate and the learned would each come to such 
modesty. The illiterate have two means: (i) becoming aware of the imperfections of human 
reasoning, and not just from careless errors, but even when reason is being used attentively, 
and (ii), somewhat more specifically, observing that the learned themselves are modest in 
their own opinions, even after a great deal more study than themselves. In describing how the 
learned come to epistemic modesty, Hume explicitly points out the role of sceptical doubts: 
 
And if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and 
obstinacy, a small tincture of PYRRHONISM might abate their pride, by showing them, 
that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but 
inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is 
inherent in human nature. 
(EHU 12.24; SBN 161. Caps in original) 
 
For Hume, consequent scepticism reveals how confusion and error are ubiquitous in human 
reasoning. Hume does not cite any specific arguments, but the reference to “PYRRHONISM” 
indicates that he is hearkening back to those very arguments that he ran through earlier in 
                                               
106 Beauchamp’s (1999, 270) gloss on “undistinguished” is “indistinct; confused”. This is a curious reading 
insofar as Hume does not hint at sceptical doubts being confused. In pure philosophical terms, they are potent, 
but they suffer psychologically and practically. 
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EHU 12. Despite the fact that there is a “confounding” objection to Pyrrhonism (EHU 12.23; 
SBN 159), it is not the case that Pyrrhonian doubts play no role in philosophy. Indeed, they 
play a positive, motivating role for Hume’s epistemology. 
The second species of mitigated scepticism is the restriction of philosophical inquiries 
“to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding” 
(EHU 12.25; SBN 162). Hume is quite vague on what this species of scepticism 
encompasses. It seems to be a general endorsement of the very methodology that Hume has 
followed throughout his entire philosophical career, namely, to study items that are directly 
given in experience rather than to proceed via a priori principles. Hume rejects the usefulness 
of speculating on “whatever is remote and extraordinary” and what belongs to “the most 
distant parts of space and time” (ibid.). Since we cannot appeal to our experience in dealing 
with such topics, we cannot make any progress at all. A priori reasoning is limited and fails to 
establish the existence of objects, much less any causal connection between objects (see 
EHU 4.13; SBN 31–32). 
Hume says of this second species of mitigated scepticism that it “may be the natural 
result of the PYRRHONIAN doubts and scruples” (ibid.). Hume brings up a specific sceptical 
doubt here. He appeals to the fact that, since ordinary causal claims cannot be indubitably 
justified (as per the philosophical objections to matters of fact described at EHU 12.22), we 
ought to be suspicious of extraordinary claims. He also identifies the realisation that extreme 
scepticism is only defeated psychologically and not philosophically as most “serviceable” in 
bringing us to this species of scepticism: 
 
To bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than to be 
once thoroughly convinced of the force of the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the 
impossibility, that any thing, but the strong power of natural instinct, could free us 
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from it. […] While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a 
thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves 
concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard to the origin of the 
worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eternity?  
(EHU 12.25; SBN 162) 
 
Hume tells us that even given this narrow limitation, there is still room to investigate the 
human mind, which, indeed, Hume has already occupied himself with earlier in the book 
(EHU 12.26; SBN 163). Hume goes on to conclude his Enquiry by stating exactly what the 
proper subjects of “science and enquiry” ought to be (ibid.). The abstract sciences are to be 
concerned with quantities and numbers, and all other enquiries are to handle “only matter of 
fact and existence” (EHU 12.27–28; SBN 163–64). Hume also expresses his view of 
theology here, which is that it has a foundation in reason insofar as it is supported by 
experience, but that it is rightly based on faith and revelation (EHU 12.32; SBN 165). So 
here, Hume finally arrives at the goal that he set out in the Introduction to Treatise (even if 
expressed in highly general terms), namely, an analysis of all the sciences via a science of 
human nature. 
Contrary to Qu’s (2017) interpretation of EHU 12, Hume does not appeal to his new 
vision of philosophy to reveal that the various sceptical problems he has run through have 
committed some fallacy or error. Rather, he uses sceptical concerns to motivate that very 
vision. According to Qu, all the sceptical considerations in EHU 12 involve “methodological 
mistakes” (2017, 6). Qu explains that there are two kinds of methodological mistakes the 
Pyrrhonist commits. The Pyrrhonist infers that our faculties are never to be relied on because 
they are sometimes fallacious. Hume does indeed think that such an inference is misguided, 
as his rejection of the “trite” sceptical objections at EHU 12.6 and the “popular” objections
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(original emphasis) to matters of fact at EHU 12.22 reveals. Qu also attributes to the 
Pyrrhonist the mistake of stepping beyond the appropriate bounds of the faculties, as per 
Hume’s second species of mitigated scepticism. Qu says that identifying this methodological 
error allows us to see how the reasoning against the justification of the philosophical system 
of double existence is fallacious (2017, 6). However, Hume thinks that the sceptical 
predicament concerning external existence is a “profound” sceptical objection, not a trite one. 
For Hume, the strongest sceptical arguments are based on experimental reasoning, and this is 
the very sort of reasoning driving the sceptical predicament. It only takes “the slightest 
philosophy” to reveal the falsity of the vulgar opinion (EHU 12.9; SBN 152). Hume even 
directly appeals to his own methodology of experimental reasoning to reveal the non-
justification of the philosophical system: “How shall this question [of the truth or falsity of 
the philosophical system] be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a 
like nature” (EHU 12.12; SBN 153). Rather than dismissing the question of the causes our 
perception as inappropriate, Hume thinks the fact that experience “must remain silent” on the 
matter provides triumph to the sceptic, and so our awareness of this sceptical problem ought 
to humble us. 
Wright (1986) pays careful attention to the way in which Hume continues to 
philosophise after his crisis. But Wright’s interpretation does not recognise the role that the 
triumph of scepticism plays in inspiring Hume’s final position. Wright employs the strategy 
of saying that Hume intended to replace reason with the imagination as the source of 
justification for belief. He says that, since the belief in causal connections is “firmly rooted in 
the principles of the imagination … [it] obtains thereby some epistemic validity” (1986, 419). 
However, Hume directly tells us that the fact that causal inferences are based on “custom … 
which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which … may be fallacious and deceitful” is a matter 
which provides the sceptic with “ample matter of triumph” (EHU 12.22; SBN 159). It is not 
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any “epistemic validity” that custom or the imagination provides that inspires Hume to a 
position of moderate scepticism, but rather, it is the fact that we inevitably continue holding 
beliefs and pursuing philosophy despite the fact that “we can cannot give a satisfactory 
reason, why we believe … that a stone will fall, or fire burn” (EHU 12.25; SBN 162). 
To sum up now. In this chapter, I have offered an argument about Hume’s sceptical 
crisis as it is expressed in his Treatise and Enquiry. Hume’s sceptical crisis is an encounter 
with a serious of doubts, the compilation of which prompt a dire temptation to reject all 
belief. In both the Treatise and Enquiry, Hume’s sceptical predicament concerning the vulgar 
belief and philosophical system plays a key role. Also common to both texts is a criterion 
challenge that emerges from the fact that mental association can operate without regard for 
evidence; in the Treatise, Hume expresses this with reference to the faculty of the 
imagination, and in the Enquiry he expresses this with reference to custom or habit. The 
position that Hume ends up in is one of residual scepticism. Hume accepts the irrefutability of 
sceptical doubts, but insists that we cannot exterminate all belief as a result of them. Hume 
does not think that scepticism requires the extermination of belief anyway, since he thinks 
that a true sceptic will not be dogmatically dismissive of philosophy. Hume does not forget or 
leave behind radical sceptical doubt; on the contrary, he uses such doubt to motivate 
diligence and modesty in philosophy. In the Enquiry, this comes across as two species of 
mitigated scepticism; in the Treatise, it is framed in terms of the recommendation to not stray 
far from the realm of ordinary experience and to avoid dogmatic terms like “’tis evident, ’tis 
certain, ’tis undeniable” (T 1.4.7.15; SBN 178. Original emphasis). The residually sceptical 
interpretation of Hume offered in this chapter is a response to challenge of attempting to 
understand the relation between Hume’s scepticism and his positive philosophical program. 
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5. Responding to Hume’s Predicament 
 
5.1 The Problem of the Vulgar Belief 
So far, we have seen that Hume encounters a sceptical predicament regarding external 
existence, that this forms part of his wider sceptical crisis, and that he carries on 
philosophising as a moderate sceptic despite his momentary temptation to reject all belief. In 
this chapter, I consider some prominent suggestions that challenge the interpretation of Hume 
that I have offered. I will also develop my thoughts on Hume’s predicament in T 1.4.7 and 
EHU 12 in this chapter. I turn my attention first to my treatment of Hume on the vulgar 
belief. Some Hume scholars have suggested that we can infer something relevant about 
Hume’s account of objects (vis-à-vis scepticism) from the fact that we can practically get by 
with just the strictly false vulgar belief in everyday experience. 
Even though Hume’s predicament is one element driving his sceptical crisis, he does 
not overtly reference external objects, body, the vulgar, or the philosophical system, in his 
response to his crisis at T 1.4.7.9–15 and EHU 12.23–34. Hume returns to the vulgar position 
after his crisis, just as how at the end of T 1.4.2 he carries on with the supposition that, “there 
is both an external and internal world” (T 1.4.2.57; SBN 218). We ought not read this as 
Hume coming to believe in the philosophical system of double existence. This is apparent 
from the context, since Hume had just reminded his readers of the fact that the philosophical 
system fully depends on the compulsion towards the vulgar belief for any of its psychological 
influence: “our philosophical system […] is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity, that it 
at once denies and establishes the vulgar supposition” (T 1.4.2.56; SBN 218). Furthermore, 
we should recall that philosophers themselves resort to the vulgar view in the course of their 
ordinary lives (see T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205; T 1.4.2.53; SBN 216). 
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In the previous chapter, I argued that Hume thinks sceptical results are not defeated, 
but moderated: the very fact that they are undefeated leads not to the abandonment of 
philosophy, but to epistemic modesty and the eschewal of questions that pertain to issues far 
removed from ordinary experience. If we narrow our view to Hume’s philosophy of external 
existence in particular, we can say the following on his behalf: the fact that we cannot find a 
satisfactory account of the external world should lead us to adopt moderately sceptical 
attitudes. However, we may now scrutinise more closely the logic behind this. How does the 
outright falsity of the universally held vulgar opinion leave us with a moderate form of 
scepticism? Recall that part of Hume’s response to his crisis was that scepticism itself does 
not dogmatically tell against engaging in philosophy. Scepticism, correctly understood, 
makes no dogmatic claims at all. As a sceptic of the philosophical system of double 
existence, Hume does not dogmatically deny that objects specifically different from 
perceptions exist, only that we cannot confirm whether they do or not. However, such a move 
is not available for the vulgar position, because causal reasoning shows that to be false. Here 
we can see a tension in the sceptical predicament: one half of it is only “sceptical” in the 
sense that it involves a negative epistemic verdict on an important belief, but it is a verdict 
pertaining to the truth value of that belief. When we look at the full predicament, we see that 
the wider problem is our failure to remedy this false belief, so we shift our focus to the 
philosophical system, towards which Hume adopts suspension of belief. But part of the 
problem is that the philosophical system represents a departure from our naturally held belief 
anyway.  
At this point, we may contrast the problem of the vulgar belief with other sceptical 
concerns expressed in T 1.4.7 and EHU 12. Hume worries that the propensity of the 
imagination to assent to lively ideas might not track truth (in the Enquiry, this is not explicitly 
framed in terms of the imagination, but in terms of our habit of forming causal beliefs; see 
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EHU 12.22; SBN 159). We consider some lively beliefs true and others false, but we have no 
principled way of distinguishing between them. Hume’s final position differs from what he 
calls “Pyrrhonism” because he does not conclude that an appropriate response to the problem 
is to reject philosophy as a whole. In the Enquiry, Hume explicitly contrasts his position with 
Pyrrhonism in this regard (EHU 12.23–25; SBN 159–62) and even in the Treatise he stresses 
the way in which his position is “truly sceptical” (T 1.4.7.14; SBN 273) and that “philosophy 
has nothing to oppose” his intellectual pursuits (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270). For Hume, scepticism 
does indeed present a challenge, but he does not think that we are obliged to refrain from 
intellectual pursuits even if we cannot adequately answer the challenge. 
The logic that philosophy does not dogmatically oppose sceptical doubts cannot be 
applied to the problem of the vulgar opinion specifically. Philosophy does indeed oppose that 
belief, as the experiments against the vulgar opinion testify. Despite this, Hume happily 
returns to philosophy after his encounter with sceptical despair. Hume seems to get by with 
the vulgar belief. We must remember that, as I have insisted, Hume does not resort to mere 
practical or psychological facts to answer questions of epistemic evaluation. For Hume, we 
resort to the vulgar view, we mingle in society, and we are able to manipulate the world and 
engage in intellectual pursuits, but we can make no inroads towards solving the problem of 
the falsity of the vulgar belief. 
At this point, two interpretive options for solving the problem of the vulgar appear. 
Firstly, an interpretive temptation may arise to seek for, on Hume’s behalf, a philosophical 
theory that would explain why we can successfully engage with the world despite the falsity 
of the vulgar opinion. Maria Magoula Adamos (2014), while not actually advocating that we 
read Hume as endorsing the philosophical system, represents the issue at hand. In the 
following quotation, Magoula Adamos lumps together Hume’s treatment of substance and 
modern philosophy, but the underlying point about the philosophical system is pertinent: 
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So, according to Hume, the vulgar is in contradiction when she ascribes identity to 
objects. If this is the case, I do not see what is wrong with the philosophical system, 
since to all appearances it seems to actually salvage the vulgar system from 
contradiction by creating the notions of substance and prime matter. For, according to 
Hume this is exactly what the philosophical system ought to be doing; namely, to 
“approach nearer to the sentiments of the vulgar” [T 1.4.3.9; SBN 222]. 
(Magoula Adamos 2014, 71. Original emphasis) 
 
The philosophical system is an attempt to correct the vulgar belief. While it might be strictly 
unjustified, it is not provably false, and does it not at least explain the fact that we practically 
succeed in getting by in the world? Magoula Adamos cites Hume’s description of the true 
philosopher at T 1.4.3.9 as motivation for her complaint. The same point may be made with 
reference to what Hume says in the Enquiry about philosophical methodology (see Kail 
2010/2007, 69). Philosophy, according to Hume, is to begin with observation and experiment 
and should aim to solve problems and resolve contradictions. Hume describes all 
philosophical inquiry when he says: “philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections 
of common life, methodized and corrected” (EHU 12.25; SBN 162. Added emphasis). Is it 
not the case that the system of double existence both methodises and corrects the vulgar 
system? As Hume says, the philosophical system tacitly confirms (or “establishes”) the 
vulgar system by admitting that there are some D&C existences (T 1.4.2.56; SBN 218). 
Should Hume not then admit that there is indeed an explanatory justification for believing in 
the double existence of perceptions and objects? Hume may still admit that we entertain the 
vulgar opinion, but the question at hand is whether Hume should officially endorse the 
philosophical system in order to explain our ability to seemingly manipulate the world and 
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engage with what seem to be real objects and other people. Hume could still admit that 
reason is not the source of the belief in body (as he says at T 1.4.2.14), but he could admit 
that there is a post-hoc justification for it, and this is all that is needed to silence the sceptic or 
satisfy those who wonder about the justification of the belief. Schnall (2004) makes the same 
point in different terms: rather than moving from the vulgar to the philosophical system, we 
should realise that that the vulgar belief in D&C existences is itself explanatorily justified, 
“because it provides a framework for explaining the constancy and coherence, as well as 
other aspects, of our experience” (2004, 46).  
As much as Magoula Adamos, Kail and Schnall offer an enticing option, there is not 
the least suggestion in the text that Hume goes down this route. Magoula Adamos 
acknowledges this, since she accuses Hume of an oversight. Schnall also admits, “Perhaps 
Hume did not recognize this way of justifying a hypothesis” (2004, 46). There is a clear 
alternative that is textually supported, which is that Hume simply thinks the problem of 
external existence is one we cannot adequately answer. The problem of the vulgar opinion 
still remains, and the temptation to solve it may appear, but Hume does not ever hint at giving 
into this temptation himself.  
An alternative to positing an explanatory justification to circumvent the problem of 
the vulgar belief would be to analyse that belief in such a way that Hume would not find it to 
engender a sceptical problem. This is the route taken by Ainslie (2015), as he holds that 
Hume’s treatment of the vulgar belief “should not be construed as being essentially sceptical” 
(2015, 108). Even though he concedes that the vulgar belief is false for Hume, Ainslie draws 
a distinction between constitutive and epistemic errors in order to show that the belief is not 
problematic. Ainslie exploits the fact that the vulgar do not actively consider the immediate 
items of experience to be perceptions in order to make this distinction. For Ainslie, an 
epistemic error involves making a false claim about an object that one has in mind. A 
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constitutive error, by contrast, involves making a strictly false claim about the bare image 
content of a perception. Ainslie provides an illustration of a television set. By taking what are 
in fact mere digital pixels to represent a person or a place, we are committing a constitutive 
error. But it is not a regrettable fact about ourselves that we fail to distinguish individual 
pixels; it is precisely what enables the possibility of televisual communication. 
Ainslie’s illustration shows how a strictly false belief can still be practically 
beneficial. One limitation of the analogy, however, is that televisual technology is an 
invention that was designed with an end result in mind. To complete the analogy, then, we 
would have to read Hume as believing in the providence of nature for the vindication of the 
vulgar belief. As remarked in Section 1.1.3, such a view does not seem a satisfactory solution 
because it remains to be seen what feature of nature would ensure this providence? So, while 
Ainslie’s suggestion is useful for explaining why Hume is not more perturbed by the falsity 
of the vulgar belief than he is, I reject Ainslie’s inference that Hume’s treatment of the vulgar 
belief is “not essentially sceptical”. The falsity of the vulgar opinion is not a mere technical 
error for Hume. He appeals to the problem of the falsity of the vulgar belief in both T 1.4.7 
and EHU 12 to motivate his moderate sceptical position. When Hume reminds us that “a 
small tincture of PYRRHONISM” (EHU 12.24; SBN 161) may abate our immodesty, he is 
referring to efficacious sceptical considerations, such as the “profound” objections to the 
evidence of sense (EHU 12.6; SBN 151). Hume’s view, I maintain, is that we ordinarily 
believe in D&C existences because the vulgar belief is a universal belief. As a compulsive 
belief, the vulgar is believed despite the fact that we can easily become aware of its 
defectiveness. This very fact, Hume thinks, ought to inspire us to adopt moderately sceptical 
attitudes. In brief, Hume does not repudiate scepticism pertaining to systems of external 
existence, but he remains true to his intention to follow the rule that, “In all the incidents of 
life we ought still to preserve our scepticism” (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270). 
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In the next section of this chapter, I will explore the possibility that a simple revision 
of Hume’s philosophy allows him to avoid his sceptical predicament. Loeb (2002) has 
proposed that Hume can easily take the vulgar belief in the D&C existence of perceptions to 
be true. The relevance of Loeb’s proposal for my thesis is that the sceptical predicament 
might actually be easily dispensable for Hume. As observed in Section 2.3.1, the inadequacy 
of Hume’s reasoning against the vulgar belief has been commonly cited since Price’s (1940) 
study of Hume’s views of external objects. Loeb exploits the very fact of this inadequacy, 
and so I understand Loeb’s proposal as putting flesh on the bones of a strategy that has been 
pondered by many of Hume’s readers. 
In the previous chapter, I defended my sceptical reading of Hume largely by paying 
close attention to the texts of T 1.4.7 and EHU 12. In Section 5.3, I will go through some 
prominent suggestions from the secondary literature on how we should read Hume’s 
scepticism. For Ainslie (2015) and Garrett (1997), Hume finds a robust, normative solution to 
sceptical doubt in his response to his sceptical crisis. In Section 5.3.1, I will examine 
Ainslie’s (2015) reading of Hume’s true scepticism. This reading uses the tripartite 
distinction between a vulgar position, a false philosophical position, and a true philosophical 
position (which Hume draws at T 1.4.3.9 (SBN 222–23)) to read Hume’s scepticism as a 
whole. Ainslie holds that the central advantage of his reading, in contrast to more sceptical 
readings, is that it solves the problem of integrating Hume’s despairing sceptical moments 
into his philosophy as a whole (recall Section 4.1.2). Garrett (1997) blunts the force of 
scepticism by employing the following strategy on Hume’s behalf: the reflexivity of 
scepticism means that it is self-defeating and this fact ought to give way to a non-sceptical 
approach to philosophy. I will address the issue of the reflexivity of scepticism in Section 
5.3.2 below. 
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In Section 5.4, I will look at Hakkarainen’s (2012a; 2012b) sceptical reading of Hume 
of objects. I take Hakkarainen to be representative of the position that Hume should simply 
be characterised as expressing different and inconsistent attitudes in different domains. 
According to Hakkarainen, the most basic interpretive challenge to do with reading Hume on 
objects is to reconcile seemingly inconsistent positions. Hume cannot both hold a belief and 
accept that a belief ought to be rejected at the same time. Hakkarainen argues that the only 
successful readings of Hume will be one that accounts for the possibility of Hume positing 
different views. These are what Hakkarainen calls ‘no-single Hume’ interpretations. I will 
object to some of the specifics of Hakkarainen’s reading of Hume on objects and I will show 
the way in which the residually sceptical reading of Hume differs from, and fares better than, 
the approach according to which he has different views in different domains of inquiry, as 
Hakkarainen suggests. In Section 5.5, I will conclude with a recapitulation of my views and 
their significance. 
   
5.2 Amending Hume’s Metaphysics 
Loeb (2002) presents an amended version of T 1.4.2 on which the vulgar belief is understood 
to be true for Hume. In proposing this amendment, Loeb frankly acknowledges that he is 
offering a revision of Hume’s philosophy and not a reading of his actual position. Loeb’s 
amendment is highly relevant because he claims that it is “by and large secured without 
abandoning principles fundamental to Hume’s project” (2002, 214). If Loeb’s proposal can 
be secured so easily, then Hume’s sceptical predicament could have been fairly easily 
avoided, even if Hume himself did not realise how to do this. Loeb’s amendment to T 1.4.2 
involves exploiting the weakness of Hume’s experimental reasoning against the vulgar belief. 
According to Loeb, while there is ample textual and historical evidence that Hume 
rejected direct realism as a non-starter (that is, that he took it for granted that the immediate 
 - 194 - 
objects of experience are perceptions only), only a single paragraph (T 1.4.2.45;  
SBN 210–11) establishes Hume’s commitment to perceptions lacking D&C existence 
(2002, 208–09). Hume is officially open to the possibility of perceptions enjoying D&C 
existence, as he explicitly states at T 1.4.2.40 (SBN 207–08). This possibility is a result of 
Hume’s conceivability principle (see T 1.1.7.6; SBN 19–20; T 1.2.2.8; SBN 32; T 1.4.5.5; 
SBN 233).107 Since Hume is open to perceptions enjoying D&C existence and he offers only a 
weak argument against the fact that they do, Loeb suggests that making the vulgar belief true 
for Hume would not involve a farfetched distortion. Loeb maintains that an advantage of 
amending T 1.4.2 in this way is that it would solve the puzzle about Hume appealing to 
constancy and coherence as separate qualities of perceptual experience that give rise to the 
vulgar belief. In this section, I will argue that making the belief in the D&C existence of 
perceptions true would represent a contravention of the fundamentals of Hume’s philosophy. 
Opting out of the sceptical predicament is not as easy for Hume as Loeb suggests. 
Recall that Hume appeals to both coherence and constancy as distinct qualities of our 
perceptions that explain the origins of the vulgar belief. It would be more parsimonious to 
identify a single quality of perceptions that explains the belief in body, and it seems plausible 
to count constancy as a type of coherence. The coherence of our perceptual experience means 
that any changes we observe in perceptions when they have been interrupted accord with our 
wider system of beliefs. In the case of interrupted but constant perceptions, there are no 
changes, but if this accords with our expectation that there should be no changes, then 
constancy just seems like a special case of coherence (Loeb, thus, describes constancy as 
“monotonous coherence” (2002, 179)). Loeb argues that Hume’s requirement that the vulgar 
belief be false prevented him from subsuming constancy under coherence (2002, 191–92). 
                                               
107 Hume mentions this possibility at T 1.4.2.40 (SBN 207–08) while defending the claim that it is possible to 
mistakenly think that our perceptions enjoy D&C existence. It is not inherently contradictory for perceptions to 
have such existence, so it is both conceivable and possible. 
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The psychological process by which a mind moves from the coherence of perceptions to the 
belief in existence of D&C perceptions is a type of causal reasoning, which, under normal 
circumstances, produces justified belief for Hume (2002, 198–99).108 But it would be 
intolerable for the vulgar belief to be knowably false and justified because of causal 
reasoning. Different psychological mechanisms, therefore, have to be in play in cases of the 
mind responding to the coherence and constancy of perceptions. Constancy and coherence 
have to be considered separate qualities that work in tandem to produce the vulgar belief. The 
psychological mechanism at play in cases of the constancy of our perceptions is not causal 
reasoning, but identity ascription (Loeb 2002, 139–47). Crucially, Hume is not committed to 
the identify-ascribing mechanism producing justified beliefs. Indeed, this mechanism tends to 
produce decidedly unjustified beliefs.109  
Hume explains constancy by saying that objects with this quality, “present themselves 
in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing 
or perceiving them” (T 1.4.2.18; SBN 195).110 He takes the example of “mountains, and 
houses, and trees” as such constant items (T 1.4.2.18; SBN 194). The quality of the coherence 
of our perceptions, by contrast, works in the following way. Loeb defines the “coherence” of 
perceptions as, “their conforming to a regularity in their temporal sequence irrespective of 
any interruptions in their observation” (2002, 178). This feature of our experience interacts 
with a psychological mechanism that Loeb calls “custom-and-galley” to make us believe that 
things exist and interact with other things in the world even when they are not currently 
                                               
108 See Loeb (2002, 60–65) for an outline of his views on Hume on the justification of causal reasoning. On 
Loeb’s interpretation, Hume takes justification to depend on the stability of belief; so causal reasoning, for 
Hume according to Loeb, tends to produce stable beliefs under normal conditions. 
109 See Loeb (2002, 154–62) for his reasoning behind the claim that the identity-ascribing propensity tends to 
lead to produce unjustified beliefs. Loeb’s main evidence is taken from the section of the Treatise on the ancient 
philosophical view of substance (T 1.4.3).  
110 That constancy could play a role in explaining the vulgar belief occurs to Hume because it is a distinguishing 
feature of those perceptions to which the vulgar attribute D&C existence (recall that the vulgar admit that pains 
and pleasures lack D&C existence; see T 1.4.2.12; SBN 192). 
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perceived by us (2002, 186).111 In a fairly detailed illustration, Hume shows how we come to 
such a supposition by reconciling otherwise contradictory aspects of experience. Hume 
supposes that he hears a knocking on a door and then sees a porter. He describes how his 
mind would immediately come to consider the existence of particular objects because of past 
experience: the door exists, even though he only hears a knock, and the porter must have 
climbed the stairs to get to the door. Hume then describes how he opens a letter, perceives the 
hand-writing, and thinks of the existence of his friend two-hundred leagues away, and how 
seas and lands must exist between him and them.112 Hume generalises the point by saying, 
“There is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not a similar instance presented to me” 
(T 1.4.2.20; SBN 197).  
Loeb holds that the experiments given at T 1.4.2.45 do not effectively secure the 
result that perceptions lack D&C existence because they fail to rule out a relevant 
metaphysical possibility. To quickly revise the one experiment that Hume takes time to 
explicate (see also Section 2.3.1), Hume tells us that when we press an eye-ball with a finger 
that a double vision is produced. Since we know that one of the visions definitely does not 
have continued existence – existing only for a moment and being entirely dependent on the 
manipulation of our organs – and that the original image and the duplicate must be of the 
same nature, we can conclude that all our ordinary perceptions lack continued existence (and 
therefore do not enjoy distinct existence either).113 But Loeb thinks that the experiments only 
                                               
111 The name “custom-and-galley” derives from the following remark of Hume’s: “the imagination, when set 
into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the 
oars, carries on its course without any new impulse. […] The same principle makes us easily entertain this 
opinion of the continu’d existence of body. Objects have a certain coherence even as they appear to our senses; 
but this coherence is much greater and more uniform, if we suppose the objects to have a continu’d existence; 
and as the mind is once in the train of observing an uniformity among objects, it naturally continues, till it 
renders the uniformity as compleat as possible” (T 1.4.2.22; SBN 198). 
112 Hume also presents a simpler illustration: “When I return to my chamber after an hour’s absence, I find not 
my fire in the same situation, in which I left it: But then I am accustom’d in other instances to see a like 
alteration produc’d in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. This coherence, therefore, in 
their changes is one of the characteristics of external objects, as well as their constancy” (T 1.4.2.19; SBN 195). 
113 Hume claims that there are “an infinite number of other experiments of the same kind” as this double vision 
experiment (T 1.4.2.45; SBN 211). 
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show that particular perceptions are members of particular bundles at a given time, not that 
such perceptions are dependent on a mind for their very existence:  
 
[…] we can form the following metaphysical picture: perceptions do have a continued 
and distinct or independent existence; some perceptions are members of a particular 
bundle of perceptions at a given time; and that a particular perception is a member of 
a particular bundle at a given time does depend, in part, on conditions internal to that 
bundle. In Price’s [1940, 114–15] terminology, facts about the perceiver do not 
generate perceptions, they select perceptions for inclusion in a bundle. Though facts 
about the perceiver cause perceptions to be members of, to enter, a bundle, the 
existence of perceptions does not depend upon facts about the perceiver. This picture, 
in which perceptions do have a continued and distinct existence, is consistent with the 
“experimental” facts. 
(Loeb 2002, 211. Original emphasis) 
 
The essential idea behind this generation/selection distinction is that conditions about a 
percipient’s organs may be a factor in determining which perceptions are given to the mind, 
but, according to this construal, it does not follow that the perceptions do not exist unless they 
are given to the particular mind for which they have been selected. Loeb insists that 
neglecting to consider this possibility is an oversight on Hume’s part, especially considering 
that Hume’s openness to the bare possibility of D&C perceptions was a distinctive feature of 
his philosophy (in contrast to Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and Berkeley) (2002, 210).  
Loeb maintains that his amendment involves a minimal revision of Hume’s overall 
metaphysics of perception. His amendment is designed to account for the belief in D&C 
existences while maintaining that our experiences are fleeting and interrupted. For Loeb, 
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instead of Hume saying, in a case of the constancy of our perceptions, that the imagination 
leads us to believe that a present mountain (for instance) is identical with a past mountain, 
Hume should say that we imaginatively infer the existence of D&C mountain. The same 
psychological mechanism would be at work, then, in the cases of constancy and coherence.114 
I object to Loeb’s suggestion on the following grounds. While Loeb’s amendment 
makes the belief in the D&C existence of perceptions true, to suggest that the vulgar infer the 
existence of perceptions comes at the cost of misconstruing the vulgar belief itself. The 
vulgar sometimes infer the D&C existence of perceptions (such as in the case of inferring the 
existence of the porter and the stairs described at T 1.4.2.20), but it cannot be the case that the 
vulgar belief always works like this. The vulgar belief sometimes involves attributing D&C 
existence to immediately experienced impressions. By modelling the vulgar belief on 
inference, Loeb’s amendment threatens to undermine this fact about the phenomenology of 
the belief. The vulgar believe that the immediate objects of their experience enjoy D&C 
existence: they ascribe identity to what are, in fact, resembling but numerically distinct 
perceptions. But on Loeb’s amendment, the vulgar effectively believe in double existence. 
The vulgar belief would be technically true because the objects that are inferred to exist are 
themselves perceptions. Loeb even acknowledges that his amendment would entail a 
modification of Hume’s explanation of the genesis of the philosophical system (2002, 212, 
n. 46). Instead of the philosophical system arising from the realisation of the falsity of the 
vulgar belief, it would have to arise from the philosopher’s mistaken view that the vulgar is 
false. There is a deeper problem though, which is that, on Loeb’s amendment, Hume thinks 
we can justifiably infer the existence of objects that are never the objects of experience. 
Consider Hume’s own illustrations of the constancy of perceptions. Hume takes the case of 
                                               
114 Since the inference to the D&C existence of perceptions is the product of an imaginative mechanism, and not 
the product of step-wise reasoning, Loeb’s amendment can account for Hume’s claim at T 1.4.2.14 that the 
vulgar belief is not the result of argument. 
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“mountains … which lie at present under my eye” that do not change even though the 
experience of them is interrupted (T 1.4.2.18; SBN 194). Because of the resemblance 
between a present impression and past impressions, the vulgar hold that the present 
impression enjoys D&C existence. The vulgar do not imagine that there is something over 
and above their present impression.  
An alternative to inferring the existence of unperceived perceptions would be to infer 
that the perceptions that the vulgar do experience enjoy D&C existence. Loeb could draw the 
following distinction in order to account for the experience of the vulgar being interrupted but 
the objects of their experience enjoying D&C existence. We may distinguish, on Hume’s 
behalf, between perception-objects and perception-activities, where the latter refers to the 
experiences that belong to a perceiver and the former refers to intentional objects of 
experience. Perception-activities can be interrupted, for example, by blinking or turning one’s 
head, but a perception-object could enjoy continued existence through this interruption. In a 
case of turning one’s head, the very same perception-object would be present both before and 
after the interruption. If we inferred the D&C existence of perceptions in this way, then the 
criticism about transforming the vulgar opinion into a double existence theory would no 
longer apply. But it comes at the cost of abandoning some of Hume’s other metaphysical 
commitments. In his account of the psychology of the vulgar belief, Hume proceeds on the 
basis that we experience numerically different and merely resembling perceptions. It is this 
that would have to be abandoned on the present suggestion. So Loeb could no longer claim to 
be amending an aberrant commitment to some fallacious experiments. 
Overall, it is not so easy for Loeb to single out the falsity of the vulgar opinion as the 
result of neglecting the metaphysical picture he proposes. That picture is, essentially, 
orthogonal to the vulgar opinion. Loeb is right to realise that Hume offers a hasty argument 
for the falsity of the vulgar opinion (in Section 2.3.1, I claimed that Hume clearly fails to 
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attend to any differences between the double-vision experiment and what he calls the 
“infinite number” of perceptual relativity experiments). There is a leap being made, though, 
from realising a deficiency with Hume’s experiments, to offering a way for Hume to 
positively infer the D&C existence of perceptions. These D&C perceptions are either the 
direct items of experience or not. If they are not, then the vulgar belief is being amended into 
a double existence theory. If they are, then Hume is denying that we experience numerically 
different and merely resembling objects in experience. 
Hume appeals to what seem to be perfunctory considerations to establish the 
dependency of perceptions. My diagnosis for this is that Hume’s conceivability principle 
forces him to concede that perceptions can exist independently of any given mind, but that he 
actually believes that the perceptions of any given mind must be dependent on that mind for 
their existence. One of Hume’s remarks in the Enquiry is enlightening here. As he disparages 
the philosophical system of double existence, he says that the manner in which external 
objects and minds are supposed to interact is inscrutable:  
 
And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so 
operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so 
different, and even contrary a nature. 
(EHU 12.11; SBN 153). 
 
Although this is officially presented as a problem with the philosophical system, I suggest 
that we can see a wider point here. Hume himself struggles to come to terms with how mind 
and objects outside the mind could interact. This problem does not arise with the vulgar, 
because the objects that are given D&C existence just are the direct perceptions of the mind. 
But they are mind-dependent perceptions. As I emphasised in Section 2.2, Hume appeals to 
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observation – what he would have considered experimentation – in order to establish the 
dependency of perceptions. We may consider these experiments to be cursory, but they 
express Hume’s conviction that a mind’s perceptions are dependent on that mind in the style 
of philosophical argumentation that he would have considered appropriate. 
 
5.3 Hume’s “True” Scepticism   
5.3.1 The True/False/Vulgar Distinction 
In this section, rather than considering a reinterpretation of the vulgar belief, I will consider 
whether any of the philosophical points Hume makes about scepticism might resolve his 
sceptical predicament (we may refer to Hume’s expressions of such points as his philosophy 
of scepticism or his views on the nature of scepticism). Ainslie (2015) offers an original and 
insightful treatment of T 1.4. For Ainslie, all of T 1.4 consists in a defence of a model of the 
mind on which we do not superintend over our beliefs, choosing which ones to accept and 
which ones to eschew, and also on which we do not normally cognise our perceptions as such 
in perceptual experience (2015, 7). Ainslie also holds that, in T 1.4, Hume makes a 
metaphilosophical argument concerning the urge that humans have to systematise and 
structure fundamental beliefs, such as beliefs about external objects, causation, and personal 
identity (ibid). 
Ainslie analyses the structure of T 1.4 as follows: Hume first treats scepticism as it 
pertains to the faculty of reason and then of the senses in T 1.4.1 and T 1.4.2, and then deals 
with specific accounts of external and internal worlds in T 1.4.3–6.115 Ainslie sees both 
T 1.4.1 and T 1.4.2 as revealing the imperviousness of belief to sceptical arguments by 
                                               
115 The accounts of the external world investigated in T 1.4 are the theories of substance (1.4.3) and primary 
qualities (1.4.4). The accounts of the internal world are the immaterial soul (1.4.5) and the continuing self 
(1.4.6). 
 - 202 - 
showing that those arguments depend on, and exploit, a false model of the mind  
(2015, 148–50).  
Ainslie offers a modified version of a dialectical reading of T 1.4.7, which he dubs 
the “philosophical” interpretation. Ainslie’s reading is intended, in part, to diminish the 
influence of sceptical doubts on Hume’s final, considered position compared to the sceptical 
reading of that section (recall that Ainslie thinks such readings are hopelessly susceptible to 
the integration problem) (2015, 237). According to dialectical approaches to T 1.4.7, Hume 
reveals his central thesis rhetorically, by the movement of his thought – as if he takes his 
reader on a journey – rather than directly stating his view. The chief advocate of such a 
reading is Baier (1991).116 Dialectical readings highlight the way in which philosophical 
reflection can move us from a false philosophical position to a true philosophical position (as 
Hume explicitly does at T 1.4.3.9 (SBN 222–23)). According to the dialectical approach to 
T 1.4.7, Hume shows us how we can be tempted towards a false philosophical outlook, but 
then reveals its erroneousness. By doing so, Hume reveals the need for an alternative, true 
philosophy. Ainslie maintains that his reading solves the integration problem, that is, the 
challenge of integrating Hume’s sceptical moments into his philosophy as a whole (described 
more fully in Section 4.1.2 above). There is a difference between the false philosophical 
position that reaches an entirely negative epistemic outlook on human reasoning, and the true 
philosophical position that avoids such a conclusion. 
Ainslie’s philosophical interpretation sees Hume as showing in T 1.4.7 that we are not 
normally in a position in which we are aware of the imagination’s associative mechanisms 
and how they are responsible for our beliefs. For Ainslie, this is precisely why sceptical 
worries are impermanent. When we dine and play backgammon, we no longer cognise our 
                                               
116 Ainslie (2015, 235) also briefly alludes to Morris (2000) as one who offers ideas suggestive of a dialectical 
interpretation. 
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perceptions as such (see T 1.4.7.9; SBN 269). The false philosopher thinks that we must find 
an answer to sceptical worries, or else reject our beliefs altogether. The true philosopher, by 
contrast, falls back on “indolence and pleasure” (T 1.4.7.10; SBN 270). Ainslie’s approach 
would allow that when Hume expresses his sceptical predicament, he is adopting the non-
natural position in which we superintend over our beliefs. Correspondingly, the return to a 
belief in “both an external and internal world” (at T 1.4.2.57) would represent this rejection of 
a false model of the mind.  
Ainslie concedes that, for Hume, the sceptical doubts of T 1.4.7.3–7 express 
unanswerable but still legitimate philosophical questions (2015, 240). Ainslie maintains, 
though, that the unanswerability of these questions is a problem for philosophy, not ordinary 
life (ibid.). My view is similar to Ainslie’s, insofar as I agree that Hume thinks it is 
impossible to repudiate all belief and that he continues to pursue philosophy after his 
sceptical crisis. I reject, however, Ainslie’s attempt to minimise the significance of scepticism 
for Hume’s final, considered outlook. 
I proceed as follows in the remainder of this sub-section. Firstly, I show that there are 
substantial textual limitations to using the vulgar/true/false philosophy distinction to read 
T 1.4.7. Secondly, I explain how what Ainslie calls “the integration problem” is not a 
problem that applies to some particular interpretations of Hume’s scepticism; on the contrary, 
since Hume concedes the triumph of scepticism, some version of the integration problem can 
always be raised against him. 
There is a substantial lack of textual evidence for Hume appealing to something like 
the vulgar/true/false philosophy distinction in T 1.4.7. There are two usages of the word 
“false” in T 1.4.7: in the despairing response to the dangerous dilemma at T 1.4.7.7 
(SBN 268) (“We have … no choice left but betwixt a false reason, and none at all”) and when 
Hume is contrasting philosophy with superstition at T 1.4.7.13 (SBN 272) (he says that even 
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when philosophy is “false and extravagant” it does not disturb our ordinary lives, but 
superstition does). There are no usages of the word “vulgar” in this section, even though, as I 
have shown in the previous chapter, the vulgar opinion in D&C existence features as part of 
Hume’s sceptical predicament in T 1.4.7.3–4. At T 1.4.7.14, Hume does indeed describe the 
true sceptic: 
 
The conduct of a man, who studies philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly 
sceptical than that of one, who feeling in himself an inclination to it, is yet so 
overwhelm’d with doubts and scruples, as totally to reject it. A true sceptic will be 
diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical convictions; and 
will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either 
of them. 
(T 1.4.7.14; SBN 273) 
 
The references to “truly sceptical” conduct and to a “true sceptic” who is diffident 
(apprehensive, or wary) of his or her sceptical doubts suggest that there is an authentic 
version of scepticism that emerges from T 1.4.7. The context indicates that Hume himself 
identifies with such a sceptic, so we cannot reject Ainslie’s approach by saying that Hume is 
describing a view that he does not endorse. At T 1.4.7.10–15, Hume recommends a return to 
philosophy with new, avowedly sceptical principles, and at T 1.4.7.11 he reveals how central 
scepticism is to his overall philosophical program. The natural implication is that, by 
describing the true sceptical attitude, Hume is describing the “proper” way of conducting 
philosophy that he endorses as he makes his return from sceptical despair (T 1.4.7.15; 
SBN 273). 
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We can perceive the substantial limitations to using the vulgar/true/false philosophy 
distinction to read T 1.4.7 by realising that there is a mismatch between the problems that 
Hume presents in T 1.4.7 and T 1.4.3.9 (which is the paragraph in which Hume actually 
draws the distinction). At T 1.4.3.9, Hume describes the true and false philosophical positions 
as responses to the vulgar supposition of causal realism.117 At the point in question in T 1.4.3, 
Hume is discussing “occult qualities”, which are invisible and unsensed causal powers 
(T 1.4.3.8; SBN 222. Original emphasis). Hume says that these powers are posited by a false 
philosophical position, but are rejected by a true philosophical position.118 Ainslie thinks that 
Hume presenting a movement from false philosophy to true philosophy in T 1.4.3 is the best 
corroborating evidence for the dialectical reading of T 1.4.7 (2015, 234). However, the 
resemblance between T 1.4.7 and T 1.4.3.9 is highly superficial. The type of difficulty 
encountered by realising the falsity of the vulgar supposition of causal realism is different in 
kind to the epistemological worries that trouble Hume in T 1.4.7. In both T 1.4.7 and 
T 1.4.3.9, Hume describes a return to “indolence”, but I claim that the indolence that we 
should understand to be present in T 1.4.7 is different to the indolence of the true philosopher 
in T 1.4.3.9.  
To give the original passage full context, in T 1.4.3.9 Hume says that the belief in 
substance is related to the belief in “occult qualities” (original emphasis). He then details 
three positions. The vulgar mistakenly believe that they are unproblematically and directly 
aware of causal powers in their experiences of events. For Hume, this mistaken belief is a 
result of the mere custom of anticipating an effect upon experience of its cause. Both the true 
and false philosophers recognise that there are no direct experiences of causal powers. The 
false philosophers, however, desire there to be more to causation than the mind developing a 
                                               
117 Causal realism in this context refers to the existence of robust causal connections or what Blackburn 
(2007/1990) calls “thick” causal connections (that is, causation that goes above mere regularity). See also 
T 1.3.2.9–11; SBN 76–77; T 1.3.14.3–6; SBN 156–58; EHU 7.3–5; SBN 62–63. 
118 Specifically, the true philosopher holds that such powers are inconceivable. 
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customary inference between items that are frequently conjoined in experience. We may refer 
to T 1.4.7.5 to gain a fuller understanding of such a desire: Hume says that disappointment 
results when we discover that the “ultimate principle” in cases of cause and effect does not 
reside directly in objects at all (T 1.4.7.5; SBN 266). The false philosopher tries to satisfy him 
or herself by positing secret, invisible powers, but, according to Hume, we have no positive 
idea of such things and no reason to believe in them. The true philosopher, by contrast, draws 
a “just conclusion” from the realisation that the vulgar are in error, which is simply that we 
lack any idea of causal powers in objects (T 1.4.3.9; SBN 223). Hume says that the true 
philosopher “returns to” a similar position to the vulgar, since neither are troubled about the 
question of causal connections between objects: the true philosopher “[regards] all these 
disquisitions with indolence and indifference” (ibid.).119  
The true and false philosophers are united by their realisation of the misplaced naïvety 
of the vulgar. However, the problem in T 1.4.3.9 is not analogous to the problem in T 1.4.7. 
The naïve vulgar view in T 1.4.3.9 is that we can directly perceive causal powers. This is 
swiftly resolved in the space of one paragraph, and Hume endorses the position of the true 
philosopher by calling the rejection of any clear idea of causal power a “just” conclusion. The 
various sceptical problems recounted in T 1.4.7, by contrast, offer sweeping, negative 
epistemic assessments of the products of the imagination. Although Hume does not identify 
any “vulgar” position in T 1.4.7, the most plausible candidate for a position that both true and 
false philosophers reject would be naïve confidence in the veracity of human psychological 
faculties. On Ainslie’s view, the false philosopher is supposed to represent the radical sceptic. 
A similarity between T 1.4.3.9 and T 1.4.7 is that Hume is content to regard disquisitions 
                                               
119 In the context of T 1.4.3, the disquisitions concern questions about causal realism. Concerning causal realism, 
the vulgar naïvely imagine there are powers, the false philosophers posit occult qualities, and the true 
philosophers deny causal realism. The true and false philosophers share the rejection of naïve causal realism, but 
the true philosophers have “return’d” to situation of the vulgar because they are not fazed by the lack of 
discernible powers in objects. 
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about causal realism in T 1.4.3.9 with “indolence” and he describes his return to philosophy 
in T 1.4.7 as the result of “indolence and pleasure” (T 1.4.7.10; SBN 269). However, Hume 
does not dismiss the radical sceptic in T 1.4.7 in the same way that he dismisses the false 
philosopher and the theory of occult qualities in T 1.4.3.9. On the contrary, Hume holds that 
philosophy should become sceptical in virtue of the insolubility of the epistemological 
problems that he encounters in his sceptical crisis. 
At T 1.4.7.5, Hume expresses the disappointment that is attached to the falsity of 
causal realism. But the problem of T 1.4.7.5 has to do with the negative epistemological 
implications of the conclusion of the true philosophy that is endorsed in T 1.4.3.9. At 
T 1.4.7.4, Hume cites the conflict between causal reasoning and the belief in the D&C 
existence (T 1.4.7.4; SBN 265–66). Hume begins T 1.4.7.5 by saying the conflict would be 
excusable if there were “solidity and satisfaction in the other parts of our reasoning” 
(T 1.4.7.5; SBN 266). Hume then goes on to reiterate how such satisfaction cannot be found. 
Our search for ultimate causal principles is simply thwarted when we arrive at the conclusion 
that we do not even have a clear idea of a causal power that could belong to an object (the 
very conclusion that Hume had called “just” in T 1.4.3.9). Hume, therefore, compounds the 
disappointment attached to our inability to discover ultimate causal principles on top of the 
previous worries raised in T 1.4.7 in order to draw a negative, epistemological result about 
the faculty of imagination. So, we may characterise the true philosopher in T 1.4.3.9 as one 
who does not pursue the search for what is not there, but, in T 1.4.7, Hume’s finds himself 
disillusioned with the true philosopher’s position.  
It may be insisted that the upshot of Ainslie’s reading is that he offers a satisfactory 
response to the integration problem. Ainslie rejects sceptical readings of T 1.4.7 because, he 
claims, any version of such a reading will fail to solve this problem. Ainslie says (in the 
context of criticising Broughton’s (2004) reading, in particular): “[if] Hume is committed to 
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the negative verdicts about his beliefs … [then] no amount of irony or detachment will avoid 
the integration problem” (2015, 228). For Ainslie, it will not work to say that Hume pursues 
philosophy but remains detached from his results because of his abiding scepticism. He 
thinks that Hume cannot seriously accept the negative assessments expressed in his sceptical 
crisis without compromising the integrity of his project.  
Recall that the integration problem (in the context of the Treatise) encompasses the 
following issues: that Hume is not entitled to continue philosophising given his response to 
scepticism; that Hume is not entitled to not abandon the results already established in Book 
One of the Treatise; and that Hume does not refer to the sceptical worries of T 1.4.7 or his 
response to them again in Books Two and Three of the Treatise. Ainslie claims that these are 
problems that emerge for the sceptical reading of T 1.4.7 specifically, since, according to 
such readings, Hume finds no way to dismiss the insolubility of sceptical problems.120 My 
response to the charge that the residually sceptical reading fails to solve the integration 
problem is that this reading captures Hume’s own response to scepticism, as expressed at 
T 1.4.7 and EHU 12. In both texts, Hume describes his vision for an experimental approach to 
philosophy (which, as I have emphasised, he takes to be an outcome of his confrontation with 
scepticism). As argued in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2 above, when Hume responds to scepticism, 
he provides a rationale for rejecting Pyrrhonism (which is to say, he provides a rationale for 
rejecting the abandonment of belief as a response to sceptical problems). Hume thinks it is 
not even possible to abandon belief in the way that Pyrrhonists claim we must (T 1.4.7.9–10; 
SBN 269–70; EHU 12.23; SBN 159–60). He adds that philosophy brings psychological 
pleasure with it and that it has practical utility (T 1.4.7.10–11; SBN 269–70; EHU 12.24; 
SBN 161). In the Treatise, Hume also says that it is inevitable that we will wonder about 
                                               
120 Ainslie acknowledges that he is burdened with addressing the integration problem because he wants to 
acknowledge that the sceptical reading gets something right about T 1.4.7 (as indeed do the naturalist and 
dialectical readings for him) (2015, 237). Ainslie thinks any reading of T 1.4.7 ought not diminish the place of 
Hume’s sceptical doubts too much. 
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answers to philosophical questions (T 1.4.7.12; SBN 270–71) and that we might as well 
pursue philosophy instead of superstition (T 1.4.7.13; SBN 271–72). In the Enquiry, Hume 
offers an explication of two species of mitigated scepticism (EHU 12.24–26; SBN 161–63) 
and a lengthier and more substantial description of philosophical methodology than he offers 
in the Treatise (EHU 12.27–34; SBN 163–65). We may find Hume’s attempt to legitimate his 
continuation of philosophy unsatisfactory. I think, however, that this should be considered a 
criticism of Hume’s philosophy, rather than a point against the correct interpretation of his 
philosophy. I maintain that we ought not appeal to a parallel to T 1.4.3.9 in T 1.4.7 since such 
a reading is not textually supported. 
To understand the issue at hand, we may consider residual scepticism as applied to 
causal, inductive reasoning. Hume provides a psychological account of causal belief 
formation that makes custom the determining principle. The worry expressed at T 1.4.7.3 and 
EHU 12.22 is that custom is all there is to causal belief formation, even in cases in which we 
would normally take our causal beliefs to be in accordance with rational rules, such as those 
provided at T 1.3.15. In both the Treatise and Enquiry, Hume alludes to the worry that future 
connections between objects might not resemble our past experiences of connections between 
objects.121 So, for Hume, the fact that our inductive beliefs are determined by custom provides 
the sceptic with fuel for an unanswerable challenge. In this way, sceptical doubt about 
induction remains part of Hume’s final, considered position, even as he continues to engage 
in such reasoning, and this engenders the question of the integration of Hume’s scepticism 
within his wider project. I hold that if questions persist about Hume’s position, they should be 
considered as engendering problems for Hume’s philosophy rather than as a problem for my 
                                               
121 In the Treatise, Hume says: “Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of 
objects for the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future […]” 
(T 1.4.7.3; SBN 265). In the Enquiry, Hume says: “… [the sceptic] insists … [that] we have no argument to 
convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other 
circumstances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a 
certain instinct of our nature …” (EHU 12.22; SBN 159). 
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interpretation of Hume. Some version of the integration problem will always remain for the 
residually sceptical reading of Hume’s philosophy, but any reading that rejects residual 
scepticism will fail to account for some part of the text.  
With regard to Hume’s sceptical predicament, the integration problem can be stated as 
follows: if Hume thinks that the vulgar belief is false and that we cannot justify a belief in 
D&C non-perceptions, then why does this not undermine philosophy altogether? Hume, of 
course, does not explicitly address his sceptical predicament in his response to his sceptical 
crisis, but he does explain his return to philosophy in terms of the pleasure that it brings and 
the practical utility it has over superstition and abstruse metaphysics. The understanding of 
Hume’s return to philosophy, in relation to opinions of external objects, that emerges from 
the text is as follows: as a matter of psychology, we fall back on believing the vulgar opinion, 
but we remain aware of the problems with that opinion, and with the intuitive attempt to 
remedy it, and so we should be inspired to a position of moderate scepticism as a result. 
Again, Hume’s response might be considered unsatisfying, but I maintain that the residually 
sceptical interpretation captures Hume’s philosophical outlook and makes more sense of the 
text than the alternatives. The integration problem is not a problem for the sceptical reading 
of Hume’s philosophy specifically, but it is an issue that applies to Hume’s philosophy that 
emerges from his response to scepticism. 
At this stage, we may also consider a point about philosophical scepticism that is 
relevant to the issue at hand. Most philosophers do not ever engage with radical scepticism as 
deeply as Hume does. Hume offers a novel philosophical system and on top of it he confronts 
radical sceptical doubts. Most of the time, we do not see it as a fault of a philosopher if he or 
she does not solve radical sceptical challenges, but since Hume chooses to deal with it, we 
always have the option of reading his response as unsatisfactory, in the same way that we 
might think that any other philosophical response to scepticism is unsatisfactory. Overall, I 
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hold that Ainslie and others may always insist that there is an unsolved problem deriving 
from Hume’s response to scepticism but that this does not represent a defect of sceptical 
interpretations of Hume’s philosophy. 
 
5.3.2 Scepticism’s Reflexivity? 
Even if we do not interpret Hume as endorsing true philosophy in opposition to false 
philosophy in T 1.4.7, the reference to the “true sceptic” who is “diffident of his philosophical 
doubts, as well as of his philosophical convictions” at T 1.4.7.14 (SBN 273) could still 
influence how we understand Hume’s final position. By endorsing the position of the “true 
sceptic”, Hume could be saying that authentic scepticism should entail suspicion of the 
considerations that lead us towards negative, sceptical evaluations. To illustrate: sceptical 
doubts about the vulgar and philosophical systems arise from causal reasoning, but causal 
reasoning itself comes into question in Hume’s sceptical crisis (at T 1.4.7.3 (SBN 265) and 
EHU 12.22 (SBN 159)). If Hume refrained from endorsing the falsity of the vulgar opinion or 
the non-justification of the philosophical system, he would no longer have any rationale for 
his sceptical predicament concerning objects.  
Garrett (1997) has offered up an interpretation of T 1.4.7.14 on which Hume exploits 
the reflexivity of scepticism. I do not intend to reduce Garrett’s reading of Hume’s response 
to his sceptical crisis to what he says about T 1.4.7.14, but I focus on what he says about this 
for present purposes.122 Garrett perceives the challenge as being how the title principle 
(“Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to”; 
T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270) can stand up given that Hume’s sceptical worries are not rationally 
defeated. Even if such worries do not lead to the extermination of belief, they still reveal the 
                                               
122 Ainslie also appeals to the reflexivity of scepticism as part of the justification for the extenuation of sceptical 
problems (2015, 243–46). I focus on Garrett (1997) in this sub-section because he directly cites the reference to 
the “true sceptic” at T 1.4.7.14 as justification for this point. Ainslie, as we have seen, has a wider, more 
idiosyncratic take on Hume’s “true” scepticism. 
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infirmity and imperfection of human reason (1997, 235–36). According to Garrett, the fact 
that “human reason judges itself to be imperfect” ought to give us “a basis to doubt” whether 
we should cast suspicion over the products of the imagination (1997, 236). Garrett explicitly 
mentions that we should consider “whether the mechanism by which we acquire belief in 
continued and distinct existence is not, after all, a veridical one” (ibid.). 
Ultimately, however, it will not work to say that Hume forsakes his commitment to 
the falsity of the vulgar belief. Hume does not reject, but moderates sceptical doubts. As was 
established in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2, Hume uses his encounter with scepticism to motivate 
his philosophical attitudes. Such a move would not be available to Hume if he summarily 
dismissed sceptical doubts because of their reflexivity. Hume certainly does not reject 
philosophy after his sceptical crisis, but his attitude remains avowedly sceptical. The 
challenge is to account for this balance, but to suggest that Hume dissolves his sceptical 
predicament by appealing to the reflexivity of scepticism would be to read Hume as having 
an ace up his sleeve that he brings out only in the penultimate paragraph of T 1.4.7. 
We can understand the purpose Hume has in mind when referring to diffidence 
towards “sceptical doubt” if we pay careful attention to the context. At the start of T 1.4.7.14, 
Hume explicates his vision for philosophy, whereby philosophical theorising does not stray 
far from the bounds of ordinary life. In the middle of the paragraph, he expresses the point 
that his experimental approach will make slow progress, but will produce results that will be 
“satisfactory to the human mind” (T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272). When Hume says, “The conduct of 
a man, who studies philosophy in this careless manner” he is alluding to the manner 
described whereby one is not despondent as a result of not being able to solve sceptical 
problems (ibid.). In the very last sentence, where Hume describes the diffidence of the true 
sceptic, he says “[a true sceptic] will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers 
itself, upon account of either of them” (ibid.). The phrase “either of them” refers to 
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philosophical doubts and convictions. So, the sentence that refers to the diffidence of the true 
sceptic reaffirms Hume’s point about not abandoning investigation as a response to 
scepticism. Thus, the sentence is a reiteration of Hume’s point that scepticism does not 
require one to jettison philosophical pursuits altogether. In other words, Hume’s view is that 
we should be diffident of our philosophical doubts insofar as we do not overstate their 
potential implications. This coheres perfectly well with using those sceptical doubts to 
motivate a position of mitigated response. 
I have observed that a sceptic about the imagination should be consistently sceptical 
about all of the imagination. Hume is a sceptic about all of the products of the imagination, 
but he thinks that this scepticism should inspire us to adopt a new outlook on philosophy. 
Within the context of philosophy, Hume distinguishes some beliefs as better and others as 
worse, and the ones that he says are better are those built on experimental reasoning. As I 
argued in Section 2.3, Hume’s basis for holding the falsity of the vulgar belief is based on 
such reasoning (and his basis for holding the non-justification of the philosophical system is 
similarly based on such reasoning, as argued in Section 3.3 above). Overall, Hume does not 
think that his scepticism requires him to make no distinctions between different methods of 
belief formation, and so the suggestion that he solves his sceptical predicament by 
repudiating the causal reasoning that drives it is spurious. 
 
5.4 Hume’s Inconsistency: The ‘No-single Hume’ Interpretation 
Hume sometimes treats the distinction between external objects and perceptions as 
unproblematic, but at other times he castigates such a distinction for its absurdity (as at the 
end of T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188) and employs the language of a strict phenomenalist (e.g. 
“properly speaking, ’tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, 
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but certain impressions, which enter by the senses” (T 1.4.2.9; SBN 191)).123 While Hume 
declares early on in the Treatise that he will suspend belief on what the causes of our 
impressions might be (T 1.1.2.1; SBN 7–8; T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84), he does not foreground this 
important point and he slips into the tendency of suggesting that the relevant “objects” that 
we might encounter in space and time, or that might enjoy causal relations, are objects 
specifically different from perceptions.124 Back in Section 1.1.1, I suggested that we could 
make sense of Hume being a sceptic about non-perceptions and contrasting internal 
perceptions with external objects by realising that the vulgar themselves make a distinction 
between the internal and external. With this in mind, we could say that Hume himself 
contrasts internal and external entities without cognising his perceptions as such because this 
is precisely what the vulgar do. In this sub-section, I object to the usefulness of distinguishing 
between Hume the common-man and Hume the philosopher. Making such a distinction is 
tempting precisely because it would allow us to say that Hume uses phenomenalist language 
in virtue of adopting a sceptical attitude towards non-perceptions, and that since he does not 
sustain such scepticism he does not consistently employ such language. 
Hakkarainen (2012a; 2012b) defines a “no-single Hume” interpretation of Hume’s 
account of objects as any, “according to which more than one position ought to be attributed 
to [Hume’s] thinking in some respect” (2012a, 285). Hakkarainen’s particular version of a 
no-single Hume interpretation posits two domains in which Hume expresses different views. 
For Hakkarainen, Realism is the position that, “there are ontologically and causally (human) 
perception-independent, continued and absolutely external entities” (2012a, 284).125 These 
                                               
123 See also T 1.2.6.7–8; SBN 67; EHU 12.9–12; SBN 152–53). 
124 Notable instances are T 1.2.3.2; SBN 33; T 1.2.3.7; SBN 35; T 1.2.5.9; SBN 57; T 1.2.5.24; SBN 63; 
T 1.3.2.2; SBN 73–74; T 1.3.3.5; SBN 80–81; EHU 1.13; SBN 13; EHU 2.7; SBN 20; EHU 4.7; SBN 28; 
EHU 4.9; SBN 29; EHU 4.13; SBN 31–32). See also Grene’s (1994, 177, n. 4) catalogue of references to 
external, mind-independent existences in the Treatise. 
125 Hakkarainen follows Michael J. Loux’s (2002) usage of “Realism” and “Real”. 
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objects that are independent of human perception may be either what I have identified as 
objects specifically different from perceptions or D&C perceptions themselves  
(see 2012a, 284, n. 3).126 Hakkarainen takes Hume to believe in Realism in the domain of 
common life and to hold that one ought to suspend belief about it in the domain of 
philosophy. This philosophy/common life distinction corresponds to different standards of 
justification for Hakkarainen (2012a, 303). In the domain of common life, Hume does not 
consider whether or not there are reasons for suspending the belief in Realism (he still does 
not actively consider it justified, but he finds no reason to repudiate it).127 Hakkarainen’s 
motivation for thinking that Hume cannot simply always suspend judgement on the matter is 
that there is ample textual evidence that Hume took the belief in Realism to be 
psychologically irresistible (Hakkarainen calls Hume’s various statements of such 
irresistibility the “involuntariness passages” (2012a, 289. Original emphasis)). Hakkarainen 
contends that reading Hume as drawing a distinction between philosophy and common life is 
more textually supported than a distinction between different moods (as in Popkin (1951)), 
different perspectives (as in Fogelin (1998)), or different kinds of assent (as in Baxter (2008)) 
(2012a, 301). 
It may be thought that some no-single Hume interpretation best characterises Hume’s 
philosophy because Hume sometimes analyses objects strictly in terms of perceptions but 
other times does not. However, the no-single Hume interpretation omits what I see as a vital 
element for understanding Hume’s account of objects, which is that Hume’s philosophy of 
objects involves a sceptical development. It is not merely that Hume adopts a position in one 
domain (or mood or perspective) and goes in and out of it. Hume is still aware of the 
                                               
126 Hakkarainen (2012b, 146) contends that this understanding of Realism is consonant with Hume’s own usage 
of the world “real”: Hakkarainen cites Hume’s apparent usages of “real” at T 1.4.2.9–10 (SBN 190–91), 
T 1.4.2.20 (SBN 195–97), T 1.4.2.24 (SBN 199) and T 1.4.4.5 (SBN 227). Hakkarainen also contends that his 
understanding of ‘Realism’ corresponds to Hume’s definition of body at T 1.4.2.1–2 (SBN 187–88) corresponds 
to the Humean definition of “body” at the start of T 1.4.2.  
127 I am grateful to Jani Hakkarainen for clarifying this to me in response to a question. 
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sceptical result that he reached concerning opinions of external existence even after the 
despair of his sceptical crisis, and he uses this to motivate his moderate sceptical position. 
Hakkarainen explains Hume’s seeming inconsistency by saying that in the domain of 
philosophy Hume subjects even his natural beliefs to scrutiny, and that once he does so he 
realises that he must disavow all and any belief in D&C existence.128 This is an acute 
observation insofar as Hume does indeed criticise opinions of D&C existence only once he 
enters a philosophical investigation into the nature of perceptual experience (I characterised 
this as reflecting on the nature of perceptual experience in Section 2.4.1). However, 
Hakkarainen’s position misrenders the situation because, even in the context of philosophy, 
we do not forsake all belief in D&C existences. Hume is very clear that we are led to the 
philosophical system precisely because we cannot jettison the vulgar belief even once we 
realise that it is false. He says that those who pretend to reject all belief in D&C existence 
when confronted with the falsity of the vulgar opinion are merely “a few extravagant 
sceptics; who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring 
themselves sincerely to believe it” (T 1.4.2.50; SBN 214). 
Boehm (2013) also raises a relevant criticism that can be applied to Hakkarainen’s 
domain distinction. Boehm criticises the tendency to simply read Hume as adopting a 
phenomenalist position on objects only in the context of philosophical theorising  
(2013, 210–11). Boehm identifies that Hume uses the realist-sounding language when he is 
philosophising in Parts 1–3 of Book One of the Treatise. There is not a clear-cut distinction 
between the theorising that Hume does in those sections of his text and what he does in 
T 1.4.2 and the end of T 1.2.6 when he uses more phenomenalist-sounding talk. I have said 
that Hume engages in a specific kind of reflection, namely, on the nature of perceptual 
                                               
128 It is unique to Hakkarainen’s reading that Hume suspends judgement about D&C existences in virtue of the 
second objection against the evidence of sense in EHU 12 (recall Section 3.4.2). 
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experience. This means that Hume engages in phenomenalist-sounding language in some 
philosophical contexts and not others, which means that the distinction between philosophy 
tout court and common life is not apt. So, although Hume engages in a particular 
investigation when he examines opinions of D&C existence at T 1.4.2 and EHU 12, it is not 
accurate to say that he disavows the vulgar belief whenever he is engaged in philosophy. 
At this point, we may also consider some wider limitations of simply taking Hume to 
be inconsistent. Hakkarainen thinks that the no-single Hume reading has the advantage that it 
does not attribute a contradiction to Hume (2012a, 298). However, while a ‘no-single Hume’ 
reading might explain why Hume says different things at different times, or in different 
domains, a separate question needs to be asked of what justifies this. To illustrate, I will 
consider what Hakkarainen says about Popkin’s (1951) reading. Hakkarainen characterises 
Popkin’s reading of Hume as making him a “consistent Pyrrhonian” (2012a, 298). Popkin 
reads Hume as suspending all beliefs except for those which nature compels him to hold; the 
Pyrrhonists suspend belief in this matter too, but the difference is that Hume was more 
realistic about how many beliefs we will be left with (see Popkin 1951, 403–05). Popkin’s 
reading falls within the category of ‘no-single Hume’ interpretations because Hume believes 
different things at different times, depending on whether Hume is in a mood in which 
“[sceptical] difficulties overcome him” or in which the “necessities” of nature prevail 
(1951, 407). Hakkarainen accepts that Popkin’s Hume successfully avoids contradiction in 
the same way that the Pyrrhonists themselves do, and so he offers a different line of 
objection: 
 
Another circumstance with respect to which Hume is also a consistent Pyrrhonist is 
that since he does not suspend judgement and believe at the same time, but only 
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during different periods of time, he is not subject to any contradiction. The problem 
with Popkin’s reading is that it is trivial or too simplistic. 
(Hakkarainen 2012a, 298) 
 
According to Hakkarainen, to suggest that Hume has different moods in which different 
philosophical outlooks prevail is too coarse-grained. Hakkarainen goes on to highlight the 
way in which Hume allows for rational reflection, which would be precluded if Hume only 
passively accepted the products of nature (Hakkarainen cites EHU 10.4; SBN 110–11; EHU 
12.25; SBN 162). Hakkarainen accepts that Popkin’s reading at least salvages Hume from 
flagrant inconsistency. However, Hume’s situation would still be problematic if he sometimes 
rejects the belief in Real entities in virtue of some reasons, but at other times ignores those 
reasons. Obviously, it would be good to explain why Hume’s beliefs change at different 
times, and indeed, Hakkarainen is aware that he needs to provide a rationale for positing 
different domains of belief for Hume and that he has to indicate what prompts Hume to move 
in and out of them. But the problem still remains, namely, that Hume ignores what he 
believes in the domain of philosophy when he is in the domain of common life.  
According to my interpretation, Hume does not take it as a requirement that he should 
suspend belief about all D&C existences, even in the domain of philosophy. In contrast to 
Hakkarainen, I hold that Hume does not think he can suspend the vulgar belief even in the 
domain of philosophy. Hume is aware that the vulgar belief is false, but when he uses the 
sceptical predicament to motivate his moderate scepticism, he does not ignore the fact that he 
will go on to adopt the vulgar belief. Hume accepts that the vulgar belief is false and cannot 
be improved upon. This is one of several sceptical considerations that serves as a reminder to 
be more cautious and reserved when nature inevitably leads him back to philosophy.  
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5.5 Overall Conclusion 
In the Treatise and Enquiry, Hume only discusses the topic of external objects at length under 
the heading of scepticism. Accordingly, Hume’s theory of objects cannot be grasped or fully 
appreciated without reference to his sceptical attitudes. Both the Treatise and Enquiry express 
sceptical predicaments pertaining to opinions of external existence. The predicament arises 
because the natural, vulgar belief is found to be false, but the intuitive response, which is to 
posit the double existence of perceptions and objects, is psychologically weak and entirely 
unjustified. In T 1.4.7 and EHU 12, Hume cites this predicament as an example of a serious 
sceptical problem. Together with a number of other sceptical problems, Hume is driven by 
the predicament to a sceptical reassessment of philosophy as a whole. After this 
reassessment, Hume decides to continue philosophising, but he keeps sceptical doubts close 
at hand.  
Given that the insolubility of the predicament inspires his residual scepticism, the 
predicament is an integral component of Hume’s epistemology. In this chapter, I have 
discussed various ways in which the essential elements of Hume’s predicament might be 
modified. Ainslie (2015) has attempted to explain that the vulgar opinion is not ultimately 
flawed because it involves only a constitutive error about the bare image content of 
perceptions, and not an epistemic error about an item that is actively cognised as a 
perception; other scholars have looked for an explanatory justification of the philosophical 
system (Magoula Adamos 2014; Kail 2010/2007) or the vulgar belief (Schnall 2004) on 
Hume’s behalf. My prime objection to these proposals has been that Hume continues to 
consider the sceptical predicament a problem after his sceptical crisis. In opposition to Loeb 
(2002), I have maintained that the essential elements of Hume’s metaphysics would have to 
be contradicted for him to reject his rationale for the predicament. Ultimately, Hume does not 
give up his metaphysics of perception: he analyses objects in terms of perceptions because he 
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is an experimental philosopher and he takes perceptions to be the objects of experience. 
Rather than rejecting the sceptical position he arrives at, he utilises it to motivate his vision 
for philosophy in general. In this chapter, I have also argued against Hakkarainen’s (2012a; 
2012b) proposal according to which we should think of Hume as holding different attitudes 
towards external existence in different domains of inquiry. Essentially, such a proposal is not 
as rich as the dialectic of a sceptical predicament that features in a sceptical crisis. Hume 
takes troubling sceptical questions seriously, even as he desires to establish a positive, 
experimental science of human nature. He does not forsake or forget about sceptical doubts, 
but moderates them. Hume’s engagement with scepticism represents an original and 
insightful attempt to understand how far we can pursue intellectual enterprises in the face of 
sceptical doubt. 
If we extenuate Hume’s sceptical predicament, we threaten to undermine the 
functional role that it has in motivating Hume’s residual scepticism. I have argued that the 
residually sceptical reading of Hume’s philosophy best accounts for the textual evidence. It 
makes sense both of Hume’s expressions of sceptical doubts (at T 1.4.7.1–8 and EHU 12.6–
22) and his avowedly sceptical return to philosophy (at T 1.4.7.9–15 and EHU 12.23–34). 
Hume offers his analysis of external existence in the context of a science of the 
human person, in which he pays attention to our actual attitudes and beliefs. For Hume, we 
derive a belief in D&C existence from the constancy and coherence of resembling but 
numerically different perceptions. Hume’s sceptical crisis is driven, in part, by the fact that 
what we actually believe is strictly false and our intuitive attempt to remedy it cannot be 
justified or permanently believed. Hume does not dogmatically affirm a perception-only 
ontology: Hume’s scepticism about double existence reveals that he officially adopts 
suspension of belief when pressed on the question of what there is beyond perception. Since 
the vulgar belief is natural and compulsive, Hume thinks that we do not ordinarily wonder 
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about non-perceptions at all. So Hume himself believes there are D&C existences, just like 
everyone else who relapses to the vulgar position. The analysis offered here of Hume’s 
sceptical predicament explains the relevance of this relapsing, and the relevance of Hume’s 
awareness of scepticism about opinions of external existence, for his wider philosophical 
outlook. 
Hume is a sceptic about external existence. We have to understand this scepticism 
with reference to his sceptical predicament, and we have to understand that this predicament 
features in a more general sceptical crisis. Hume is a sceptic about objects specifically 
different from perceptions, but his verdict on the psychological weakness of the philosophical 
system is as important as his negative epistemic assessment of it. This is one aspect of 
Hume’s sceptical predicament. The other is the problem of the vulgar belief: it is false, but 
psychologically irresistible. The predicament is the result of our failed to improve on this 
belief. In this way, Hume’s philosophy of external existence is not only sceptical, but is a 
manifestation of a raw struggle with scepticism. Hume’s philosophy of external objects is a 
case study in taking seriously sceptical doubts that pertain to a significant, continuing 
philosophical issue.  
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